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Abstract 
 
The focus of the thesis is the agency of women in communication with the Soviet 
authorities from 1924 until 1941. Its primary goal is to deduce from the language and 
content of their letters how women fashioned their public identities in dialogue with the 
utopian ideal of the ‘New Soviet Woman’ in the 1920s and 1930s. These ‘public letters’ 
are primarily drawn from the caches of letters sent from citizens to Soviet officials, 
organs and publications, which were read, catalogues, and archived, but never 
published at the time. In these letters, women often adopted and reproduced ‘Bolshevik 
language’, carefully crafting their roles as workers, peasants, revolutionaries, Soviet 
mothers and daughters in an ongoing process of negotiation with Soviet power. They 
crafted these narratives creatively, infusing them with their own perspectives and 
experiences. 
Although the October Revolution ostensibly ‘emancipated’ women from the oppression 
they suffered under tsarism, they remained objects of suspicion for Soviet policymakers 
and theorists, not least because of their reproductive capacities and traditional roles in 
the home. While older generations of women presented a ‘risk’ to the regime’s success 
because of their experiences before the Revolution, younger women were no less 
threatening, due to their involvement in child-bearing and child-raising. Women of all 
generations were expected to ‘work on themselves’ and to strive to meet the ideological 
expectations of the New Soviet Women. Old and young were able to mitigate the risks of 
their generational identities by prudently reproducing the Bolshevik script, even as they 
advanced their own agendas and needs.  
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Exploring themes of emotions, rights and relationships, the thesis argues that women 
created space for themselves and their lives within the ideological framework of the 
Soviet project. Though the exercise of this agency was at times in conflict with state 
discourse or policy, it should not be confused with dissent, but understood as means of 
engagement with the Soviet utopian project on their own terms. 
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Key Figures, Glossary, and Abbreviations. 
 
baba/babka old peasant women. Derivative of babushka, 
(grandmother)– usually pejorative 
byt’      daily life, existence 
d.      delo, an archival file (pl./g. dela) 
f.      fond, an archival ‘fund’, or collection  
GARF      State Archive of the Russian Federation 
Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich Chairman of the Central Executive Committee 
of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
Komsomol     Communist Union of Young People 
Krasniy bibliotekar’ Red Librarian, trade magazine for library 
workers 
krest’ianin     peasant (male) 
krest’ianka     peasant (female) 
Krest’ianka     a women’s journal aimed at the peasantry 
Krupskaia, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Deputy Minister of Education, 1929-1939 
kolkhoz     collective farm 
Krokodil a satirical magazine published in the Soviet 
Union from 1922 
l.    list, a particular page from a dela. 
likbez likvidatsiia bezgramotnosti, and abbreviation 
of the campaign for the ‘liquidation of 
illiteracy’ 
Little Octobrists a youth organisation for children between 7 
and 9 years of age 
Lunacharskii, Anatoly Vasilievich People’s Commissar for Education, 1917-
1929 
Molotov, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars, 1930-1941  
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NEP    New Economic Policy 
NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs 
(later: Ministry of Internal Affairs) 
oblast’      region 
op. opis’, the ‘inventory’ of dela on a particular 
subject within a fond 
Pioneers a youth organisation for children between 9 
and 15 years of age 
Pravda A daily newspaper and the official newspaper 
of the Communist Party 
profsoiuz     trade union 
raion      district 
rabotnik     worker (male) 
rabotnitsa     worker (female) 
Rabotnitsa     a women’s journal aimed at working women. 
RGAE      Russian State Archive of the Economy 
RGASPI Russian State Archive of Social and Political 
History 
RSFSR      Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
sovnarkom Council of People’s Commissars, responsible 
for the general administration of state affairs 
Vyshinskiii, Andrei Ianuarievich Procurator General of the RSFSR, 1931-1934, 
subsequently of the USSR, 1935-1939 
Zhenotdel Women’s department of the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee of the All-Russian 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
Russian words have been transliterated according to the Library of Congress scheme 
and, unless personal names, are italicised in the text. The exceptions to this are the 
common terms: Soviet; Moscow; Joseph Stalin; and the name Asya, which would 
otherwise appear as ‘Asia’.  
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Introduction 
 
Safronov knew that Socialism was a matter of science and so 
he spoke logically and scientifically, giving his words two 
meanings so as to firm them up – one fundamental and one 
reserve, the same as with any other material1 
Andrei Platonov, The Foundation Pit 
 
The period of socialist construction that followed the Russian Revolutions of 1917 
demanded huge upheavals to the personal and social lives of its citizens, with the aim of 
forging the new Soviet person from the pre-Revolutionary subject. The reconstruction 
of the ‘Russian’ mind, body and soul permeated early Soviet discourse and everyday life, 
demanding youthful energy, joyful Revolutionary zeal, and conscious self-mastery. 
Religion, and in particular Orthodoxy, had long constituted a cornerstone both of the 
institutions of the Russian Empire, and of Russian and Eastern European communities, 
and was marked by its respect for custom and continuity. The future was now supreme, 
and all efforts were directed to the construction of socialism, and subsequently 
communism, erasing all traces of the pre-Revolutionary past in Soviet citizens, including 
Orthodox faith. This relentless forward march was encapsulated by Stalin in 1935 with 
his now infamous statement that ‘life has become better, life has become merrier’, with 
which he declared that socialism had been achieved. Soviet discourse anticipated the 
achievement of communism in the imminent future, where the robust and enthusiastic 
new Soviet citizen would have been forged and set in steel. 
                                                          
1 A Platonov, The Foundation Pit, (c. 1930), trans. Robert Chandler, (London, 1996), p. 32. 
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However, a more complex identity belonged to the newly ‘emancipated’ and re-forged 
Soviet woman. In the wake of the Revolution she was, at least nominally, granted 
entitlement to education, wage and labour equality, and reproductive and sexual 
autonomy, all of which would allegedly alleviate her suffering, rescuing her from the 
domestic slavery endured under capitalism. The ‘bourgeois’ institution of marriage, and 
the private nuclear family which had emerged during the evolution of capitalism, would 
wither away, to be replaced by ‘free love’ and socialised childcare. Though the 
Bolsheviks argued that ‘feminism’ was a bourgeois threat to the needs of working class 
women, ideas of gender equality were presented as a goal of socialist economic 
transformation particularly by female party members – most notably Aleksandra 
Kollontai – who were now ironically known as ‘Bolshevik feminists’.2 
But, the identity of the New Soviet Woman came with certain caveats, contradictions, 
and retractions. Soviet discourse on gender equality presumed the youth and 
heterosexuality of Soviet citizens, and stopped short of completely ideologically 
rehabilitating ‘womanhood’, instead still holding men as the standard to reach. Though 
early Marxist and Marxist Leninist theorists, such as August Bebel, had criticised 
religious institutions, and the Catholic church in particular for associating woman with 
‘the flesh’, public discourse conflated gender with heterosexuality, and sex with 
maternity.3 This had the effect of either erasing or vilifying ‘older’ women, who were 
already institutionally under-represented as a social group. The older woman was 
                                                          
2 R.G. Ruthchild, Equality and Revolution: Women’s Rights in the Russian Empire, 1905-1917, (Pittsburgh, 
2010), p. 8. 
3 A. Bebel, Women in the Past, Present and Future, (London, 1915), p. 55. In Bebel’s critique of the attitude 
of the Catholic Church to women, his attention was focused upon the flaws inadequacies of the Church’s 
domination of the institutions of heterosexual marriage decrying that ‘however apparent it may be that 
there is not the smallest compatibility between the two, either in age or in mental or physical constitution 
– the bride may be twenty and the bridegroom seventy, or vice versa, the bride may be young, handsome, 
full of life and spirits, the bridegroom old, decrepid (sic), morose, - all of this is of no consequence to the 
Representative of Church and State’. 
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presented as baba or babka – a term denoting an old peasant woman, with pejorative 
associations (particularly in the form babka). Women of childbearing age were cast as 
either sexualised ‘problems’ for men, or essentially passive ‘helpers’, by theorists, 
propagandists and policymakers.4 
These anxieties were also ‘enshrined’ within scientific discourse. As Eric Naiman has 
noted in Sex in Public, the anatomo-historical scientist Anton Vital’evich Nemilov’s The 
Biological Tragedy of Woman, published in several editions between 1925 and 1930, 
encapsulated the gendered anxieties about women in adulthood and beyond that 
formed much of Soviet discourse of the time. Nemilov suggested that ‘[t]he tragedy of a 
woman’s biological calling lies in the fact that unconsciously [or against her will – 
nevol’no] and completely, so to speak, ‘in the dark’, she joins chains of hereditary 
particles and thus fatally stretches from the past to the future’.5 In other words, her 
access to ‘monumental time’, the eternal cycles of reproduction occupied by (biological) 
women, placed her at odds with the linear, forward march of socialist construction, seen 
to constitute the masculine ‘norm’.6 In this vein, maternity was constructed both as an 
essential social function, and a chain binding women to the past. This posed a particular 
problem to the new Soviet state, concerned with the linear forward motion of historical 
time, through which it was presumed the Revolution would resolve the exploitation of 
capitalist society. In From Darkness to Light¸ Igal Halfin demonstrates the eschatological 
                                                          
4 J. Waterlow, ‘Babushka, Harlot, Helper, Joker: Women and Gender in 1930s Political Humour’, in M. Ilič 
(ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Women and Gender in Twentieth-Century Russia and the Soviet Union, 
(Basingstoke, 2017), p. 135. A fuller explanation of these tropes, and their implications, is found in the 
following selection of works: F.L. Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex: Lifestyle Advice for the Soviet Masses, 
(DeKalb, 2011); E. Waters, ‘Victim or Villain? Prostitution in post-Revolutionary Russia’, in L. Edmondson 
(ed.), Women and Society in Russia and the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 160-177. 
5 A.V. Nemoliv, Biologicheskaia tragediia zhenshchiny, (Leningrad, 1925), p. 102 
6 J. Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’, Signs, 71:1 (Fall, 1981), pp. 13-35. Kristeva’s account of the ‘monumental 
time’ of women locates the individual woman in a ‘cyclical’ women’s time, characterised by the 
reproductive cycle.  For a fuller discussion of the ‘eternal feminine’ in the early Soviet context, please see 
ch. 5 of Naiman’s Sex in Public, as well as Hannah Proctor’s ‘Women on the Edge of Time: Representations 
of Revolutionary Motherhood in the NEP-era Soviet Union’, Studies in the Maternal, 7:1, (January 2015), 
pp. 1-20. 
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potential of Marxist and early Soviet discourse, arguing that Marxist thought outlined ‘a 
prescribed temporal motion of the proletariat from the ‘darkness’ of capitalism toward 
salvation in a classless society.’7 The ‘monumental time’ of women arguably constituted 
a plane totally separate from their revolutionary masculine counterparts, to whom they 
were linked as a sexual distraction, a threat to the ‘bright light’ of Communist revolution, 
yet biologically necessary for its survival.8 The ‘problem’ of women doomed the 
movement for gender equality to demise, as it distinguished the New Soviet Woman 
irreconcilably from her masculine counterpart, as a constant source of anxiety to be 
controlled and supervised.  
The intention of this thesis is to argue that women in the 1920s and 1930s skilfully 
received and reproduced the complex and often conflicting ideology on womanhood, to 
construct and present their own lives in ways acceptable within the authoritarian 
constraints of the period. In doing so, the letters they sent to officials, policymakers, and 
organs of the press will be examined in order to identify the intersections between 
individual and public identity. Before moving on to a discussion of the practicalities of 
this source base, it is first necessary to examine Bolshevik thought and policy as it 
related to women in the 1920s and 1930s.  
 
Bolshevik Thinking on the Woman Question 
 
Attention to the ‘woman question’ (zhenskii vopros), which was concerned with the 
position of women in Russian society, was not limited to the Bolsheviks, nor even to the 
                                                          
7 I. Halfin, From Darkness To Light: Class, Consciousness, and Soviet Salvation, (Pittsburgh, 2000), p. 1. 
8 The phrase ‘bright light of Communist revolution is adapted from Halfin, who refers on p. 2 of From 
Darkness to Light to Marxist portrayals of the ‘bright light of Communism’. 
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nineteenth century, though radicals of all stripes had championed some form of sexual 
equality since the 1860s.9 Nonetheless, following the October Revolution the Bolshevik 
government became the first government in history to self-consciously endeavour to 
emancipate women, leading to the decline and stigmatisation of the pre-Revolutionary 
feminist movement.10 However, even from the outset, the Bolsheviks did not necessarily 
share a consistent line on gender, nor did they fully address the question of ‘biological 
difference’ between men and women, preferring to foreground the issue of class. Lenin, 
the Bolshevik party’s acknowledged leader, like his ideological predecessor Engels, 
maintained that the subjugation of women to ‘domestic slavery’ was the first instance of 
class oppression, and that ‘the chief thing [was] to get women to take part in socially 
productive labour, to liberate them from ‘domestic slavery...’.11 Lenin acknowledged 
that working women were indeed necessary for the success of any socialist revolution. 
He maintained that ‘[one] cannot draw the masses into politics without drawing women 
into politics as well. For the female half of the human race is doubly oppressed under 
capitalism.’12 Though rooted in discussions of class oppression, Lenin’s rigid delineation 
between the two ‘halves’ of the human race indicates the concept of underlying 
biological difference between the sexes, suggesting a tension in Bolshevik thought 
between notions of equality and biological difference. 
However, despite an underlying unease about the principle of sexual inequality, the 
majority of Lenin’s musings on the ‘woman question’, much like those of Marx and 
                                                          
9 L. Edmondson, ‘Equality and Difference in Women’s History: Where Does Russia Fit In?’, in R. Marsh, 
(ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine, (Cambridge, 1996), p. 103. The argument that the ‘woman question’ 
had been firmly on the agenda since the seventeenth century is offered in: G.A. Tishkin, Zhenskii vopros v 
Rossii v 50-60gg XIX, (Leningrad, 1984).  
10 B.A. Engel, ‘Women in Russia and the Soviet Union’, SIGNS, 12:4, (Summer, 1987), pp. 781-7. 
11 V.I. Lenin, ‘International Working Women’s Day’, in On the Emancipation of Women, p. 82. The 
theoretical roots of this argument are found in F. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the 
State, (Chicago, 1902).  
12 Lenin, ‘International Working Women’s Day’, p. 85. 
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Engels kept the subject of class a priority over sex divisions, which were considered to 
be symptomatic of class oppression, and could hypothetically be resolved by ‘raising’ 
women to the status of men. Even his 1913 article ‘The Working Class and Neo-
Malthusianism’, which concerned an issue of great importance to working women who 
bore the brunt of unwanted and unaffordable pregnancies, Lenin assumed his audience 
to be male, stating that ‘[t]hings are harder for our generation than they were for our 
fathers’, and consistently addressing the worker as ‘he’. 13  Despite cursory 
acknowledgement of the need for comprehensive change in social attitudes and 
customs in order to end women’s oppression, and his statement that ‘the struggle will 
be a long one, and it demands a radical reconstruction both of social technique and of 
morals’, Lenin failed to expand upon the problem of social inequality between the 
sexes.14 Although a number of contemporary thinkers within the party outlined 
possibilities for the reconstruction of social technique and morals, the Party leadership 
failed to meaningfully engage with this line of thought. The issue of sexual difference 
was moved firmly from the agenda until after 1917, to avoid distraction from the 
perceived central issue of class, and the struggle against tsarist autocracy.15 The 
ambiguity of Leninist thought on the ‘woman question’ is also visible in Lenin’s 
correspondence with his fellow Bolshevik Revolutionary, Inessa Armand. Lukewarm 
about Armand’s creation in 1914 of the women’s magazine Rabotnitsa, Lenin explicitly 
stated his concern that class solidarity would be splintered by ‘bourgeois’ feminist 
demands:  
Why is the approach to this problem inadequate and un-Marxist? Because… the main social 
problem is presented as… an appendage to the sex problem. The important point recedes 
                                                          
13 V.I. Lenin, ‘The Working Class and neo-Malthusianism’, in On the Emancipation of Women, p. 31, pp. 30-
33. 
14 Lenin, ‘International Working Women’s Day’, p. 82. 
15 Edmondson, ‘Equality and Difference in Women’s History’, p. 103. 
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into the background. Thus not only is this question obscured, but also thought, and the class-
consciousness of working women in general, is dulled.16 
Although Armand’s letters, to which these extracts form the response, remain 
unpublished, and are missing from archives, Lenin’s responses indicate her position. 
From her letters, it is clear that she made important contributions to Marxist-Leninist 
thought and policy on gender, not least as the first director of the Zhenotdel, the 
‘women’s department’ of the Party apparatus. Although she, too, failed to critically 
examine the implications of the rigidly determinist assertions already discussed, she 
nonetheless emphasised that women were responsible for the improvement of their 
own lot, and that their equality must be an active pursuit of women. She also substituted 
the word ‘emancipation’ with ‘liberation’, implying action rather than a passive 
condition.17 In this respect, Armand, ‘learned to question, to contradict, and if necessary 
to defy [Lenin].’18 It is clear that despite her dynamism, the practical effectiveness of 
Armand’s relatively radical stance was largely stifled. Lenin’s influence as an individual, 
the singular party political culture he inculcated, and the suppression of dissidence, 
stifled the possibility for what we might now consider a ‘feminist’ leadership to emerge, 
which might have encouraged female agency in the Soviet Union to flourish.19  
However, Armand’s exchanges with Lenin provide evidence of a vibrant discourse 
amongst women within Bolshevik circles on the ‘woman question’. On the one hand we 
                                                          
16 C. Zetkin, ‘My Recollections of Lenin’, in On the Emancipation of Women, (Moscow, 1977), p.103. An 
overview of the publication of Rabotnitsa and its circulation is available in D.L. Meeks’ ‘A Soviet Women’s 
Magazine’, Soviet Studies, 4:1, (1952), pp. 32-47, and N. Tolstikova, ‘Rabotnitsa: The Paradoxical Success of 
a Soviet Women’s Magazine’, Journalism History, 30:3, (Fall, 2004), pp. 131-140. Meeks describes 
Rabotnitsa on p. 32 as ‘a magazine for women about women’. Both articles discuss that the purpose of the 
publication was to promote party policy and educated readers on the aims of the country, while providing 
women with ‘normative and idealised roles’ (Tolstikova, p. 138). 
17 M. Buckley, Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union, (Hempstead, 1989), p. 45, R. Stites, ‘Women’s 
Liberation Movements in Russia, 1900-1930’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 7:4, (1973), p. 460.  
18 Elwood, ‘Lenin’s Correspondence with Inessa Armand’, p. 235. 
19 Discussion of the influence of Lenin, both as an individual and as Party leader can be found in N. 
Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge, 1983). 
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see the conservative elements essentially hostile to women’s emancipation, and on the 
more radical wing were figures such as Armand and Kollontai, (while Trotsky might too 
have been considered a contemporary ‘ally’, to borrow a modern-day phrase). Strictly 
limited by the ideological confines of Marxist-Leninist conceptions of class solidarity, 
there was little room for female solidarity in its own right. The oppression of women, 
both under domestic labour and in their personal relationships, was perceived as 
functions of class relations, and thus ‘women’s liberation’ as a functional ideology was 
ultimately subordinated to class solidarity.  
Despite an environment which discouraged attention to gender and sexual equality at 
the expense of class, women remained active thinkers and writers on the subject. Some 
of the most creative, if controversial contributions to Marxist work on sexual equality 
were made by Aleksandra Kollontai. Expanding upon calls from Inessa Armand and 
Leon Trotsky for the socialisation of domestic role, and for the liberation of women by 
women themselves, Kollontai surpassed her contemporaries on the subject of the 
double standards of sexual codes and morality. In ‘Sexual Relations and the Class 
Struggle’, she stated that ‘[i]n the eyes of society the personality of a man can be more 
easily separated from his actions in the sexual sphere. The personality of a woman is 
judged almost exclusively in terms of her sex life.’20 However, the potential solutions to 
the problems of masculine derision that she indicated in her fiction are not found in her 
theoretical writings. Where female agency was never permitted to be an ‘autonomous 
force’ amongst the Bolshevik thinkers, Kollontai was compelled to channel its potential 
into artistic form in her short stories.21Moreover, Kollontai explicitly rejected the 
principle of a universal ‘woman question’, and declared that ‘unity does not and cannot 
                                                          
20 A. Kollontai, ‘A Serious Gap’, Selected Writings, pp. 125-6, A. Kollontai, ‘Sexual Relations and the Class 
Struggle’, Selected Writings, p. 245. 
21 See, for example, Kollontai, ‘Sisters’, in Selected Writings, p. 224. 
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exist’22. It is true that in any society, let alone the vast Russian Empire, ‘women’ never 
constituted a homogenous entity, the ambiguity of Kollontai’s statement suggested a 
reluctance to actively challenge sexual antagonisms within class boundaries, though she 
did acknowledge the issue. 23  While her short stories touched upon the universalism of 
inequality within relationships, as well as female friendship, solidarity, and gendered 
agency, these principles were not linked to broader practical or political issues of 
gender socialisation in her activities within the Party. Perhaps since she could not, 
Kollontai did not publicly expand upon the observations made in her fiction, including 
her criticism of the distinction between public and private domains. Important 
contributions to the theoretical liberation of women were therefore made by female 
thinkers in the early Soviet state, albeit indirectly. Moreover, though their commitment 
to the fundamental emancipation of women from the social practices of gender 
inequality was weak at best, Bolshevik leaders did pay an unprecedented amount of 
attention to their legal emancipation. Therefore, however shallow the rhetoric might 
have been, and however underdeveloped its substance, the ground broken by these 
assumptions had important consequences for Soviet women.  
 
Making Sense of the New Soviet Woman in Policy and Practice 
 
Ambivalent as the commitment of its authors may have been, the body of work on 
gender equality built by Marxist-Leninist writers translated to a reasonably 
comprehensive programme of social legislation. By 1921, ‘Lenin could declare that 
                                                          
22 A. Kollontai, ‘The Social Basis of the Woman Question’, in Selected Writings, p. 61. 
23 Buckley, Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union, p. 56. 
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according to the law, not a trace of sexual inequality remained’. 24 The Code of Laws 
concerning the Civil Registration of Deaths, Births and Marriages, of October 17, 1918, 
apparently sought to revolutionise the household. Marriage was rationalised as a 
secular, rather than religious institution, and articles 74-87 of the Code established the 
necessity of mutual consent for the validity of a marriage, as well as the abilities of 
wives as well as husbands, to request a divorce.25 The automatic imposition of the 
husband’s surname following marriage was ended by Article 100, and Article 104 ended 
the legal obligation of women to take up residence with her spouse. Abortion was 
legalised in 1920. Although the elimination of backstreet abortions, and the 
improvement of public health and hygiene was the primary motivation behind this 
measure, the decree did not at any point appear to question the woman’s right to an 
abortion in principle. 26  Moreover, in 1919 the Zhenotdel, or ‘women’s department’ of 
the Party was established by decree of the Central Committee. The Zhenotdel in the 
eleven years of its operation functioned as an organisational medium through which 
women would be able to protect their own interests.27 With leaders including Inessa 
Armand, Konkordia Samoilova, and Aleksandra Kollontai, the Zhenotdel oversaw 
campaigns, and meetings held by a network of delegates across the Soviet Union, often 
composed of quite ‘ordinary’ women, and assisted the delegates’ meetings with 
endorsements, and by the publication of ancillary documents, bulletins as well as a 
                                                          
24 R. Pethybridge, ‘Stalinism as Social Conservatism?’, European History Quarterly, 11:4, (October, 1981), 
p. 465. 
25 ‘From the Code of Laws concerning the Civil Registration of Deaths, Births and Marriages, of October 
17, 1918’, in R. Schlesinger, (ed.), Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia: Family in the USSR, (London, 1949), 
pp. 34-5. 
26 Buckley, Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union, p. 37. 
27 Much has been written on the topic of the Zhenotdel. A selection of key articles would include: B. 
Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’, Slavic Review, 51:3, (1992), pp. 485-496; W. Goldman, 
‘Industrial Politics, Peasant Rebellion, and the Death of the Proletarian Women’s Movement in the USSR’, 
Slavic Review, 55:1, (1996), pp. 46-77; R. Stites, ‘Zhenotdel: Bolshevism and Russian Women, 1917-1930’, 
Russian History, 3:2, (1976), pp. 174-193. 
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range of women’s journals, such as Rabotnitsa and Krest’ianka, aimed at working and 
peasant women respectively.28  
Ultimately, since women’s oppression was considered to be rooted in class, sexual 
equality would be achieved through their integration into the mainstream labour force. 
As Melanie Ilič’s extensive research on Soviet labour policy and its effect upon women’s 
labour conditions in the 1920s and 1930s has revealed, Soviet policy provided the 
clearest view of the apparent conflict amongst policymakers regarding ‘difference’ and 
‘equality’. Though a 1920 decree stated that women ‘undertaking the same quantity and 
quality of work as male workers’ should be paid the same wage, the 1918 Labour Code 
had already set out a range of protective restrictions on the use of female labour, 
indicating a presumed distinction between the work to be undertaken by men and 
women.29 Moreover, the implications of the enforcement of legislation relating to equal 
pay defaulted upon age-old assumptions about female productivity. In response to the 
effect of equal pay legislation on the employment of women of childbearing age, in the 
early 1920s, policymakers introduced legislation that protected women against 
dismissal upon the grounds of pregnancy or dependent children.30 The issue of 
menstrual leave, based upon the impact of heavy labour upon women’s reproductive 
organs, received considerable discussion throughout the 1920s and 1930s.31 Underlying 
this ‘protective’ legislative programme was an ‘assumption of women’s more delicate 
physiological constitution’, which the new Bolshevik government sought to mitigate, 
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ending the isolation of women within the home, and drawing them as fully as possible 
into the workplace.32 
The subsequent Marriage Law, enacted in 1926, granted registered and unregistered 
marriages equal rights and obligations under law. In doing so, it sought to protect 
women from the high levels of insecurity that had inadvertently resulted from the 
liberalisation of divorce during the economic uncertainty of NEP, or New Economic 
Policy, which ended the food requisitions of War Communism, and loosened restrictions 
on private enterprise.33 Though NEP had been intended to lessen tensions over the 
requisition of produce in the countryside, revive the industrial economy and promote 
unity behind the Party, its interaction with the social policies of the immediate post-
Revolutionary period had calamitous consequences for the newly emancipated Soviet 
woman. Unemployment among women rocketed, as a result of the shift to cost-
accounting, and support for socialised child-rearing declined.34 Moreover, though 
divorce was widely considered to be essential for the emancipation of women as it 
enabled them to maintain their autonomy in social relationships, its use in practice after 
1918 often resulted in the abrupt departure of husbands – often unregistered – 
following signs of pregnancy. Child abandonment also increased in the period. The 
legislation of the mid-1920s, therefore, sought to protect women and children from the 
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inadvertent effects of both NEP and the attempts to liberalise conjugal values, and 
prevent their further social and political isolation.35   
Where illiteracy, too, had previously isolated women, particularly peasant women, 
Zhenotdel delegates’ meetings arranged reading classes to facilitate political education, 
in an attempt to end the individual isolation of the family, and raise consciousness of 
socialist and workers’ issues.36 Thus, the outward appearance of the Soviet state 
throughout the 1920s was one of socialist progress and progress towards gender 
equality. However, it must be noted that the Bolsheviks’ programme of rapid social 
legislation did not guarantee the same pace of social change; the legislation did not 
penetrate the tenets of everyday life for many years, and there remained strongholds of 
resistance throughout Soviet state and society against the new ‘emancipated’ condition 
of women.37 The Zhenotdel by the late 1920s was gradually undermined, and eventually 
eliminated in 1930, considered no longer to be necessary.38 Activism by and for women 
was subsumed by the Department for Agitation and Mass Campaigns, as part of which 
activists were expected to display party discipline and support for Stalinist economic 
policies.39 The more creative Bolshevik ‘feminists’ were marginalised. Aleksandra 
Kollontai, for example, was transferred to the position of ambassador to Norway in 
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which she remained for the rest of her life.40 The only ‘women’s organisation’ that 
remained was the Soviet Women’s Committee; however this was committed by official 
sanction to the struggle of women against fascism, and functioned only as an unofficial 
‘contact space’ for discussions of gender.41 With the issue of sexual equality presumed 
to have been solved by the 1930s, its safeguards were duly dismantled.  
According to all indication, by 1936, it appeared that the ‘woman question’ had been put 
to bed, and the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, that ‘Women in the USSR are accorded 
equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political 
life’.42 Indeed, with discussions of self-determination and gender roles kept resolutely 
off the political agenda, assumptions about female roles replaced their analysis.43 The 
protective labour legislation of the 1920s – never fully implemented – was replaced 
with labour regulations promoting ‘equality’.44 Concerns about the birth rate that had 
emerged by 1930 led to a clear programme of pro-natalism, and abortion was 
prohibited once again in 1936. Disquiet about Soviet sexual morality meant that divorce 
was made more difficult to obtain, homosexuality was criminalised, and the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate offspring was reinstated 45  Essentially, the 
monogamous family was rehabilitated, and the emancipation of women was declared to 
have been achieved; a contradiction in gender ideology that would characterise 
‘liberation’ for generations of Soviet women. Therefore, what has come to be known as a 
double – or triple - burden for the new Soviet woman was consolidated: images of ‘the 
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successful and problem free Soviet superwoman’ proliferated, in which women were 
portrayed as great achievers in the home, the workplace, and the soviets.46  
 
Understanding the ‘Great Retreat’ in the 1930s 
 
Following the publication of Nikolai Timasheff’s The Great Retreat in 1946, this 
‘rehabilitation’ of the family, and the crystallisation of the double burden, came to be 
seen in the West as a triumph of social conservatism. Timasheff’s thesis was that: 
‘utopian revolutionaries who take power ultimately must modify their utopian policies 
that they may preserve power and even the opportunity to cultivate some part of their 
utopian garden’.47 The shift in social policy in the 1930s was thus seen as a retreat from 
Soviet ideals in order to stabilise the regime and of particular interest for this thesis, a 
return to pre-Revolutionary family values. Since its publication, aspects of Timasheff’s 
‘Great Retreat’ have been debated extensively, with scholars focusing in particular on 
the policy contradictions entailed by the political programme, and their consequences 
for women in particular. By the early 1980s, Roger Pethybridge, drew on Timasheff’s 
notion of a kind of revolutionary pragmatism which formed in the Soviet 1930s, and 
Pethybridge identified the return of the family unit as a means of low cost childcare at a 
time when all adults, including mothers, were needed in the workforce.48 Perhaps more 
influentially, given her area of extensive expertise, Wendy Goldman’s body of work on 
women, abortion and the family has developed Timasheff’s principle of the ‘cultivation 
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of the utopian garden’, regarding the conservatism of policies on the family. She asserts 
that the right to bodily autonomy through the control of one’s own fertility received 
little consideration by the Soviet state, forming part of the Stalinist state’s increasingly 
‘conservative attitude’. Rather than being viewed as a women’s ‘right to choose’, 
abortion was considered by the state as a necessity, rooted in poverty, and that with the 
eradication of poverty, women would have little reason to reject motherhood.49 These 
studies encapsulate the conservatism inherent to Boshevik and early Soviet though and 
policy on gender and social politics. 
In the last decade, these questions have once again preoccupied historians, who have 
offered slightly different perspectives on the matter. Lauren Kaminsky’s 2011 study of 
family life under Stalinism highlighted that many women felt truly disadvantaged by the 
radical divorce and alimony policies of the 1920s. She asserts that ‘Stalin-era family 
policy [was] the continuation of a radical revolutionary tradition… explicit in its 
promotion of equality’, and her work is emblematic of a more recent reconsideration (or 
at least a more rigorous nuancing) of the Great Retreat, suggesting that social policy 
after 1936 marked a return to the protective legislation of the utopian 1920s, rather 
than to earlier tradition. She also notes that women sought to engage with the state by 
protesting in the language of equal rights for all women and mothers, in favour of the 
restoration of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate families.50 In contrast, 
Matthew Lenoe has argued that the ‘retreat’ identified by Timasheff was part of a 
synthesis with pre-Revolutionary culture, not a return to the utopianism that Kaminsky 
suggests. His characterisation of the intersection between public opinion and official 
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discourse as a ‘synthesis’ is perhaps somewhat simplistic but his portrayal of Soviet 
society as consisting of diverse groups, a concept coexisting easily with many of the 
central tenets of many social histories of the 1930s is, overall, sound.51 Taken together, 
these works show both that by the 1930s Soviet policymakers were forced to 
acknowledge not only the cost of maintaining the family policies of the 1920s and the 
diverse reactions of different social groups within Soviet society. Despite a clear desire 
among Soviet women for the protection and public legitimisation of the nuclear family, 
after the Revolution and Civil War, Sheila Fitzpatrick notes that ‘wives’ were almost an 
unrecognised category in the first years after the Revolution, and that housewives 
seemed often to be accorded a second class status, with one woman complaining that 
‘sometimes I thought that housewives were not even considered human.’52 Against such 
a hostile discursive context, Fitzpatrick claims that for many housewives seeking means 
of connection with the Soviet state and society, the emergence in the 1930s of the wife-
activist movement was ‘a godsend’.53 
Quite notably, Fitzpatrick argues that women actually responded to the change in 
attitude to the nuclear family positively, and gave varied and considered feedback to 
alimony laws. Her study notes in particular that the disintegration of the family seems 
to have been widely perceived by women as a social and moral evil, and that it was seen 
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by women as an important institution, to be actively upheld by authorities.54Fitzpatrick 
cites the frequency of appeals to judges for intervention in a wide range of male 
delinquencies as evidence for this. Although this appears to provide convincing 
evidence for popular anxiety about family disintegration, Fitzpatrick’s study does not 
address the sense of self-confidence displayed by women who in writing these appeals, 
acted autonomously, assuming the right to a certain standard of behaviour and respect 
within marriage and family life. Many of the responses documented in studies by 
Fitzpatrick and Goldman were first lain out by Janet Evans in the early 1980s, who 
argues that many letters were critical of aspects of the 1936 decree, and called for a 
more liberal abortion law and a stricter control of divorcees who failed to pay 
maintenance. The letters cited in Evans’ study indicate a willingness on the party of 
these women to consider their political environments critically. However, Evans notes 
that the majority of these letters were written by students, professional women and 
female shock workers, those workers who achieved exceeded productivity targets. 
Instead, ordinary women tended to write on issues of alimony, divorce and state 
benefits.55 Nonetheless, the fact that they wrote at all indicates that, regardless of 
educational level or social status, women remained able and willing to act on their own 
behalves in response to issues pertinent in their lives.  
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In light of all this, Kaminsky’s allegation that ‘Stalin-era family policy [was] the 
continuation of a radical revolutionary tradition… explicit in [its] promotion of equality’ 
is quite credible.56  Existing studies of family politics in the 1920s and 1930s highlight 
the conservatism which underlay the revolution of daily life after 1917, as well as the 
diversity of opinion across all social groups of women, refuting a straightforward 
interpretation of the ‘conservative retreat’. Rather, in light of the interaction between 
citizens and the state, Lenoe’s suggestion that we re-read the Great Retreat as a 
reincorporation into the utopian model of slowly evolving pre-Revolutionary family 
arrangements seems to reconcile formerly disparate interpretations of retreat and 
utopianism, and provides a foundation upon which to base the study to follow.57 This 
historiographical foundation also raises the question of the extent to which women 
sought the accommodation, or at least the tolerance, of their personal arrangements by 
the Soviet vision.  
For considerations of the extent to which women accepted a convergence of public and 
private life as means through which to legitimise their experiences and to relate their 
lives to the Soviet project, Rebecca Spagnolo provides the clearest example of the 
blurring of public and professional, and domestic and personal life from a different 
angle: that of the fusion of workplace and home of the domestic worker.58 Spagnolo’s 
study traces the self-esteem of domestic workers through language and union 
membership, and highlights their struggle to link their expectations of respect with 
reality, articulated by the insistence of many live-in domestic workers on being 
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addressed with the formal vy (You).59 The conclusions reached in Spagnolo’s study 
invite a broader rethinking of the dichotomy of private and public space which has not 
yet been widely acknowledged, and she argues that the notion of workplace as home 
and home as workplace is yet unexamined. Spagnolo’s findings provide a particularly 
interesting context for the convergence of public identities belonging to mother-
teachers identified by Thomas Ewing, and the distinct identity that resulted.60 Ewing 
argues that mother-teachers had their own sense of what Stalinism symbolised at the 
time, and what their work and families meant. He suggests that this was articulated and 
enacted on a daily level, permeating homes, schools and more broadly, society.61 Both 
studies, by Ewing and Spagnolo, highlight the tensions that many women faced between 
professional and personal identities, which have not been fully addressed by studies of 
alimony or abortion laws, nor by examination of family dynamics These convergences of 
professional and personal space and identity provide an intriguing lens through which 
to view women’s voices. This thesis will argue that in their letters women actively 
addressed aspects of their identities and social roles which straddled ‘public’ and 
‘private’ domains, to highlight the ways in which the obligations of Soviet citizenship 
each role involved impacted their experiences as Soviet women.   
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‘So they really thought that way!’62 Locating the Gendered Stalinist Self 
in Public Letters? 
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to prove the existence of the authentic ‘self’ under 
Stalin, nor to clearly identify its contours, but to trace the evolution of the intersection 
between early Soviet policy and women’s individual lives and public identities. In any 
case, it would be impossible to do justice to the multitude of ‘selves’ represented within 
the cache of letters transcribed. Rather than measure the degree of the internalisation of 
Soviet ‘norms’, its purpose is to analyse its reproduction of those norms, and 
demonstrate the existence and exercise of agency by ordinary women under highly 
extraordinary circumstances, in their use of Bolshevik language to construct a public 
‘identity’. 63  Nonetheless, the methodology of the thesis implies a particular 
understanding of Stalinist subjectivity, and the significance of language to it, which 
requires some elaboration.  
Broadly speaking, the historiography on ‘Soviet subjectivity’ is constituted by three 
broad approaches, all of which, as Katharina Uhl has succinctly explained, draw heavily 
on techniques of discursive analysis influenced primarily by Michel Foucault.64 
Regarding the basic principles of the ‘self’ in contemporary and recent historiography,  
Choi Chatterjee and Karen Petrone outlined several layers of the ‘self’ in ‘Models of 
Selfhood and Subjectivity: the Soviet Case in Historical Perspective’, which have 
emerged from Western historiography. First, the biological creature and its material 
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needs, followed by the self that is ‘implicated in the social discourses and cultural codes 
of its origin’. Secondly, the ‘self’ that is inexorably bound by the ‘cultural codes’ and 
discourses of its parent society. Finally, ‘the reflexive self is an active agent that 
scrutinises both itself and the world it inhabits, and thus plays a dynamic role in 
creating its own narrative of itself’.65 The existence of this third layer of the ‘self’ forms 
the crux of academic debate on the Soviet self, and this thesis will proceed on the basis 
that its existence is proven by the dynamism and agency with which women negotiate 
with authorities in their letters.  
In the Soviet context, discussions of the ‘self’ have proven to be somewhat more 
complicated. Juliane Fürst has suggested that the dynamism and agency exercised by 
Soviet citizens was inextricably bound by their social and political contexts. The social 
context within which Soviet citizens operated provided the ‘environments and 
motivations’ for identities and opinions to form. For Fürst, ‘acceptance and resistance in 
the Stalinist world are inextricably linked by common presumptions, common language, 
common values, and a common habitat’.66 Likewise, although both Jochen Hellbeck and 
Igal Halfin later revised their initial conclusions on the autonomy of Soviet individual 
selves, for them, language was the crucial determinant of the self of the Soviet citizen, 
and since it was tasked with the transmission of the official discourse, the Soviet self 
was essentially constructed not by the citizen, but by the ideological language with 
which she conceived of herself. 67 According to Halfin, ‘there is no reason to introduce a 
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pre-existent, authentic subject who cynically manipulates the Bolshevik discourse’.68 
The intangibility of the pre-existent authentic subject is of course, quite reasonable.  
Moreover, the extent to which any individual’s reception and reproduction of her 
dominant discourse was conducted ‘cynically’ is undoubtedly limited by the feelings and 
activities of daily life. However, the suggestion that the Soviet self was shaped entirely 
by the dominant discourse, and a desire to reproduce it, is problematic, since it fails to 
account for continuities in the processes of negotiation with authorities across 
discursive shifts. Halfin did concede that that the creation of the Soviet self did not 
preclude the possibility of alternative forms of self-identification – though these were 
related directly to the modes of ‘self’ prescribed by the dominant Soviet discourse.69 
Hellbeck also acknowledged in later studies that, while language remains at the core of 
construction of the ‘self’ in the early Soviet period, there did also exist some space for 
individual interpretation amongst Soviet subjects.70  
More convincing, however, is the assertion that Soviet subjects should be treated as 
historical actors, rather than simply as passive characters. Anna Krylova rejects the 
passivity implied by the above readings of the ‘Stalinist soul’, and quite convincingly 
demonstrates instead the existence of ‘a Stalinist subject that is neither lost in Stalinist 
culture, nor securely untouched by its ideals and demands.’71 Soviet discourse therefore 
becomes a constituent of the social practices of individuals and groups, rather than of 
the individual self itself, accounting for the engagement and interaction between 
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collective pressure and individual agency, and self-regulation, as Kharkhordin 
explains.72 Within this interpretation of the ‘self’ in the Stalinist period, the Soviet 
subject therefore plays a dynamic role in the construction of her own social identity, 
examining her own life and the environment she inhabits to construct a sense of ‘self’ 
acceptable under Soviet circumstances, in line with the alterations of manner and 
appearance involved in social practices, proposed by Erving Goffman, as the thesis will 
go on to argue.73  
Yet, Sheila Fitzpatrick has suggested that ‘the task of self-construction (or 
reconstruction) is very different from the task of self-exploration. Indeed, the two may 
be incompatible’.74 That the two are very different tasks is undeniable – certainly, the 
task of exploring and authenticating Soviet selves is not the intention of the thesis – but 
their incompatibility is quite dubious. Fitzpatrick’s own exploration of the ‘usable’ self 
supports this, suggesting that Soviet citizens were in fact able to consciously reproduce 
or reject models of Soviet identity as a survival strategy.75 In her body of work more 
generally, Fitzpatrick has sought to demonstrate the way Soviet citizens fashioned their 
own identities in public, in order to acquire ‘access’ to different aspects of Soviet life, be 
they education, employment, civic belonging, or more fundamentally survival.76 In an 
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article on subjectivity and Soviet scholarship, Naiman relayed his excited exclamation 
upon discovering a letter from a Soviet citizen: ‘So they really thought that way!’ – is the 
significance of the written word as a source for the comprehension of the Soviet 
experience .77 By exploring the process of the construction of the reflexive self, we can 
feasibly identify the exercise of agency in the construction (or reconstruction) of the 
public identity of the female citizen, rather than the construction (or reconstruction) of 
her ‘soul’, so to speak. In the written word of the Soviet subject we may only be able to 
identify glimpses of the subjective self – but, for the purpose of this thesis, this is more 
than sufficient.  
Indeed, one of the most compelling discoveries made in the Russian archives since the 
end of the Soviet Union has been the extraordinary cache of letters authored by Soviet 
citizens to political leaders and officials, newspapers and other such state organs. 
Nadezhda Mandelstam, in her memoir, Hope Against Hope, commented with 
extraordinary foresight on the richness of the mounting body of letters received by 
Soviet authorities: 
‘[T]hese mountains of letters will be a veritable treasure trove for historians: the life of our 
times is recorded in them more faithfully than any other writing, for they speak of all the 
hurts, humiliations, blows, pitfalls and traps of our existence[…]’78  
Though Mandelstam characterised this type of letter – to authorities, often in pursuit of 
state intervention – as ‘a plea for a miracle’, this genre of letter writing ostensibly 
served a variety of functions, both for their authors and for the state that solicited 
them.79 The Bolshevik Party, via its press organs, solicited letters from its citizens as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Australian Journal of Politics and History 50:3 (2004), pp. 357-371;  ‘Ascribing Class: The Construction of 
Social Identity in Soviet Russia,’ The Journal of Modern History 65:4 (1993), pp. 745-770. 
77 Naiman, ‘On Soviet Subjects and the Scholars who make them’, p. 308. 
78 N. Mandelstam, Hope against Hope: A Memoir, trans. M. Hayward (London, 1999), p. 93. 
79 Ibid., p. 93. 
36 
 
worker and peasant correspondents, set the agenda to be discussed, chose those letters 
that would be published, and used this correspondence with the masses to tailor its 
propaganda, to gauge public opinion, further political education, and to monitor the 
state apparatus.80  As Fitzpatrick has shown, letters written to the state fell into a 
number of ‘genres’: confessional letters expressing one’s thoughts and convictions, 
victim letters containing a desperate plea for help, denunciations and complaints about 
neighbours or misbehaving local officials, ‘opinions, suggestions and advice’ on a wide 
range of matters both political and apolitical, fiercely loyal to vehemently critical.  The 
‘balance’ of individual agency and its co-option for the benefit of the state’s authority 
contained within correspondence with authorities depended upon the ultimate aims of 
the exchange.  
Despite the size of the source base, and its richness, letters from Soviet citizens to 
newspapers and to figures of authority have frequently been seen as a problematic 
source. Reflecting further on the vastness and complexity of citizen letters to authorities, 
Mandelstam warned that: 
‘But to go through [the letters] and sift out the tiny grains of real fact will be a Herculean 
labour. The trouble is, that even in these letters we observed the special style of Soviet polite 
parlance, speaking of our misfortunes in the language of newspaper editorials.’81 
Indeed, reflecting these complexities, the literature on the value of public and private 
correspondences has been influenced heavily by the discussions of the Stalinist self, 
outlined earlier in this chapter, to explore how social identity was formed in Soviet 
societies, and what role state coercion played in identity formation. However, over the 
last two decades, a number of studies have attempted to move beyond the standard 
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debate upon the utility of letters, between proponents of the ‘totalitarian’ model of 
complete social atomisation, and uncompromisingly revisionist arguments, to reach a 
new consensus about social identity and individual agency among women under Stalin. 
The first approach is to trace how Party officials and state organs used correspondence 
with Soviet citizens to shape their public identity, and the potential of said citizens to 
operate within this public identity to express their range of opinions.82 In particular, 
attention has been paid to the role of peasant and worker correspondents, and the 
processing of denunciations by the peasant newspaper Krest’ianka gazeta, as well as to 
letters to newspapers as a source of information on the everyday practices of state 
control in the USSR.83 Matthew Lenoe, in his study of reader correspondence with 
newspapers, characterises letters to state newspapers primarily as a constructed 
practice, through which the Soviet state and its agents sought – and succeeded - to 
shape public identity. The value of reader correspondence as a ‘window on the everyday 
functioning of society, [and] the instruments of power’ is evident insofar as the agenda 
for correspondence, its publication, encouragement, and to a considerable extent the 
language used was determined by party leaders and officials.84 Lenoe sees letters as a 
problematic source for the study of popular opinion, maintaining that even those with 
subversive intent ended up propagating official ideology, by speaking the ‘official’ 
language.85 This ‘official’ language and its role in Soviet society has been described by 
the aforementioned Stephen Kotkin’s influential work on ‘Speaking Bolshevik’, to refer 
to the phenomenon identified in Soviet society whereby citizens learned to identify 
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themselves, and to speak publicly in politically acceptable language – in terms of class, 
labour, lauded social categories, and official class ‘enemies’.86 
Kotkin’s work has been of particular significance for historians seeking to understand 
the ways in which Soviet citizens communicated with the state. He argues that the 
practice of speaking Bolshevik inculcated a new social identity, through which the state 
largely appropriated the basis for social solidarity, and through which citizens learnt the 
terms and techniques of engagement with the socialist state. Though ‘atomisation’, if not 
as total as some commentators have claimed, was significant, citizens were able to 
‘work the system to their minimum disadvantage’ by gaining ‘literacy’ in the Bolshevik 
language. 87  Kotkin asserts that  ‘this subtle mechanism of power, within the 
circumstances of the revolutionary crusade, accounted for the strength of Stalinism’.88 
In this sense, Kotkin’s work provides a valuable lens for the study of the relationship 
between Soviet women and official gender ideology in the early Soviet Union, 
accounting for the way in which engagement with the language of the regime ostensibly 
lent legitimacy to the evolution of Soviet policy.89 Moreover, as Eric Naiman has 
suggested of the Soviet subject, ‘[she] was speaking herself into an already established 
master text, and as she empowered herself she was also incrementally empowering that 
text’.90 It is not the concern of this study, however, to dismiss the agency of women due 
to its overall contribution to Soviet power, nor to suggest that their engagement with 
authorities formed any defined process of dissent. Rather, the study intends to 
illuminate the role of women as historical actors through this process of engagement 
with the Soviet state. I argue that they confidently negotiated their positions within the 
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authoritarian state through the process of identity construction and reconstruction in 
their letters.  
This thesis thus acknowledges the role that ‘the language of the state’ might have played 
in shaping opinions of all shades, but argues that a study of this type of public letter 
writing invites a fuller examination of what the practice meant for individual citizens. 
Newspapers and officials received letters from women that, though not explicitly anti-
Soviet enough to raise the attention of the censors, were far from homogenous. A 
relatively ‘top-down’ interpretation is clearly essential to understanding the role of 
public letters in establishing a public identity and means of communication, but as an 
approach it is insufficiently reflexive and fails to allow for proper examination of public 
responses to and engagement with particular policies. Nor does viewing letter-writing 
as a solely state-led initiative allow for consideration of mutual perceptions of the 
‘threat levels’ of different groups or interests in relation to key contemporary political 
concerns. 
In this thesis, it is argued that the kind of atomisation assumed even by Kotkin did not 
permeate so deeply. Citizens, by virtue of the intangibility of their ‘actual’ attitudes and 
feelings, were ‘free’ to some extent to engage dynamically with the practice of letter 
writing. It is therefore necessary to combine these ideas about the construction of 
discursive boundaries with a more flexible approach. Other historians have begun this 
work on letter writing as a social practice, of course. In particular, studies have tended 
to analyse the content of letters, and the way that ‘official’ language is used, to gauge the 
popularity of certain policies, and their effects. Of particular note have been studies of 
family policy, primarily alimony law and the prohibition of abortion, such as those by 
Lauren Kaminsky, Sheila Fitzpatrick and Wendy Goldman, which have shown the ways 
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in which women responded either positively or negatively to different decrees and 
changing ideologies, using public letters as a key source base.91 Such studies have 
examined both the background to the gender ideology disseminated, and the reception 
and impact of specific policies amongst women. Goldman’s examination of the 1936 
prohibition of abortion provides a key example of the use of letters in this way. 
Comparing letters to newspapers and officials with the accounts of demographers and 
doctors, Goldman traces the differences between official and popular reproductive 
discourse, and suggests a clear understanding amongst ordinary women of the 
relationship between reproductive control and liberation.92 
Such distinctive understandings of Soviet ideas among citizens are apparent elsewhere, 
in studies such as Benjamin Nathans’ work on rights, for example. Nathans has 
persuasively shown how letters in response to the 1936 Constitution used the language 
of rights, and an appreciation of the subtleties of the language of the Constitution to 
argue for their own visions of fairness, rather than the ‘language of common 
citizenship’.93 This language of rights in fact echoed ideas also found in the public 
discussions of the 1936 family decree, particularly surrounding the prohibition of 
abortion, in which women expressed not only their opposition to the decree, but the 
extent to which they had appropriated abortion as a right.94 In their opposition, women 
used the official language to discuss the restrictions the decree would place on their 
ability to ‘contribute to the new society’, speaking of their desire to study and work, and 
develop themselves as human beings’.95 That women would stress their rights as human 
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beings also reflects some of the language evoked by Fitzpatrick’s discussion of 
confessional letters. One letter included in her study, from a woman named Sedova, 
simply pleads for sympathy: ‘I’m not asking [...] for Sedov to live with me, but I am a 
human being and I don’t want to be thrown overboard and I don’t want people to make 
fun of me’.96 Tendencies such as these suggest the conscious mastery, and unconscious 
nuance women’s experiences lent Bolshevik language in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Thus, a second major approach to letters to the state, is to consider the content of letters 
not as a reflection of state interests alone, but as a source that allows us to access the 
intentions of the author, especially if we pay attention to the language used, and 
examine how the authors reproduce Bolshevik language in their self-presentation. As 
Fitzpatrick states, the activity of public letter writing ‘must be taken very seriously by 
anyone seeking insight into the private lives of Soviet citizens, their articulation of 
identity as individuals, and their sense of themselves as social beings’97  Crucially, 
Miriam Dobson’s work on letters as a source reconciles the alternative approaches in 
the historiography, asserting that though the fact that a worker in the 1930s was able to 
write to the state in Bolshevik language does indicate the significance of these 
mechanisms in shaping the public identities of Soviet citizens, the letters themselves 
provide a sense of their authors’ particular understanding of the ‘unspoken but widely 
recognised limits’ of public discourse, repeating standard phrases from the press and 
making use of ‘authoritative vocabularies’ to express meanings different from those 
intended.98  
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In some studies, the extent of citizens’ desire and ability to subvert official language and 
concepts is particularly pronounced. Sarah Davies has sought to demonstrate the ways 
in which Soviet citizens intentionally perceived and deviated from these boundaries 
through the examination of NKVD reports, arguing that ‘people moved freely between 
the two worlds of official culture, and... the shadow culture’.99 Although Soviet citizens 
spoke Bolshevik, ‘on occasions’, according to Davies, they were able to invest the 
language with meanings diverging from those intended by the state. For example, 
officially ‘hallowed’ language, such as narod, (or ‘people/nation’), would be used 
divisively by dissenting citizens to denote the lower classes, distinct from the state, 
rather than the whole people.100 Moreover, as has been discussed above, citizens also 
made their complaints or expressed their desires by invoking ‘rights’ – whether those 
explicitly outlined in the Constitution, or others, such as the reproductive rights which, 
according to Goldman had been appropriated by women.101 The chronological context 
of this study, the late 1920s and 1930s, lends the acquisition of Bolshevik language, and 
the genre of the public letter a greater significance. The period was unique in that it saw 
the embrace and utilisation of ideology by state actors. The infusion of language with 
ideology resulted in its transformation into something to be acquired, if at only be those 
citizens raised prior to the Revolution, as Eric Naiman has attested: 
Ideology was transformed from a native to an acquired tongue, a language of which there 
were no native speakers, since its grammarians were the “vanguard” of future subjects, as 
yet unborn, who, untainted by the capitalist past, would eventually speak this language 
virtually from birth.102 
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The novelty of Bolshevik language, therefore, becomes a signal not only of engagement 
with the new Soviet state, but of the author’s chronological relationship to it; an 
indicator of identity. Not only would the use of Bolshevik language provide a sense of 
the author’s understanding of the limits of public discourse, but their place in the value 
system associated with ‘generation’ following the Revolution. The ideological fluency 
with which letter-writers reproduce Bolshevik language, the epithets they use, and their 
chronological positioning therefore provide another sense of their self-perception, and 
another layer of interpretation.  
Nonetheless, the wholescale embrace of public letters as a source for such persuasive 
interpretation also presents its own challenges. Indeed, the writing of history is rooted 
in the interpretation of sources, be it consciously or unconsciously. Moreover, as 
Naiman suggests in his defence of the approach, ‘the trick is to make sure that license is 
put to use consciously, that it be made to work with sufficient energy and against a 
sufficiently complex object so as to result in that object’s persuasive deformation for the 
scholar’s readers.103 It is nevertheless imperative to acknowledge the limitations of that 
interpretive license. Perhaps most significant are the risks associated with actively 
seeking phenomena such as ‘dissent’, as Davies does. Additionally, one should not 
understate the role of ‘official discourse’ in providing citizens with the necessary 
language to relate their lives to authorities. Even while addressing the limitations of 
Kotkin’s interpretation of the role of Bolshevik language, there are nonetheless 
significant conclusions raised which should be borne in mind.   
Upon the above basis established for the study of public letters, it is necessary to 
properly clarify the nature of the ‘public’ correspondence, and the veracity of its opinion, 
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to be used. Significantly, Fitzpatrick notes that many ‘public letters’ in the 1930s in 
particular, were written by single authors, rather than groups of people, and as such, 
asserts that ‘public letter writing was a form of individual, private communication with 
the authorities on topics both private and public’, and that many letters, particularly 
those addressed to officials, dealt with personal matters. As such, her argument follows 
that in the 1930s, these letters articulated Soviet citizens’ identities and perceived roles 
in society, and that citizens’ letters ‘constituted one of the few modes of public opinion 
that continued to function’.104 The frequency of letters pertaining to personal questions, 
both to newspapers and party officials cited in studies by Fitzpatrick, Goldman, Evans 
and Davies to name but a few, lends weight to this argument. However, the role played 
by state institutions in soliciting correspondence from the public, and providing them 
with the necessary language to relate to the state, as identified above, should not be 
understated. 
As previously discussed, Kotkin, along with Halpin and Hellbeck, note the possibility of 
‘half-belief’ among the population. However, to suggest that this was required of people 
as an unconscious tactic in the early Soviet regime is perhaps to place too high a 
premium on the role of total immersion in Bolshevik propaganda, at the expense of a 
genuine ambiguity in the attitudes of many Soviet citizens to the regime.105 In a 
discussion of the texts of lower-class Russians after the Revolution, Steinberg argues 
that ‘ambiguity and ambivalence are no less part of the ways people define their 
identities than are sharp convictions and strong faith’, by demonstrating the coexistence 
of the language of human dignity and rights with a disdain for those classed as 
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‘others’.106 Moreover, the complexity of Soviet identities should not be viewed as 
entirely disconnected from the Soviet Union’s pre-Revolutionary history, in a European 
context. Svetlana Boym’s work on everyday life reminds us that the concept of private 
life is ‘hardly featured in any pre-Revolutionary dictionary’, and that, as across Europe, 
personal identity has, historically been intertwined with a social or religious role.107 
Therefore that the ideal Soviet citizen was the opposite of the pre-Revolutionary 
‘Russian’ personality in the sense of religiosity appears to be a false dichotomy: the two 
were remarkably similar constructs in the primacy of an anti-individualist, social role, 
evidence of continuity connecting the social role of subjects and citizens before and 
after the Revolution.108 This is to some extent supported by the view apparently held by 
many Soviet women, of the family as an institution that should be upheld by the state, 
evidenced by the frequency of appeals to the state for intervention in family matters.109 
At this juncture, the increasing frequency with which women appealed to the state upon 
personal grounds prior to the Revolution acquires a greater significance.110 Letters from 
(female) citizens to the organs of state, however distinctively written, do not therefore 
constitute a uniquely ‘Soviet’ means of communication,  less still a novel method of 
straightforwardly whittling Soviet persons into appropriate shape. This practice, had a 
‘heritage’, so to speak, in its evolution through petitions and appeals from subjects to 
authorities.111 Upon this basis, we might posit that women were confident in the 
practice of negotiation with authorities, enabling them to pick up the practice of 
‘Speaking Bolshevik’ with relative ease. 
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Ultimately then, though clearly the solicitation of correspondence by Soviet officials did 
act as means of shaping public identity, and the use of Bolshevik language is a key 
consideration in this public correspondence, the concept of a public facet of personal 
identity as a purely Soviet or ‘official’ construct should not be exaggerated. Essentially, it 
must be concluded that the terms of expression used in public correspondence would 
be quite different to that used in personal relationships, despite whatever personal 
content may be expressed. If the premise that one individual might express dissent, 
agreement, and apathy almost concurrently is accepted, then it follows that the 
communication of Bolshevik language could be a two-way process, as Dobson asserts. 
Its variation from the language of the everyday, provides a ‘sense of these letter writers’ 
understanding of the discursive boundaries of the system in which they operated... [and] 
by reading between the lines, get a sense of how their own ideas and beliefs departed 
from the official script’.112 Therefore, for the study of women’s public correspondence, 
‘public letters’ would sensibly be characterised as communication with authorities, 
about private or public matters, couched in ‘Bolshevik’ language but rarely congruent 
with it. 
Having considered the role of ‘public’ letters as a source, in relation to the construction 
of the Soviet ‘self’ in the Stalin era, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions, and 
raise further questions. Firstly, the use of ‘official’ language in letter-writing is of key 
importance. Though Kotkin’s assertions that the ‘inescapable political lens of 
Bolshevism’ became the one vehicle for the articulation of citizens’ various 
understandings of themselves remains convincing in many ways, his account 
overemphasises the role of Bolshevism as a language to be learned.113 Instead, it seems 
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reasonable to accept that inherent to the phenomenon of ‘Speaking Bolshevik’ was both 
an ambiguity and flexibility in its public acceptance.114 In this sense, rather than 
learning to ‘Speak Bolshevik’ in order simply to articulate their senses of self, Soviet 
citizens instead navigated the new public identities, learning both how to acceptably 
articulate their understandings of themselves, and to use this language to express a 
range of opinions with relative safety. 115 It is clear from the existing literature that 
citizens’ letters to state organs were a valuable tool for individuals to reflect on their 
role in Soviet society, in Dobson’s words by ‘adopting the language of the regime’, and 
by subscribing to particular ‘acceptable’ social identities, such as peasant, or mother. 116 
This is broadly supported by Fitzpatrick’s research which, by tracing the various genres 
of public letter-writing, has outlined ways in which Soviet citizens related to the state, 
and how their use of ‘official’ language might reflect certain aspects of convergence 
between what can be termed ‘public’ and ‘private’ identities.117 Moreover, the kinds of 
issues raised by women, and the language they are couched in, indicate that women’s 
letters to officials and to newspapers are a valuable tool for analysing how the notion of 
the ‘Soviet woman’ was understood within wider society.  
 
Archival Materials and Key Considerations 
 
The thesis aims to reconcile the different approaches taken to letter-writings in the 
Soviet Union, asking how effective the authorities’ attempts were in shaping the new 
Soviet woman and her political and social outlook, and probing in depth both the 
reception of this language and the independent and sometimes challenging ways 
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women came to conceive of their own identity even as they communicated with the 
authorities. These letters employed terms quite distinct in their ideological character to 
the language presumably used in personal relationships, even on occasions when the 
content is intensely personal. However, letters undoubtedly give us a clear sense of the 
way their authors understand the boundaries created by the official discourse with 
which they were faced. By explicitly recognising the fluency with the practice of public 
correspondence amongst women – their self-conscious navigation of their 
contemporary discourse – the thesis intends not only to reconcile the strands of 
methodological historiography on the Soviet self in public correspondence, but to 
suggest a thread of continuity between the seemingly rather distinct early Soviet period 
with its preceding and subsequent histories.  This approach is intended to allow us to 
trace the ways women ‘stabilised’ (to some degree) Soviet gender policy, by adopting 
and, by bringing their own diverse lives to its ideology, reproducing, and yet also 
altering it. 
Viewing letters from Soviet women to officials and editorial boards in such a way will 
also account for the sheer variety amongst women’s voices by foregrounding women’s 
participation in the evolution of early Soviet discourse, and its translation into concrete 
policy. Building upon the literature by Dobson, Kaminsky, Fitzpatrick et al, which 
provides strong evidence of real pluralism amidst very real authoritarian restrictions, 
the thesis seeks to ‘frame’ the agency Soviet women demonstrate in their public letters 
in terms of a ‘snapshot’ of a longer history. To avoid falling into traps that the study 
seeks to redress – of constructing a rigidly singular narrative – the source base 
consulted for the study is large, constituted of around 850 individual letters, from the 
Russian State Archive (GARF), the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History 
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(RGASPI), and the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), the latter holding, quite 
unexpectedly, thousands of letters from citizens to the newspaper Krest’ianskaia gazeta. 
RGASPI and GARF respectively hold letters from citizens to officials such as: Nadezhda 
Konstantinovna Krupskaia (Deputy Minister for Education from 1929 until 1939), 
Andrei Ianuarievich Vyshinskii (Procurator General of the RSFSR , subsequently of the 
Soviet Union from 1931 until 1939), Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (Chairman of the 
Council of People’s Commissars from 1930 until 1941, equivalent to head of the Soviet 
government), Olga Davydovna Kameneva (a Soviet politician who held a handful of roles 
between 1918 and 1928), Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin (Chairman of the Central Executive 
Committee of the RSFSR until 1938, and subsequently Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet until 1946).118 Correspondence with the majority of these figures is 
included in the study. 119  Letters to newspapers such as Krest’ianskaia gazeta, 
Krest’ianka, and Pravda, as well as trade publications such as Krasniy bibliotekar’, Golos 
sakharnika have also been consulted. Letters were selected from the period of 1924 
until 1941, for both practical and historical reasons. A larger quantity of letters is 
available for the years after 1923, while 1924 also marks Lenin’s death. The study ends 
with the Soviet Union’s entry into the Great Patriotic War in 1941. 
Of letters to Molotov, Vyshinskii, and Kalinin, held in files titled ‘Letters received in the 
name of comrade [e.g.] Molotov for the year 1935’, those from women accounted for 
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between 0.54% and 7% of all letters. Spikes in letters from women occurred in 1935, 
1936 and 1937 – the years of the 1936 Constitution and its draft, as well as the 
escalation of the Great Terror. Correspondingly, these letters tended to be appeals, or 
comments upon the new Constitution or Decree. Indicating their volume, letters to 
Krupskaia from women had been archived according to their authorship by women, as 
reflected by the titles of the files, such as ‘Letters from women to N.K. Krupskaia about 
their lives, study, and work’, ‘Letters from women to N.K. Krupskaia concerning 
requests for material help’, and one file titled ‘Letters from women to N.K. Krupskaia on 
the position of women after the Revolution’.  Letters to Krest’ianka were primarily from 
women, though a very small minority (less than a handful) appeared from men. Letters 
from women to Krest’ianskaia gazeta reflect the proportions noted in the files of 
correspondence with male officials, whereas women were more highly represented in 
the files of letters to Krasniy bibliotekar’, a fact which will be addressed explicitly in the 
thesis in chapter three, on rights and obligations.   
Although the statistical distribution of these letters is interesting, the focus of the thesis 
is not a quantitative study of the letters available in the archives, which would have 
required focus on one ‘recipient’, be they an individual or newspaper editorship. Instead, 
the approach is similar to Sheila Fitzpatrick’s in ‘Supplicants and Citizens’, that is, an 
‘approach less of a census taker than that of a botanist exploring the variety of plant life 
in an unfamiliar terrain.’120 This approach allowed me to survey a broader range of 
letters – to officials, specific trade newspapers, as well as newspapers with wider 
circulation. In addition, it enabled me to gauge the frequency of different subjects and 
priorities in letters delivered to a range of recipients.  
                                                          
120 S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Supplicants and Citizens’, p. 81. 
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The representativeness of these sources also requires consideration. As established 
already, the analysis of these sources is not ‘quantitative’ but rather qualitative. The 
majority of letters from women (bar a few letters written in almost illegible 
handwriting) were reviewed. Certain characteristics and subject matters emerged as 
‘typical’ subject matters, recurring frequently across the body of letters reviewed, and 
letters which were particularly clear examples were transcribed.  These subject matters 
ultimately formed the argument, structure and organisation of the thesis overall, and 
once this was established, the body of transcribed letters was revisited to interrogate 
this hypothesis. The majority of letters were microfilm copies of originals, or originals, 
while some typewritten copies were included. Where letters were sent to magazine or 
newspaper editorships, some saw signs of editing with red pencil, though the majority 
were marked with the notation arkhiv. The unedited texts (i.e. the content beneath the 
red pencil) have been used for this thesis. In addition, state-solicited responses to 
legislation, more often collected and type-written stored separately to the editorial 
stocks of publications, have been reviewed. Examples of Soviet discourse itself are 
drawn from the rigorous research amongst the historiography on women in the early 
Soviet period. 
As with any history of texts produced by ‘ordinary’ citizens in the Soviet Union 
limitations of language and literacy require acknowledgement. By definition, the women 
about whom this study is written were compelled, for whatever reason (although as 
Sarah Davies has pointed out, these aims were often utilitarian), to write to authorities 
about their lives.121 As will be addressed later in the study, literacy was by no means 
universal in the early years of the Soviet Union, nor was the desire to engage with 
                                                          
121 S. Davies, ‘The “Cult” of the Vozhd’: Representations in Letters, 1934-1941’, Russian History, 24: 1-2, 
(1997), p. 132. 
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authorities. Efforts have been made to include where possible the voices of women 
whose letters were written by a proxy, and the liquidation of illiteracy among different 
‘groups’ of women is explicitly addressed in the body of the study. Though the women 
whose voices are consulted in this study possess a variety of nationalities, as befitting a 
federative body as vast as the Soviet Union, these letters are, for quite practical reasons, 
written solely in Russian. A related, but distinct, process of colonial transformation took 
place concurrently in the cultural ‘peripheries’ of the Soviet Union.122 Soviet leaders had 
insisted that their state could not be an empire, not least since it viewed Russian 
peasants as backwards, patriarchal figures, and many of the measures they introduced 
across Central Asia were not in and of themselves colonial measures. However, as 
Douglas Northrop has shown, the degree to which perceptions of mutual difference 
between Soviet policymakers and Central Asian people shaped the particularities of 
Bolshevik policy in the Central Asian Republics denotes that the Soviet Union was 
fundamentally colonial in its approach.123 Bolsheviks saw themselves as a ‘transmission 
belt’ for European cultural ‘norms’ such as gender equality, and social reforms, and 
hoped that Central Asian communities would acquire ‘a lexicon of politics and cultural 
identity that Bolshevik rank-and-file workers could recognise.124 Though this resulted 
in various modes of colonial power relations across the Soviet Union, what emerged 
alongside this was a strong rhetoric of liberation, particularly in terms of gender. 
Though the policies associated with ‘Bolshevik liberation’ were often met with 
resistance or non-engagement, this rhetoric of liberation could and was employed by 
                                                          
122 Though non-Russian identities were frequently considered distinct, or as a colonial ‘peripheral’ by 
Soviet policymakers, as the introduction has suggested, this thesis seeks to challenge the assumption that 
these identities were ever really ‘peripheral’ to that of the New Soviet Woman. Moreover, as Northrop 
argues, a similar process of ‘mutual reshaping’ as has been identified by this thesis resulted from the 
ongoing encounters between Soviet authorities and, in his case study, Uzbek society: D. Northrop, Veiled 
Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia, (London, 2004). 
123 Northrop, Veiled Empire, pp. 21-22. 
124 Northrop, Veiled Empire, p. 23. 
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women from non-Russian republics in a variety of contexts. The thesis proposes that, 
amongst those women who wrote to authorities in Russian, or signed their names 
against such missives, women often found great ‘utility’ in their identities as ‘non-
Russian’ Soviet women, though the opportunities they afforded may not have been as 
extensive as those open to Russian Soviet women.125  
The sources examined also present an extraordinarily varied range of preoccupations 
amongst women writing to authorities. The major strands of analysis have therefore 
been self-selecting, based upon the underlying commonalities possessed by the diverse 
source material. In order to do justice to the material, these ‘self-selected’ themes will 
form the overall framework for the study, whilst still seeking to account for the diversity 
of backgrounds, sexualities and family lives integral to the community of writers. As a 
point of principle, all writers who self-present as female are included in the study, 
which will not attempt to formulate politicised notions of the ‘veracity’ of gender 
presentation. A full exploration of gender diversity in the Soviet Union would 
necessitate a separate study in order to do justice to these citizens. 
Executing the methodology in this way will enrich debates about the existence of society 
in the Soviet Union beyond the rigidly dichotomous interpretations to which it is all too 
easy to defer. Ultimately, in doing so, the thesis hopes to contribute to the growing body 
of work intended to understand the pluralism of the women of the Soviet Union – 
beyond assumptions about traditional social categories of peasants, older women, 
religious women, and segmentation solely along national or ethnic lines – and to begin 
to write coherent histories drawn from multiple, and representative, narratives. In this 
                                                          
125 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism, (London, 
2006), p.99, and ‘Pilgrimage and Performance: Uzbek Women and the Imagining of Uzbekistan in the 
1920s’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 34:2, (2002), p. 264. 
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way, the thesis seeks to emphasise the agency, intelligence and self-possession of 
women in the Soviet Union, suggesting that women actively sought to accommodate 
their ‘actually existing’ lives and circumstances within the ideological framework of the 
Soviet Union. 
 
The Articulation of the ‘Soviet Self’ by New Soviet Women: Emerging 
Themes 
 
The first chapter of the thesis to follow will deal with the ways that generation, or 
generational cohort affected the way in which emancipation is understood by women. 
One issue that has been little addressed in the historiography thus far, despite having 
formed a salient ‘counterpart’ to the New Soviet Woman, and will serve as a ‘case study’ 
of sorts will be that of old age and the succession of ‘generations’ which followed the 
Revolution. In other words, it will examine how far the coincidence of the Revolution 
(and its subsequent ‘efforts’ at women’s emancipation) with certain stages in the 
normative life cycle affected conceptions of what it meant to be an emancipated 
communist woman. Though a variety of studies, such as that by Anne Gorsuch, have 
dealt with the experience of Soviet gender amongst Soviet youth their diverse lives and 
identities, this research will address important questions about how women of different 
generational cohorts understood the concept of the new and emancipated Soviet 
woman, and in particular, the way their cohort identity differentiated their  experiences 
from those of older or younger women.126 Rooting the discussion of generation in 
cohort identity, and old age, in this way will define the scope of this portion of the study, 
and provide a point of discussion for a fuller exploration of the responses of women 
                                                          
126 A. E. Gorsuch, ‘”A Woman Is Not a Man”: The Culture of Gender and Generation in Soviet Russia, 1921-
1928’, Slavic Review, 55:3, (Autumn, 1996), pp. 636-660. 
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from older generations and different circumstances. These conclusions will also aid 
understanding of how generational cohort affected identity formation in this period, 
and will lend itself well to further discussions of other influences on women’s view of 
emancipation in this period: family bonds, marriage, motherhood and other such 
personal circumstances. 
In the context of the conclusions made in the first chapter on generations, the second 
chapter will deal with women’s emotions, addressing the question of how women dealt 
with emotions – particularly negative emotions, which were considered unnecessary or 
illogical in the new Soviet society – in the context of Soviet womanhood and 
emancipation. Primarily, the chapter will seek to understand what women’s emotional 
responses to different aspects of their lives can tell us about how ‘emancipated’ Soviet 
women saw themselves in the Soviet 1920s and 1930s. This forms part of a larger 
discussion of negative emotions, and the extent to which they were considered ‘un-
Soviet’ within a socialist society that did not acknowledge mental illness, suicide or 
negative emotion as possibilities. 
The third chapter addresses the question of how far women appropriated different 
aspects of ‘emancipation’ as rights. In particular, I seek to demonstrate which aspects of 
Soviet gender policy were received in this way, and by whom, building upon the 
conclusions drawn about generation in the previous chapter. This chapter complements 
the work already undertaken on the topic of ‘rights-speak’ as a phenomenon in the 
Soviet Union, by building an understanding of women’s perceptions of ‘rights’, and the 
distinctions drawn – such as ‘human’, ‘citizen’ and ‘worker/toiler’.  In addition, I aim to 
address invocations of humanity in women’s self-expression and emotional writing, 
identifying the origins of this feature – whether Soviet or pre-Revolutionary – and 
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examining how women related their humanity to the project of the new Soviet woman. 
Finally, the chapter will examine the question of women’s responses to behaviour or 
events that they felt infringed upon their rights, or denied them the returns for 
obligations fulfilled. The understandings displayed by women of their rights against this 
behaviour will provide an example of the ways in which understandings of citizenship 
and rights affected emotional responses to such exchanges and affected personal 
relationships. This portion of the chapter will trace the ways in which women identify 
the dissonance between Soviet gender policy and ‘emancipation’, and male attitudes 
and behaviour, and how women sought to assert their rights against abusive or 
disrespectful behaviour. Ending the chapter with this study will set a context for the 
discussion in the final chapter of how these influences on Soviet life and discourse 
affected personal relationships. 
The issue of personal relationships builds on the discussions of women’s sense of ‘rights’ 
particularly against disrespect and discrimination, and their concepts of their emotional 
lives. The focus of this chapter is the flexibility of family and marital units, and the ease 
with which women accepted this fluidity. Studies have clearly and repeatedly indicated 
that many, particularly married, women’s responses to certain aspects of family 
legislation were often governed by family relationships and marital partnerships. 
Responses to increasingly punitive alimony laws demonstrate this perhaps most visibly. 
That said, other studies, such as Fitzpatrick’s account of the sexual mores of students, 
reflect a more contradictory attitude to ‘traditional’ heterosexual relationships, 
indicating the sheer variety of experiences, attitudes, and responses amongst Soviet 
women.127 This raises the question of how women’s relationships and social bonds 
                                                          
127 S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Sex and Revolution: An Examination of Literary and Statistical Data on the Mores of 
Soviet Students in the 1920s’, The Journal of Modern History, 50:2, (June, 1978), p. 252-278. 
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might have been affected by Soviet policy and ideology in the 1920s and 1930s, and if 
they were differently affected according to generation. 
In the four chapters outlined above, the thesis will argue that women of all ages and 
backgrounds in the Soviet Union actively engaged with authorities, in letters to officials, 
policymakers and newspapers, to carve an acceptable ideological ‘place’ for their 
individual lives, share their concerns, and at times, express dissent. Women engaged in 
this process of social identity construction, or reconstruction, through the process of 
‘Speaking Bolshevik’. Although the specifics of their public identities were, to some 
extent, prescribed by the scope of discourse that dominated at any given time, women 
exercised a considerable amount of agency in the selection and crafting of the identities 
they presented, and the elements of their lives they chose to share. In doing so, they 
cemented their roles as historical actors in the history of the Soviet Union. 
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Chapter One 
‘Grandma, they call me’: Generational Cohorts, Cooperation, and 
Transformation in the New Soviet State 
 
Soviet discourse was saturated with references to ‘generation’, and in particular to 
youth. As the element of the population who would grow up entirely under Soviet 
power, free from the effects of pre-Revolutionary influences, Anne Gorsuch has 
suggested that ‘Soviet youth were considered one of the most vital targets in the 
struggle for social transformation and cultural construction.’1 Early Soviet ideology 
constructed a system of generations which was, at least in principle, one of conflict 
between ‘old’ and ‘young’. In practice, this proved impossible to maintain. Though older 
people – as did women – represented a link to the tsarist past, their experiences of the 
darkness of the ‘old’ society provided a valuable discursive counterpart to the bright 
and happy socialist childhoods of the present and future. Additionally, the 
marginalisation of the elderly could never be absolute: as health, social hygiene and 
medicine improved with the construction of socialism, Soviet citizens would live longer 
– with the ultimate goal of the ‘abolition of death’.2 Younger generations, on the other 
hand, were tasked with the responsibility of the active construction of socialism, and 
satisfactory participation in the new Soviet society. The expectations of their ‘fluency’ 
with Bolshevik practices were higher, and fewer exceptions were made for slips in their 
revolutionary performance. But what was meant by generation in the early Soviet 
context? 
                                                          
1 A. Gorsuch, ‘Flappers and Foxtrotters: Soviet Youth in the “Roaring Twenties“, The Carl Beck Papers in 
Russian and East European Studies, 1102, (1994), pp. 2-3. 
2 S. Lovell, ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Bd. 51, 
H. 4, (2003), p. 567. 
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The ‘problem’ of generation has been studied both as a historical concept, and often as a 
sociological concept with explicit reference to ‘youth’ cohorts as a foundation stone. In 
relation to the Soviet and Russian examples, a number of fascinating studies have 
convincingly argued for an empirically definable ‘first Soviet generation’, evaluating age 
in relation to historical factors such as the Revolution and the civil war.3  However, 
relatively little research exists thus far to explain generation in a way that addresses 
both old age and youth in an historical context. That generation implies relativity works 
both ways.4 As Lovell notes, that older people as a ‘cohort’, particularly in the 1920s, 
were outnumbered by youths, and they were not well represented institutionally, but 
this does not mean that their relationship to ‘youth’ was necessarily fixed in the pattern 
of opposition that is so commonly assumed.5 Instead, it would be more accurate to 
suggest that the relationship between generational cohorts was one characterised by 
cohesion, as much as conflict, not least due to the persistence of familial and community 
relationships throughout the period in question. Rex Wade, appraising the 
historiographical work on Russian generations, summarised the generational structure 
of Russia through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as one in which ‘conflict was 
there, but so was co-operation, and the handing of values from one generation to 
another.’6  I contend that women of older and younger generations were both 
ideologically and socially ‘necessary’ for the Soviet state to function: both faced 
particular sets of obstacles to their successful participation in Soviet life, and both 
                                                          
3 See, for example, D. Koenker, ‘Fathers Against Sons, Sons Against Fathers: The Problem of Generations in 
the Early Soviet Workplace’, Journal of Modern History, 3:4, (2001), pp. 781-810; A.E. Gorsuch, Youth in 
Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents, (Michigan, 2000); A. Krylova, ‘Identity, Agency 
and ‘The First Soviet Generation’’. S. Lovell (ed.), Generations in Twentieth Century Europe, (Basingstoke, 
2003), pp. 101-121; M. Neumann, ‘’Youth, It’s Your Turn!’: Generations and the Fate of the Russian 
Revolution (1917-1932)’, Journal of Social History, 46:2, (2002), pp. 273-304.  
4 S. Lovell, ‘Introduction’, Lovell (ed.), Generations in Twentieth Century Europe, (Basingstoke, 2007), p. 4 
5 Lovell, ‘Soviet Russia’s Older Generations’, p. 205. 
6 R. Wade, ‘Introduction: Generations in Russian and Soviet History’, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 
32:2-3, (2005), p., 135.  
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exercised agency as women in their navigation of the ideological contradictions 
inherent to their roles in public life. Ultimately, women of all ages were familiar with the 
discursive nuance appropriate to their generational cohort, and were able to assign 
their experiences with relevant social ‘roles’, highlighting their autonomy and securing 
their roles as meaningful historical actors. 
 
Old Age and the New Soviet Woman 
 
Older people, those who grew up in the pre-Revolutionary society occupied only a 
marginal space in early Soviet discourse, appearing, when they appeared at all, as 
remnants of the tsarist past, in opposition to the untarnished Soviet youth. 
Formulations of the ‘older’ generation were peculiarly gendered in the early Soviet state. 
Eric Naiman and Hannah Proctor have examined the dialecticism of the position of 
women and their bodies in early Bolshevik discourse in relation to the communist 
future.7 Indeed, the work of the aforementioned anatamo-historical scientist, Anton 
Vital’evich Nemilov, in the Biological Tragedy of Woman, encapsulated the gendered 
anxieties about women in adulthood and beyond that formed much of Soviet discourse 
of the time: 
A purely ‘human’ feature of the female sexual apparatus is the marked development of the 
organs of lust [organy sladostrastiia] […]  Even in communist society, when not only in word 
but in deed woman will have equal rights with man, her comrade, when there will be public 
cafeterias, and when the public upbringing of children will have been organised, the 
                                                          
7 H. Proctor, ‘Women on the Edge of Time: Representations of Revolutionary Motherhood in the NEP-era 
Soviet Union’, Studies in the Maternal, 7:1, (2015), pp. 1-20, Eric Naiman, Sex in Public: the Incarnation of 
Early Soviet Ideology, (Princeton, 1997), in particular chapter five: ‘NEP as Female Copmlaint (I): The 
Tragedy of Woman’. 
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‘biological tragedy’ will remain… in a woman it is precisely the menopause that marks the 
start of the infirmities of old age and is a terrifying herald of death8 
Though ominous, this hyperbolic appraisal was an augmentation of Bolshevik anxieties 
about women’s apparently ‘monumental’, cyclical time. It divorced her intrinsic 
corporeal traits from the ‘backwardness’ she had inherited from pre-Revolutionary 
social norms in order to assign to her responsibility for any interference she might 
make with the construction of socialism. This reformulation of woman as she aged cast 
her as an inevitable, perpetual victim of her own immutable physiology, and arguably, 
as one whose marginalisation from Soviet society was desirable, if unrealistic. Casting 
aside the obvious biological essentialism and misogynistic implications about the social 
risks inherent to the female body, such an approach to biology and sex suggested that 
once women reached menopause, their social role became ultimately obsolete. 
Nemilov’s account here is full of a peculiar revulsion, but its sentiments were not 
altogether unusual, reflecting contemporary ideological anxieties about youth and 
generation, about the female body, and its genealogical relation to the tsarist past as 
well as its undesirability and its sheer necessity to the Soviet future. As V. Yu Smirnova 
has shown, the female body was, in the popular press as elsewhere, a particular focus of 
attention as the element of womanhood ‘most [visibly] susceptible to age-related 
changes’.9 Women ‘past their youth’ were frequently posed not only as a threat to the 
health of the new Soviet society, but to the health of the new Soviet man himself. Sex 
education and public health posters were predominantly designed to appeal to men, 
inciting fears of feminine danger. The most vivid threats to men’s health in the 1920s 
were the prostitute in the city and the babka in the country, both of whom represented 
                                                          
8 A.V. Nemoliv, Biologicheskaia tragediia zhenshchiny, (Leningrad, 1925), p. 46, cited in Naiman, Sex in 
Public, and then independently sourced. 
9 V. Yu. Smirnova, ‘Konstruirovanie vozrasta v zhurnale ‘Rabotnitsa’ v sovetskoe vremia’, Zhenshchina v 
rossijskom obshchestve, 1, (2016), p. 93 
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feminine elements of pre-Revolutionary society.10 Political posters shed light on the 
contribution of public health to the formulation of the idealised ‘New Soviet Man and 
Woman’ and the employment of a medical-scientific discourse, which tied together 
biological age and generational outlook, to legitimise gender difference in the new, 
supposedly egalitarian, society. If public health discourse addressed women directly, it 
was as potential mothers. When older women were acknowledged at all, it was as a 
superstitious folk-healers who actively prevented socialist progress, or unwitting 
obstacles to socialist progress.11 Raising and educating healthy Soviet citizens was a key 
priority for the state in its infancy. Older women, who had served as caregivers, 
midwives, and educators prior to the Revolution, represented a spectre from the past to 
be swept aside by the revolutionary work of their youthful (masculine) counterparts.  
 
Reflecting the level of priority that young people occupied in the 1920s and 1930s, 
youth organisations such as the Komsomol, for those aged between fifteen and twenty-
eight, the Pioneers, for those between nine and fifteen, and the Little Octobrists, for 
seven to nine year olds, well outlived the women’s organisation the Zhenotdel which 
was formally shut down in 1930. In posters, women who appeared to be beyond the age 
range of the Komsomol appeared rarely.12 Though by 1933 the social significance of the 
older generations was being reappraised to some extent, the imagery of the 1930s 
featured almost exclusively young women, able-bodied collective farm workers, or 
                                                          
10 F.L. Bernstein, ‘Envisioning health in revolutionary Russia: the politics of gender in sexual-
enlightenment posters of the 1920s’, Russian Review, 57:2, (1998), pp. 191-217.    
11 Rose Glickman provides an overview of the construction of the older peasant woman as a spiritual 
healer before and after the Revolution in ‘The Peasant Woman as Healer’, in B. Evans Clements, B.A. Engel, 
C.D. Worobec, (eds), Russia’s Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation, (Oxford, 1991), pp. 
148-162. 
12 E. Waters, ‘The Female Form in Soviet Political Iconography’, in B. Evans Clements, B.A. Engel, C.D. 
Worobec, (eds), Russia’s Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation, (Oxford, 1991), pp. 236-8. 
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mothers.13 Older women tended to be featured in relation to younger generations – and 
they were often compared unfavourably, as ‘impediments’ to the smooth functioning of 
Soviet daily life. A cartoon in the November 1936 issue of Krokodil depicted a baby boy, 
crying having been reprimanded for tearing up his father’s copy of a ‘mandate’, whilst 
under the supervision of his elderly grandmother, who stares on bewildered. On the 
following page, a cartoon depicts an old woman sitting at the bedside of her grandson, 
who disdainfully corrects her understanding of bureaucratic procedure.14 Though they 
appeared independently of their generational identity more frequently,  when younger 
women appeared in relation to their children the emphasis was on the need for them to 
be ‘better’ mothers.15 Though Soviet ideology had reluctantly accepted the existence of 
its older citizens by the mid-1930s, their relationship to the new Soviet generation was 
to be one of free, if not unproblematic childcare. 
This rather benign view of the elderly was not necessarily typical, however, of the 
discourses on age in the early revolutionary period. Somewhat ironically, given his own 
advanced age amongst Bolshevik revolutionaries, Lenin, in a speech to the Third 
Komsomol Congress in 1920, stated that: 
The old society was based on the principle: rob or be robbed; work for others or make 
others work for you; be a slave-owner or a slave. Naturally, people brought up in such a 
society assimilate with their mother's milk, one might say, the psychology, the habit, the 
concept which says: you are either a slave-owner or a slave, or else, a small owner, a petty 
employee, a petty official, or an intellectual -- in short, a man who is concerned only with 
himself, and does not care a rap for anybody else.16 
In short, the influences on a person imparted by their early years were considered 
irreversible, highlighting the importance of ‘youth’, and the danger of those remnants of 
                                                          
13 Krokodil, 1936, No .32, pp. 7. 
14 Krokodil, 1936, No .32, pp. 7. 
15 Krokodil, 1933, No. 1, p. 12. 
16 V. I. Lenin, ‘”The Tasks of the Youth Leagues” a speech delivered at the Third All-Russia Congress of the 
Russian Young Communist League, October 2, 1920’, in V. I. Lenin on Youth, (Moscow, 1967), p. 239. 
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the ‘old society’. Notable, too, is the allegorical reference to the maternal role as a link to 
the past, and key to the future. Those people brought up in the old society posed a risk 
to the success of the Revolution, because their mothers ostensibly tied them to the pre-
Revolutionary mind-set. The allegory recalls Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’, which claims 
that women’s reproductive functions represent a cyclical time or eternity, rather than a 
future-driven linear time – that which formed the basis of the new Soviet state. In the 
same speech, Lenin referred to the place of the older generation in this Soviet future, in 
relation to youth, presenting a rather dire picture of their role in the socialist future: 
It was the task of the older generation to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The main task then was 
to criticise the bourgeoisie, arouse hatred of the bourgeoisie among the masses, and foster 
class-consciousness and the ability to unite their forces… [but] The generation of people who 
are now at the age of fifty cannot expect to see a communist society. This generation will be 
gone before then. But the generation of those who are now fifteen will see a communist 
society, and will itself build this society17 
These portions of the speech in particular are interesting, because the social value of the 
older generation is presented in a noticeably negative light. Though ‘older’ people have 
played a valuable role in the revolutionary process, this role is over; the bourgeois 
influences of their earlier years insurmountable. Soviet society, founded upon a 
rejection of the bourgeois past and the construction of a socialist future, viewed the 
builders of the bourgeois past with suspicion.  
Moreover, as Smirnova has shown in her study of the construction of age in Rabotnitsa, 
that language employed in public forums such as this acted as means of the formation of 
social power, rather than simply an expression of it – Lenin’s declarations therefore 
served to ‘Sovietise’ popular ideas about the social value, and ideological power of 
                                                          
17 V.I. Lenin, ‘The Tasks of the Youth Leagues’, p. 236. 
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externally defined generations. 18 Though the ill-defined ‘older generation’ were 
ideologically disempowered in Soviet society, they were still practically expected and 
compelled to contribute to the construction of socialism while they were alive. This 
established the necessity for the ‘older generation’ to reconcile itself somehow with the 
regime. However, though Lenin makes some reference to the general age range 
determining one’s ‘generation’ (those raised before 1917), it is unclear who exactly 
constitute the ‘older’ generation.  
According to the Soviet social psychologist Nikolai Rybnikov it was those aged fifty or 
over, due to the steep decline in labour productivity after this age.19 The 1920 census 
had shown that there were almost twenty million people over the age of 49 (including 
Lenin), a significant challenge to a country that viewed its elderly as a symbol of the old 
regime and the cultural backwardness of its subjects.20Despite his own membership of 
the social category, Lenin, in his speech to the Third Komsomol Congress, evidently 
classed those aged fifty or above as part of an ‘older generation’, though there is an large 
gap between those who will build a communist society – aged fifteen – and those – aged 
fifty – who will not.  In the speech as a whole, Lenin referred to ‘generation’ twenty-four 
times, frequently in the context of opposition, and images of generational conflict 
remained a central feature of revolutionary discourse, appearing as a social category 
second only to class.21 Though ideologically central, concepts of ‘generation’ as a point 
of political conflict were relatively ambiguous, and, in the first years of the Soviet state, 
                                                          
18 Smirnova, ‘Konstruirovanie vozrasta v zhurnale ‘Rabotnitsa’ v sovetskoe vremia’, p. 93. 
19 S. Lovell, ‘Soviet Russia’s Older Generations’, S. Lovell (ed.), Generations in Twentieth Century Europe, 
(Basingstoke, 2007), p. 206. 
20 Lovell, ‘Soviet Russia’s Older Generations’, p. 206.  
21 The frequency of Lenin’s references to ‘generation’ in the speech to the Third Komsomol Congress is 
highlighted by Matthias Neumann in ‘Youth, It’s Your Turn!’, p. 275. It was directly mentioned 24 times. 
Additionally, as discussed earlier, older generations frequently appeared in early Soviet imagery as a 
point of contrast to ‘newer’ and more Soviet generations.  
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one’s generational cohort carried immense ideological importance for social, political 
and gender identities amongst the Soviet population. 
Theoretically, the survival of older generations into the first decades of the New Soviet 
state caused Soviet thinkers quite the headache, though as Lovell points out, the Soviet 
state did not ‘seem to trouble itself much over the living conditions of the great majority 
of its old people’.22 Indeed, Golfo Alexopoulos’ Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens and the 
Soviet State reveals that some communities took away the civil rights of their residents, 
if over a certain age threshold.23 In the early 1920s, elderly people were ‘all but absent’ 
in systems of social security. Pensions were only available in cases of invalidity, 
maiming and the loss of a breadwinner, the first of the three being the only criteria upon 
which an old age pension could be drawn. There was also no formal age of retirement – 
old age was framed by the 1918 Code on Labour Laws as a cause of invalidity, rather 
than a category of insurance itself.24 Though legislation was introduced in 1925 to 
establish pensions for teachers in rural regions, eligibility was dependent upon the 
provision of proof of at least five years’ service to Soviet education.25 
Evidently, those over the age of fifty were considered to be fit to work, and certainly 
some will have been – a questionnaire circulated by Rybnikov to those over the age of 
49 revealed that many faced their ‘old age’ and social disenfranchisement with stoicism 
or defiance. Some took up gymnastics.26 Moreover, Smirnova has suggested that ‘age’, or 
‘youth’ to be more specific was thus constituted in part by a set of particular 
characteristics, distinct from its bodily and chronological components. Perhaps most 
significantly, a physical ability and sense of enthusiasm to participate in the 
                                                          
22 Lovell, ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, p. 564. 
23 G. Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens and the Soviet State, (New York, 2003), pp. 68-9. 
24 Lovell, ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, p. 572. 
25 Lovell, ‘Soviet Russia’s Older Generations’, p. 207. 
26 Lovell, ‘Soviet Russia’s Older Generations’, p. 206. 
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construction of the country in its youth were certainly integral to this definition of 
‘youth’.27 Lovell, too, in ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, argues that 
Soviet views of older and younger generations were, in reality, more fluid than one 
might assume.28 This ambiguity was borne out to some extent by a corresponding shift 
in the discursive representation of relations between old and young.  
By the 1930s, the ambiguity surrounding old age was accommodated in Soviet 
discourse, to a degree. Lovell suggests that older people represented ‘and 
unquestionable source of moral and cultural authority’, having experienced the misery 
of pre-Revolutionary life, and now being able to attest to the liberty and joyousness 
espoused by the new state. Likewise, the older generation could more reliably narrate 
the ‘foundation narrative of the USSR, having been politically conscious for longer than 
the regime had been in existence.29 Older people, by virtue of their personal histories of 
Revolution, could draw upon these experiences to distinguish themselves from the 
younger generations, excusing certain complaints or demands, as well as 
mistranslations in the process of ‘Speaking Bolshevik’. As Rex Wade notes, the discourse 
that emerged in the 1930s on the ‘value of the older generation sometimes translated 
itself into genuine benefits’, both practically and symbolically.30 The value of older 
generations were thus ‘woven in’ to discourse on the construction of socialism (and 
subsequently communism), by virtue of the eternal significance of their revolutionary 
work. The cover of Krokodil’s November 1936 ‘special edition’ in celebration of the 
Stalin Constitution showed a crowd headed by a youthful Soviet Man and Woman. A 
likeness of Lenin was featured near the front of the crowd, and on his shoulder, an 
                                                          
27 Smirnova, ‘Konstruirovanie vozrasta v zhurnale ‘Rabotnitsa’ v sovetskoe vremia’, p. 94. 
28 Lovell, ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, pp. 564-585. 
29 Lovell, ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, p. 579. 
30 Wade, ‘Introduction: Generations in Russian and Soviet History’, p. 137. 
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ambiguously aged woman carrying a small child. The cartoon was accompanied by a 
rhyme, which suggests not only that the Soviet aim that death be ‘abolished’ would see 
fruition, but that the longevity of the Soviet Union itself ‘undoes’ the old age of its 
builders: 
Up to one hundred years (Let do sta rasti) 
For us without old age (Nam bez starosti) 
Year on year [it] grows (God ot goda rasti) 
Our cheerfulness (Nashej bodrosti)31 
Despite efforts towards the symbolic abolition of death and old age posited by discourse 
in the 1930s, it remained a fact that the older generation would not in actuality witness 
very much, if any, of the achievement of communism. Moreover, although they could 
theoretically bear witness to the wretchedness of the past, women were still forced to 
grapple with their pre-Revolutionary roles of child-rearing, and the symbolic 
reproduction of the modes of the ancien régime. Women therefore formulated their 
generational identity, this thesis posits, by emphasising both their revolutionary work, 
and the sense of transformation the Revolution had brought to their lives, in an almost 
eschatological sense.32 Often, their lives were presented as ‘beginning’ with the re-birth 
of the Revolution. This sense of transformation allowed women to present their lives 
prior to the Revolution, almost as a sacrifice to the regime that made the shining future 
possible. Unable to live to experience (much of) the joyous socialist society under 
construction, their lives were transformed as a result, and their efforts towards Soviet 
society’s consolidation remained as their ‘legacy’. Lovell suggests that the ‘triumphalist 
conclusions’ of old people’s lives were lent poignancy by the brevity of the time spent as 
                                                          
31 Krokodil, 1936, No. 32, p. 1. 
32 The eschatological rhetoric inherent to Bolshevik discourse is outlined, by both Halfin and Manchester, 
though it is worth noting that straightforward explanations for Bolshevism as having its ‘roots’ in 
Orthodoxy are, as Manchester suggests, flawed. L. Manchester, Holy Fathers, Secular Sons: Clergy, 
Intelligentsia and the Modern Self in Revolutionary Russia, (Illinois, 2008); I. Halfin, From Darkness to Light. 
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Soviet citizens, citing the worker and model autobiography writer Agrippina 
Korevanova in her 1935 Izvestiia piece: ‘My age tells me that the time is approaching to 
die, but I haven’t lived yet, I’ve just arrived in the world and want to live.’33 So it is 
evident that, by the 1930s, which were relatively ambiguous in their approach to 
generation, older women’s experiences were gendered. Yet the shared experiences of 
older women of the overhaul of the Revolution indicates the formulation of a set of 
shared values and techniques in relating their ageing lives to Soviet discourse. 
Wade suggests in his introduction to the study of generations in the Soviet and Russian 
examples, that ‘[g]enealogical relations are obvious, but we also talk about generations 
as a larger and more complex phenomenon, as cohorts of people with certain 
characteristics or value systems’.34 These value systems were not necessarily held in 
direct, or constant conflict, particularly in letters from older women. Melanie Ilič in Life 
Stories of Soviet Women, also notes that, though she had ascribed a generational identity 
to her respondents based on their dates of birth, they related their own lives to ‘defining’ 
events experienced in their lives.35 Therefore, although we can deduce certain details 
about our letter-writers’ lives based on the dates and ages they provide, it is important 
to acknowledge the role that self-selected ‘defining events’ played in women’s lives in 
the crafting of generational identities and values. It is necessary therefore to reconcile 
conclusions about the genealogical, or chronological relationship between cohorts with 
the complex relationships of different cohorts with social or historical events and 
processes, such as the Revolution, or the tsarist past. In doing so, it is possible to 
identify how women’s public letter-writing relates to formulations of female old age in 
                                                          
33 A. Korevanova, ‘Kak ia zhila i kaki a ostalas’ zhiva’, Izvestiia, 8 March 1935, p. 4: cited by Stephen Lovell 
in ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age, p. 579, and independently checked. 
34 Wade, ‘Introduction: Generations in Russian and Soviet History’, p. 127. 
35 M. Ilič, Life Stories of Soviet Women: the Interwar Generation, (London, 2013), p. 9. 
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the period, as well as to youth. Letters in which girls and women discussed the ‘old’ or 
‘dark’ pre-Revolutionary past inherently implicate those who actively participated in 
this life. However, tales of pre-Revolutionary life sought to reconcile the experience to 
that of the Soviet present, and relate to youth as it proceeded before the Revolution as a 
point of comparison, or during the Revolution, as evidence of revolutionary work.  In 
this way, the significance of social milestones to the Soviet regime effectively reinforced 
women’s self-identity as historical actors.  
Women themselves in their letters demonstrated their understanding of their 
generational identities as one involving both genealogical progression, and the 
evolution of successive shared value systems, which were not necessarily in conflict. In 
1930, a woman named Arganova wrote to Nadezhda Krupskaia, the Minister for 
Education, and, incidentally, Lenin’s widow, simply to reach out and describe her 
achievements. Having reached what she described as the final days of her life, she 
recalled her life and achievements: 
Dear Nadezhda Konstantinovna! 
Finally, I arranged to write a letter to You. What made me write this letter? I have reached 
my final days…. With a feeling of pride and deep satisfaction I note, that I did not stay aside 
from that which the revolution required…. I am illiterate, but you know… living among 
Chechens… that literacy – it is the first issue. At first they didn’t believe me and didn’t listen, 
then I arranged to take ten poor girls myself to the city of Grozny, to study. So I did each year 
in Spring and Winter.36 
The life Arganova described involves many aspects of identity: rural location in the 
Caucasus, far from the centre of power; maternity, literacy and suffering. However, 
Arganova referred with considerable frequency to her generational identity: 
                                                          
36 GARF, f. 7279, op. 8, d. 15, ll. 33-34. 
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Each time, I remembered my dead daughter and each time I said to myself: “all these poor, 
unenlightened girls – my children, my daughters, and Soviet power – it possesses the power 
to bring the new to lives …. Now, after some years, when I again take someone to the city to 
learn, I hear: “Grandmother Arganova!” or: “here comes our mother!”[…] They were the ones 
I took to the city a few years ago, to learn[…] I am joyful and very well[…]  I know that I will 
die, but I know the undertaking will never die. I did something useful, and that makes me 
feel good!37 
What is striking about the letter is that, despite being authored by a woman from the 
Soviet Caucasus, and far from the centre of power, it was not framed in terms of region, 
or lifestyle, but in terms of generation and gender. By identifying herself in a social 
context as ‘mother’ and ‘grandmother’, referring to the ‘daughters’ she aided in their 
education, Arganova expressed her sense of location in the generational lineage she 
perceived as constituting the society in which she lived. Though our impressions are 
based on a single letter from (if Arganova’s doctor was correct) the end of a woman’s 
life, the actions and aspects of her identity that Arganova chose to relay to Krupskaia are 
explicitly related to her age. Her suggested commitment to revolutionary goals at that 
moment was undeniably remarkable, as was her explicit statement of pride that her 
legacy was a contribution to the construction of socialism through the facilitation of the 
education of young women. 
Arganova’s attitude to literacy at the end of her life in 1930 emphasised her sense of 
emotional meaning she found in her contribution to the literacy programmes in her 
community, reflecting too her awareness of the ideological connotations of her 
generational cohort: 
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I’m illiterate, but you know… literacy, it is the main thing…. I myself took ten girls to the city 
[to learn]. So I did every spring and winter. I know that I will die, but I know the undertaking 
will never die. I did something useful, and that makes me feel good38  
Additionally, a focus on literacy sheds light on the significance of Arganova’s words as 
they relate to her generational identity. The literacy rate among Chechens in 1917 had 
been recorded as less than 1 per cent, amongst both men and women.39 Arganova’s 
efforts for the girls in her community arguably held great significance for the 
construction of socialism. For Arganova, there was little shame in the admission of 
illiteracy. Having grown up prior to the Revolution, when the skill of literacy was limited 
in her community, it is perhaps unsurprising (at least statistically) that she was unable 
to read or write. Thirteen years after the Revolution, she was still functionally illiterate 
– albeit able to sign her name. We might assume from Arganova’s ability to sign her 
name that she had at least engaged in some study of the alphabet, though her adoption 
of the epithet ‘illiterate’ as a self-description is nonetheless surprising. The Decree of 
Illiteracy of 19 December 1919 had criminalised the refusal of illiterate people to study, 
and of literate people to teach.40 Her acceptance of the identity of an illiterate in 1930 
appears then to reflect her generation cohort, as it related to the political norms of the 
day. 
To some extent, Arganova’s portrayal of her generational identity, which she explicitly 
related to younger women, corresponds with Lenin’s remarks on the role of youth in the 
construction of socialism. She was proud that the younger women in her village referred 
to her as “Grandmother Arganova!” or cry “here comes our mother!”, and referred 
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39 D. Vincent, The Rise of Mass Literacy: Reading and Writing in Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 14. 
40 Vincent, The Rise of Mass Literacy, p. 131. 
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explicitly to that role outlined for the ‘older’ generation by Lenin a decade earlier.41 
Arganova expressed pride in her contribution to the Soviet future: “I know that I will die, 
but I know the undertaking will never die. I did something useful, and that makes me 
feel good’. The tone of the letter in its reference to the co-existence of generational 
cohorts from opposite sides of the revolutionary ‘fence’ is remarkably harmonious. 
Though Arganova’s membership of the older generation was crucial to her self-identity 
in this context, she did not position herself in opposition to, or left behind by, those 
young women that will live on. Central to Arganova’s perception of her legacy was the 
transmission of the values of the Revolution to its young women: unable to read or write 
herself, Arganova was keenly aware of the importance of literacy for the young women’s 
liberation from the remnants of the old society. 
Having established the importance granted generational identity both in Soviet 
discourse, and women’s reproduction of it, what remains to be established, however is 
what women meant when they imply complex generational identities, and what 
determined the generation they felt that they belonged to. In addition, how this affected 
the way that they understood the meaning of the ‘New Soviet Woman’ remains to be 
shown. Lovell has argued that ‘Generations can have considerable coercive power once 
they have taken shape as distinct social constituencies or interest groups’, noting that in 
many social histories of European societies, ‘historically adjacent cohorts were 
profoundly divided by their experience of World War I […] Generation provided a point 
of intersection for biology, society and politics, and hence a powerful agent of 
mobilisation’. 42 It is interesting then to inquire how and why social, cultural and 
political differences come to contribute to distinct tenets of an individual’s identity, 
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beyond for example, urban or rural identity, and how it is that these ‘generational 
identities’ function across such alternative intersections.  
Moreover, Arganova’s explicit acknowledgement of her mortality and legacy imply a 
perception of generational identity determined, to some extent, by her proximity to 
death relative to other members of her community.  Thus, as Pierre Nora has suggested, 
to be a member of a generation is the only way for us to feel individual while forming 
part of a social group, since one’s experiences take on a particular social ‘role’ in relation 
to those of others.43 Indeed, Arganova used biological relationships as way of thinking 
about social relationships in this way, emphasising an understanding of time beyond the 
‘horizontal’ sense of the contemporaneous and their shared experiences. She located 
her generation in a metaphorical genealogy, adding a ‘vertical’ dimension, effectively 
presenting a picture of her sense of self amongst the generations, as part of a larger 
Soviet ‘family’.44    
In order to better understand generation as it applied to old and young women alike, it 
is thus necessary to determine a broader definition. ‘Generation’ is a construct whose 
meaning shifts across disciplines: gerontologists, for example, in their study of the 
process of ageing, frequently use the term to refer to family lineage. The focus that is 
most applicable to historical study, however, is that of generational cohorts within an 
identifiable social location, a concept, first credited to Karl Mannheim, that provides a 
clear foundation in which to root an underlying concept of social ‘time’ for the course of 
the study. Mannheim argues that biological and social rhythms are indispensable to one 
another; that we must ‘nest’ chronological age groups within social and historical 
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contexts, establishing distinct cohorts. It follows that sharing a birth year, or even ‘that 
their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve a similarity of 
location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position to experience 
the same events and data etc., and especially that these experiences impinge upon a 
similarly ‘stratified’ consciousness.’45 Mannheim sought to detect distinct generational 
‘entelechies’, by defining generation in the terms of historical and social events, such as 
the Revolution or parenthood respectively, rather than in years or decades.46 According 
to Émile Durkheim, we should therefore be focusing on social time, rather than 
chronological time, and rather than a prescriptive approach which defines generation 
by numbers of years, we are considering the social experience of aging in relation to 
others within a society.47 Variations between cultures, and even within cultures, then, 
can be accounted for to some extent. Yet, whether a shared ‘consciousness’ is totally 
necessary to define a generational cohort is debatable: differentiation within a cohort 
would certainly be inevitable: contemporaries do not directly share historical 
experience, i.e. within the same town, village or community, and thus contemporaries 
are simultaneously non-contemporaneous. The ‘non-contemporaneity of the 
contemporaneous' is clearly important, but it is undoubtedly more convincing to 
consider this idea as a recognition of the complex dialectic between layers of lived 
experience, rather than as the whole answer. 
David Ransel’s findings, in Village Mothers: Three Generations of Change in Russia and 
Tataria, largely corroborate this significance of social time for generational identity. 
Using interviews with rural women about child-rearing, motherhood and family life he 
presents a nuanced representation of generational change across three cohorts of 
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women, defined by their chronological age at particular moments. Ransel maintains, for 
example, that those women of the ‘first generation’ of the study, who married and 
started a family before the war and had “settled into the life of private farming, the 
upheaval of Revolution and collectivisation was akin to disaster. These women, it 
follows, could be characterised by an adherence to religious norms and devotion, and 
pre-collectivisation community values.48 According to Ransel, women of the ‘second 
generation’ were “caught in a time of profound changes in moral and social values”, 
marrying around the time of the Great Patriotic War. Reaching maturity in an 
environment of all-encompassing ‘Soviet values’ caused their allegiances to be more 
arbitrary in nature, characterised not by a principled commitment to particular 
institutions or events, but by a strong sense of defiance, both against the lives their 
mothers and grandmothers endured and the constraints upon their reproductive 
autonomy from the state.49 Ransel’s third generation of women, born in the 1930s and 
building their families following the death of Stalin, had become to some extent 
‘sovietised’. Characterised by a higher degree of allegiance to the regime, these women 
were freer from the religious influences that had remained part of family life through its 
strong matrilineal backbone, articulating instead  a strong sense that of moral 
satisfaction in a ‘life properly led’ against the standards of the Soviet regime.50 Most 
salient about these conclusions, is that although each particular age cohort shared 
certain experiences, and it was thus possible to identify certain characteristics within 
women’s responses, across what might be termed generational lines, responses to 
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changes in reproductive and family discourse were far from uniform; and that ‘each 
woman led a separate life with individual sorrows and achievements’.51  
Thus, to more fully understand the role of agency in the process of ‘Speaking Bolshevik’, 
it is important to develop understandings of generational identity which account with 
greater precision for the considerable agency, self-awareness, and subjectivity 
possessed by women in the Soviet Union. Letters written by women to the Soviet state 
show that they were certainly aware of their location within a particular historical 
moment. A ‘wife of a red army soldier’ at the beginning of 1939 wrote to Nadezhda 
Krupskaia primarily about her gratitude to Lenin and Stalin, and the joys of Soviet life, 
and described herself as ‘a lucky woman, that [she] was born in the Stalinist epoch, 
which is concerned about us, about women, whose rights were granted to us by the 
party and government and our dear leader I.V. Stalin.’52 In fact, it would have been 
difficult not to be aware of one’s historical location in the decades following the 
Revolution, and so such historical experiences would inevitably have formed part of 
one’s ‘cohort identity’.53 But, since older generations were increasingly perceived as 
bearers of Soviet historical memory, with first-hand experience of the Soviet Union’s 
foundation narrative, a note is required on the symbolism of chronological time for 
individuals, within this narrative. 
Laura Carstensen’s work on the influence of a perceived sense of ‘time remaining’ upon 
individual outlooks offers a useful lens through which to view the ‘individual sorrows 
                                                          
51 Ransel, Village Mothers, pp. 236-252, p. 4. Interestingly, the women in Ransel’s study, in hindsight 
identify their lives in relation to the Great Patriotic War, as do the women interviewed by Melanie Ilič, in 
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53 I Paperno, ‘Personal Accounts of the Soviet Experience’, Kritika, 3:4, (2002), pp. 590. 
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and achievements’ of generational identity54 Carstensen has maintained that it is the 
subjective sense of time remaining that has profound effects on human processes, 
including motivation, cognition and emotion, rather than simply chronological time.55 
Whether young or old, when people perceive time as finite, they attach greater 
importance to finding emotional meaning and satisfaction from life, investing less into 
expanding horizons. There is of course a correlation here between perceived future 
time and chronological age: frequently, as people age, time is increasingly perceived as 
finite.56  Although as we have discussed, youth and age were partly politically 
constructed during the 1920s and 1930s, and were accessible through participation in 
certain activities, such as labour and education, always present was an awareness of the 
mortality of older generations, and sometimes the young.57 Applying the concept of 
‘time remaining’ helps us to understand how women of different ages present their 
relationship to the Soviet future. For example, the Red Army wife introduced above saw 
her horizons as expansive, having been born into the ‘transformation’ of the Stalinist 
epoch. Her letter focuses on the joyous potential of her life and its historical role 
positioning herself to face a glorious socialist future.58 Arganova, on the other hand, 
sought to draw the meaning of the socialist future to herself in her present. She did not 
survive to see the completion of the construction of communism, but the progress 
towards this goal that she granted the girls in the village provided her with the sense of 
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meaning and satisfaction at the end of her life: ‘I did something useful, and that makes 
me feel good’.59 
Moreover, the concept of ‘time remaining’ helps us to understand that portion of life 
post-Komsomol and pre-menopause as a generational cohort, without slipping into lazy 
generalisations about womanhood and maternity as inevitable social ‘events’ for 
women.60 According to their social landscape, women’s skills should have been acquired, 
and they should now be productive members of society. The social value of their time 
left had, by middle age essentially, ‘decreased’, as, potentially, have their remaining 
years. So, they respond to the discourse of the state in such a manner. By incorporating 
the concept of ‘perceptions of remaining time’ into our understanding of ‘generational 
cohorts’, we are also able to properly understand the role of those women without 
children in the generation cohort, allowing the cohort to retain its intrinsically diverse 
character. This leads me to believe that, by considering both the ‘romantic historical’ 
conception of generation in social and historical rather than chronological terms, in 
tandem with elements of Carstensen’s introduction of socio-emotional selectivity theory, 
and perceptions of ‘time left’, we can reach the most convincing understanding of 
generation, and begin to understand why and how generational cohorts are formed, and 
the ways in which they act as ‘communities’, uniting the outlooks of otherwise very 
individual women. Viewing generational cohorts in this way allows us to better 
understand the simultaneous sub-stratification and cohesion at play, enabling us to 
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comprehend attitudes to literacy, labour, and the Revolution, the key themes of this 
chapter.  
The chapter, then, will demonstrate that women in public letters defined their 
generational cohort according to the social event of the Revolution, and their 
participation in its success. Although women’s self-identification was affected most 
strongly by socio-historical time, their generational identity appeared also to have been 
dependent on their own perception of the time that they had to spend under Soviet 
power. The amalgamation of social(ist) time, and a perception of their time left 
remaining meant that older women – whose utility to the regime should have been 
limited – were able to located themselves as ‘actors’ in the historical narrative, a 
strategy for inclusion which was ultimately incorporated into Soviet discourse. The 
metaphor of ‘transformation’ aided women of all ages in the relation of their lives to 
early Soviet ideology. Most commonly, this transformation was won through the 
acquisition of literacy, and participation in education and productive labour, as 
elements of a politically constructed concept of ‘youthfulness’. In this way, both old and 
young women accommodated their lives in the new Soviet state. 
 
 
Literacy, Education, and the Transformative Power of Revolution 
 
In a speech to the Second Congress of Political Education 1921, Lenin declared that “the 
illiterate person stands outside politics, he must first learn his ABCs. Without that there 
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are only rumours, gossip, fairy tales, prejudices, but not politics”.61 In the decades 
following the Revolution, the young Soviet state undertook remarkable literacy drives, 
known as likbez, an amalgam of the words likvidatsiia bezgramotnosti, or ‘liquidation of 
illiteracy’. The formal commencement of the likbez campaign was December 26 1919, 
with the Decree ‘On the liquidation of illiteracy among the population of the RSFSR’. 
Under the terms of the Decree, all people from 8 to 50 were required to become literate 
in their native language.62 Even prior to the Revolution, Tsarist officials had expressed 
concerns about the incompatibility of widespread (and largely peasant) illiteracy with 
modern industrialisation, though anxieties remained about the deconstruction of belief 
in tsarism and Orthodox as a potential consequence of the promotion of literacy and 
reading.63 In a similar vein, a key motivation behind the literacy campaigns of the Soviet 
state in the 1920s was mass mobilisation of the population behind the Soviet state, 
considered necessary for ‘modernising’ (or at least breaking down traditional, pre-
Revolutionary attitudes) among the population and building support for the new state 
and society, aiding socialist construction. The war on illiteracy was also closely 
associated with the campaign against religion.64 
At the time of the Revolution, though there had been a considerable demand for 
education and literacy (largely among wealthier peasants and townspeople), its 
acquisition was limited.65 Between 1875 and 1914, male illiteracy had fallen from 
around 80% to between 30—40%, with the skill distributed unevenly across social 
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groups and geographical communities throughout the period in question.66 A similar 
rate of female literacy levels in the period is not available for comparison, though we 
know that, by 1917, ‘women’ constituted the group in society with the lowest literacy 
rate.67 According to accepted figures, in 1917, 12.5% of women/female citizens over the 
age of seven in the new Soviet state could read; as opposed to 37.5% of men (though it 
must be noted that illiteracy was unevenly distributed). Low levels of literacy and 
education are explained by the demands of daily life prior to the Revolution.  
Prior to 1917, literacy had possessed lower value for girls than boys, as the ‘opportunity 
cost’ to the household economy was higher: while the labour performed by boys was 
largely seasonal, the housework undertaken by girls and women was not.68 According to 
the Bolsheviks, literacy was to offer emancipation from the patriarchal daily life of the 
pre-Revolutionary era. As Lenin had himself stated, ’…only literacy and consciousness 
can emancipate a woman from the domestic way of life and enable her to be 
independent of her husband.’ 69 Literacy programmes in the reading rooms sought to 
reinvent daily life and raise the political consciousness of their participants, and 
covered divorce, venereal disease, and reproductive rights. That said, the Soviet state 
understood the significance of women’s role in society in relation to its men and its 
children, and sought to reinvent daily life characterised by a Soviet consciousness, as 
the fledgling state believed that the supposed “backwardness” of women threatened the 
Revolution’s success, holding back the education of her children, and dampening her 
                                                          
66 Vincent, The Rise of Mass Literacy, pp. 9-13. 
67 There had been a movement aimed at increasing female literacy in the mid-Nineteenth Century, which 
called on ‘noblewomen and priests’ to teach literacy to peasant girls, for the purpose of guiding peasant 
maternity practices and ‘improving’ peasant society in general. This was not altogether successful. Susan 
Smith-Peter has explored this movement in ‘Educating Peasant Girls for Motherhood: Religion and 
Primary Education in Mid-Nineteenth Century Russia’, The Russian Review, 66:3, (2007), pp. 391-405. 
68 Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read, p. 45. 
69 Clark, Uprooting Otherness, p. 96. 
83 
 
husband’s revolutionary spirit.70 The New Soviet Woman should therefore be literate 
and politically conscious. 
Though literacy campaigns directed at women were subject to severe vacillations in 
their funding and momentum, by 1939, female literacy had increased to 72.5% (as 
opposed to 90.8% male literacy). This indicates that in general terms, the campaigns for 
the liquidation of illiteracy were obviously statistically successful.71 It can be argued 
further, however, that the drive towards literacy, though clearly politically motivated, 
extended beyond the intentions of the state, due to the dynamism and willingness of 
women to take advantage of the situation with which they were presented. The skill of 
literacy affected women of different generations in different ways; it was dearly valued 
by many; and used in ways not intended by the state by others. Fitzpatrick has 
demonstrated that, ‘for the Bolsheviks, social class was defined both by basic occupation 
and by ‘consciousness’, which was essentially a political criterion.’72 Though they took 
up the skill at varying rates, women were keenly aware of the implications of the 
acquisition of literacy and subsequently political literacy for their social status, and 
viewed it as means of access to the ideologically ‘correct’ social class, and the associated 
social inclusion. Moreover, as Fitzpatrick has attested, when workers and peasants 
complained that they were being deprived of the rights bestowed by the Revolution, 
these rights were to education and social mobility out of the traditional confines of the 
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working class and peasantry.73  Women saw literacy as transforming their traditional 
roles within peasant and working communities, providing them with opportunities for 
‘socialist self-improvement’, and the occupation of a variety of politically prestigious 
social roles. 
With the help of the Zhenotdel and Trade Unions, a network of likpunkty, or liquidation 
points and reading rooms were set up across the country in 1920 (though the aims of 
these measures often exceeded the means to execute them). Though attendance was 
sometimes poor amongst women, attendance at groups run by women, groups with 
childcare, and (often derided) sewing circles was often high. According to Clark, male 
peasants were said to ‘… look down on women, and refuse to sit with them in the same 
classroom’.74 The most widely used textbook was based on a pamphlet by D.Iu. Elkina, 
containing the famous opening line ‘We are not slaves’, and filled with similarly 
relentlessly political sentences for instruction. The textbook is in fact referenced in 
letters to Krest’ianka. However, it was clearly not the intention of the Soviet state to 
impart to its population a critical attitude, or aid it in its development of an independent 
world view by teaching it to read and write. Indeed, the ‘unnecessary weapon’ of 
literacy without sufficient political guidance was explained by a Likbez pamphlet in the 
early 1920s to literacy instructors, which maintained that:  
If you only teach your students to read and write, without giving them the necessary 
direction to their thoughts, without giving them interests, and an active involvement in their 
surrounding life, you give your students a weapon without teaching them how to use it. Such 
knowledge might turn out to be unnecessary and easily forgotten.75  
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But, the development of a sceptical attitude and a critical world view was in some ways 
inevitable. At the heart of demands for literature prior to the Revolution was ‘the belief 
that the printed word [was] a means to attain power over oneself’, according to 
Brooks.76 Although many women were enthusiastic to learn to read and write, it follows 
that there was a sizeable number of women who were not, as well as those who simply 
did not have the time - or the childcare - to easily do so,  particularly in the 1920s, when 
the commitment to women’s literacy was faltering at best. A survey of Smolensk textile-
workers conducted at the end of 1926 and the start of 1927 recorded the desire to study 
according to age, taking into account both desire and realistic expectations of ability. 
While women under 20 and women over 39 were highly motivated, women (and men) 
between 20 and 39 recorded a relatively low motivation (30.1% and 50% respectively), 
indicating (although not with total certainty), that the responsibilities carried by adults 
of this age group prevented them from ‘feeling enthusiastic’ about literacy instruction. 
Ironically, it was people aged between eighteen and thirty-five at whom the literacy 
drives were aimed, demonstrating further the generational priorities of the authorities 
in the period.77 
However, women of all ages faced more personal factors that determined their 
approach to literacy. One anecdote sent to Krest’ianka describes the “strength and 
patience” required to educate the young peasant girls in 1924: 
Girls gather in the gazebo and talk about school… Almost all are illiterate, and do not dare to 
go… It is clear that one would not mind learning grammar, but feels that to study is only for 
children, [for her] it is a big shame. This goes on for quite a while, as the girls tease each 
other about learning (and boys). Eventually they decide to go to school. ’Masha you go first’ 
requests one girl…. They argue a long time about who should open the door and go in. 
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Finally, Masha is elected. Masha resolutely opens the door and goes into the school. Then, we 
begin negotiations with the teacher78 
Amongst this group of young women of similar ages, various concerns regarding age-
appropriate behaviour were expressed: being ‘too old’ to learn; pride; romantic 
distractions; and even petty day-to-day squabbles about who should ‘lead’ the activity.  
All of these concerns affected the practical inclination of girls to read. Even where the 
will was present, study was difficult for many women, as one might expect. A letter with 
the title ‘girls are learning to read’ was sent to Krest’ianka in 1925 detailing the 
difficulty with which girls in the village were learning to read and write. The letter 
explained that the liquidation of illiteracy in the village (Cheriank) had been going badly, 
but was now going much better – there were fifteen girls enrolled in study at the 
present time. ‘Although they read with difficulty, they [can] write.’79  
Letters to Krest’ianka from 1924 also emphasised the reluctance found among older 
women when it came to literacy lessons, and the difficulties they faced trying to learn to 
read. Describing the difficulties literacy instructors faced in galvanising the efforts of 
their older, rural students, one women, Ksenia Vatepova, wrote that ‘In the beginning 
the peasant women did not agree to go to school, saying that we are too old and we 
won't learn, and so we will live.’80 She described that the women were surprised to find 
that they had learnt to read and write so quickly, explaining the effect that literacy had 
had on the women’s world view, and stating that they ‘now realised, that when there is 
the desire (pri zhelanii), everything can be achieved (vse mozhno sdelat’)’.81 Literacy was 
portrayed in this letter as ‘unlocking’ the potential of all citizens. That the letter was 
intended for publication in the magazine highlights the degree to which literacy was 
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viewed as a key component of the New Soviet Woman. Although, as has been discussed, 
we cannot know the ‘true’ value individuals placed upon different elements of their lives, 
the public intentions of the statement demonstrate that the author understood that 
literacy was crucial for bringing the New Soviet Woman into being. Moreover, literacy 
was portrayed by Vatepova as having transcended the boundaries of the old women’s 
world views. Previously, as old women, they had seen no use for the skill. Having 
acquired it, they ‘realised’ that anything was possible. In this respect, literacy is posited 
as having ‘undone’ the agedness of the women’s worldview, enabling them to acquire 
those politically determined characteristics of youth, that according to Smirnova were 
quite distinct from the biological components of age.82 
Evidently, though difficulties enthusing older women to learn literacy were 
undoubtedly frustrating, (in no small part, due to the stubborn reputation afforded old 
peasant women), their reluctance was not necessarily due to stubbornness or inability, 
but lack of consciousness, resolvable through the initiative and socialist labour of fellow 
citizens. A local delegate, uncertain about her own skills of literacy but deeply 
committed to educating her peers, requested assistance from the editorial board of 
Krest’ianka: ‘we are asking you comrades, help us, don’t leave us, so that we are not 
again left in the dark, we want light, we are dark now and many are illiterate, though 
many try, so few are strong […] for we live in a pit, and do not see or hear anything […] 
Sorry that this is poorly written’ the ‘little educated (malogramotnaia) Kh. Korneieva’, 
wrote to the journal in 1925.83 Noteworthy in Korneieva’s letter is her  visceral 
association between literacy and social and political consciousness. Having acquired her 
own literacy, she became a delegate, and transmitted her skills to her peers. 
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As literacy and education became more commonplace, the former became more firmly 
consolidated essentially as a means of social currency and access to the new political 
society – and of exercising agency within it. As discussed, by the 1930s a sense of 
ambiguity had emerged surrounding the value of older generations to society. Although 
their socialisation under capitalism made them politically problematic, older people. 
They also served the purpose of safeguarding Soviet social cohesion by contextualising 
the present ‘free and bounteous society’ with the lived historical memory of the old 
regime. While technically illiterate, Arganova was evidently politically quite literate, and 
though her employ of Bolshevik language seems very ‘deliberate’ she was able to easily 
reproduce the ‘foundation narrative’ of the new Soviet State.84 
The meaning of literacy and education then, once these skills were transferred to the 
women of the Soviet Union, was no longer in the hands of educators. Women were free 
to internalise a sense of entitlement or attachment to education; to communicate and 
bargain with the state; and to read and communicate the texts of their contemporaries; 
all beyond the immediate directive of instructors and officials. Literacy – and crucially, 
its usages – was ‘a tool for enabling individuals and social groups to extend their 
understanding of themselves and their world’, with literacy itself a component of that 
world.85 Attitudes to literacy throughout the period are thus more dynamic than they 
were perhaps ‘supposed’ to be by those who encouraged them, with opinions based on 
more personal and micro-social reasons than ‘backwardness’.   
Moreover, literacy, and subsequently education was the key to acquiring and cementing 
proletarian identity, and mobility from their traditional communities, of which women 
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were keenly aware.86 A prospective Krest’ianka correspondent from Tula, named 
Kuralesova, apparently equated the role with social mobility out of the category of 
‘peasant woman’, or at least with the key to the expansion of the role. She wrote that ‘if 
my notes can be put in the magazine, then please enrol me as a correspondent. And if 
my notes are meaningless, it is because I’m a peasant women (krest’ianka), I graduated 
only from a rural school’.87 Her identity as a peasant woman at this time served to 
explain her backwardness, indicating that she saw the written word as means of 
transcending this social identity. In this vein, she asked for corrections of her prose, 
asking the editors ‘please tell me what mistakes I make. I really wish to write notes for 
the magazine, but my poor literacy (malogramotnost’) is a burden on me.’ 88 
Kuralesova’s understanding of the value of literacy in enabling social mobility was 
mirrored in many other letters from women on the subject. Anastasia L. related social 
mobility to the tropes of darkness and light, with which we are familiar, stating ‘you 
know, that literacy (gramota) is the ray, which illuminates the path for your life’.89 
Another correspondent paired illiteracy with darkness, claiming that her local economy 
was a ‘mess’, since ‘illiteracy and darkness stalk the market’.90 
The allegory of darkness and light, and the revolutionary transformation that literacy 
enabled women to harness was commonplace in letters from women on the subject, 
which frequently outlined a growing desire among women to empower themselves 
within their social and cultural environments. A letter titled ‘WE WILL LEARN’, signed 
by a krest’ianka, C. Zorskaia demonstrated the political consciousness achievable by 
illiteracy by comparing its absence to unconsciousness: 
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 In the neighbouring villages, where there are schools, still in the winter girls and women 
were taught to read and write. But our village is sleeping […] Still it comes from Moscow, 
Krest’ianka. Here is Enlightenment. But to read it – we have few women and girls who 
possess [the skill].91 
As the ‘transformative’ power of the Revolution remained scarcely visible to many 
women across the Soviet Union, education became synonymous with self-
empowerment. Soviet power had provided women with the opportunity for 
emancipation in those early years, while their role in the workforce remained tenuous, 
characterised by restriction, and unease within workplaces about the suitability of 
women’s physiologies to the workforce.92 The education of women, therefore, clearly 
took on a cross-generational significance for the position of women within a given 
community environment.  
In the letters discussed above, rural conditions were framed, in line with Soviet 
discourse, as an impediment to the Soviet ‘modernisation’ of the individual and society, 
and to the full emancipation of women from their local customs and cultural traditions, 
which were roundly condemned by Soviet policymakers, and presented as particular 
targets for transformation. Likewise, the Bolsheviks’ colonial  ‘exoticisation’ of non-
Russian Soviet identities, and the emphasis upon the unveiling and subsequent 
‘emancipation’ of Muslim women was reformulated by women writing from non-
Russian regions of the Soviet Union, reflecting identities as fluid and historically rooted 
as any other in the Soviet Union.93 The articulation of this exoticisation by Central Asian 
Party-affiliated women thus arguably  reflects discursive notions of ‘Otherness’, rather 
than an internalised sense of ‘difference’ from Russian Soviet women in certain 
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respects.94 In this vein, a woman named Zhernakova wrote to Krest’ianka in 1925 to 
describe her success in teaching literacy to women in Uzbekistan. Recounting her 
instruction of a school in Uzbekistan, she describes the expectation amongst her diverse 
group of students: 
A school for girls of the mountains is full of Uzbeks […] The young, almost children, along 
with old women […] they feel that there is good in their conversations and laughter, and they 
gather here in the expectation of something new, and useful […] 
Zhernakova asked for the women to tell her of their lives before the Revolution. An 
elderly woman described how she had been downtrodden by her husband, which had 
aged her prematurely. According to Zhernakova, ‘tears made it difficult for the woman 
to speak of such a sad life, to remember the people who had caused her so much grief.’ 
Silence fell upon the room. The way in which the elderly woman’s ‘old’ life was 
described in Zhernakoa’s letter spoke of a sense of rebirth, entailed by the possibility of 
an education, provided by the Soviet government. After a few minutes, another woman 
rose to speak. Zhernakova’s description of the youth and vitality of the woman, and her 
revolutionary zeal matched the symbolism of the New Soviet Woman, underlining her 
earlier suggestion that both old and young women embarked upon ‘new’ lives after the 
Revolution: 
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Now a young, beautiful Uzbechka (Uzbek woman) rises, the wife of a communist, who wishes 
to study, and breaks the silence with sharp, guttural sounds. She speaks of the lives of 
illiterate girls, trapped behind walls, who are sold as objects. [She speaks] of the law, of the 
Mullah […] We women want to learn, […] but there is no law, no courses, husbands do not 
like scientists […] Now the good Soviet power, wishes well, [and] allows us to dream in 
school, and we go to study, and [once] literate, we will live as the New Uzbek Woman, and be 
able to work like the European woman.95  
The emotive description of life prior to the Revolution depicts Uzbek women as ‘reborn’ 
after 1917, freed from the restrictions placed upon them by the customs of their daily 
lives in the Russian Empire, as well as the attempts by KUTBZh that Yulia Gradskova has 
described, to remove them from ‘established practices of control over her body’ by men 
from her community.96 Critically, it was the ‘modernising’ Soviet state which freed 
women from the ‘walls’ behind which they were trapped, though the individual 
endeavour of the Uzbek woman to learn enabled her to acquire this freedom fully. 
Zhernakova’s letter contained a litany of the assumptions made in Soviet ideology in the 
1920s and 1930s about the superiority of European cultural practices, the advantages of 
youth, and, since the ‘voice’ of the New Uzbek Woman was defined by her marriage to a 
communist, the subsidiary position women still held in relation to men. Nonetheless, 
the role granted to literacy in the life of the New Soviet Uzbek Woman was one of 
awakening: with life granted anew to old and young after 1917, women of all ages could 
transform their lives through education.  
As literacy became the ‘norm’, rising as we know to 72.5% among women by 1939, it 
appears to have been more imperative to women of all ages to be able to participate in 
this in some way.97 Literacy became a key part of what it meant to be a Soviet woman, 
though critically, literacy seems to have taken on its own meaning to women. The skill 
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of literacy influenced self-perceptions, and women’s understandings of their rights both 
as women and as citizens.  Literacy enabled them to negotiate and bargain with state 
officials regarding their social positions; to complain about one another; to seek counsel 
for personal problems; or simply to send greetings and thanks. There is a significant 
amount of evidence that literacy and education were seen as the key to social inclusion 
in the Soviet state amongst those who did not receive their primary education under the 
Soviet system. Women wrote to officials just to say hello, to send thanks, or to keep 
officials abreast of their activities. One newly-literate woman, A.K. Massagetova, wrote 
to Nadezhda Krupskaia on the subject of her own literacy, expressing her delight at 
being able to write the letter in the first place. Having learnt literacy three years earlier, 
following a visit from Krupskaia to her kolkhoz, she had been inspired to learn, and 
made a promise to study. She wrote: ‘I want to report that I fulfilled the promise I made 
to study. Now, I’m studying on cooperative courses (kooperativnykh kursykh), and the 
liquidation of illiteracy.’98 Massagetova’s progress, sparked by Krupskaia’s visit, had 
been quite remarkable. She commented that ‘when I entered [the likbez] I was totally 
illiterate, but look now how I write fluently since I left!’99 Although Massagetova’s letter 
contained a number of spelling and grammatical errors (making it quite difficult to 
transcribe), this actually serves to emphasise the sense of transformation she felt it 
necessary to express in her letters. The visit from Krupskaia, as Deputy Minister for 
Education, had changed her life, and she wished to be able to extend the same sense of 
transformation to her own students, stating that she taught classes of ’60 people [who] 
would love for [Krupskaia] to come to us, and who would love to have a chat with 
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[her]’.100 Massagetova’s literacy had unlocked the possibility of further technical 
education for her, providing her with access to the world of skilled socialist labour. 
 
Labour and Socialist Construction 
 
In letters to officials and newspapers, women frequently referred to their access to 
literacy or education in terms of labour and employment opportunities. Though not 
unexpected, this is a significant element of women’s reproductions of the Bolshevik 
‘script’: labourers, toilers and workers were venerated as heroic proletarian identities 
in the new Soviet state, to which education represented the key. As the beneficiaries of 
the Revolution, labour and revolutionary consciousness were intrinsically intertwined, 
and had perceptible effect upon (working) women, who had been emancipated by the 
Revolution. After the Revolution and Civil War, labour began to combine with, and in 
some cases replace older ‘female’ identities, which had been based upon a woman’s 
status within household, or her relationship to male relatives. In this manner, labour 
constituted the ‘core’ of the transformative power of the Revolution, and means of 
illuminating the ‘dark’ corners of everyday life. As such, letters relating to issues of 
employment and Revolution provide considerable potential for study of the social 
reception of Soviet gender ideology. 
A group of former teachers – all women – who were unable to work, detailed in their 
request for an increase in their pension to Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov in 1936 the reasons for their entitlement to a 
comfortable old age. Their generation, and crucially their ability to meaningfully 
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participate in the Revolution at the time, they felt, entitled them to discard the identity 
of ‘worker’. They wrote: ‘many [of us] are old, unfit for work, and can’t survive on a 
pension […] without assistance from loved ones.’ Feeling that the small pension on 
which they were required to live was ‘an affront to human dignity’, the women stated 
that ‘not only had [they] been teachers, but were… in the midst of the revolution, the 
party, and the defeat of capitalists – [they] should be able to look back, retire, and live 
comfortably.’ The letter was signed by ten women under the word: pensionerki (female 
pensioners).101 That these women had evidently lived as adults through the Revolution 
meant that their revolutionary experience, and crucially, their revolutionary 
contributions established a sense of ‘generation’ amongst them. This caused them to 
feel, as revolutionary ‘veterans’, entitled to retire comfortably from the socialist 
construction required of their youngers. Moreover, the women suggested that through 
their labour, they had already earned the salvation provided by the Revolution. By 
claiming that they should be able to look back upon their achievements, the women 
located themselves temporally on the ‘right side’ of the Revolution. They implied that 
since they were part of its success, they should be privy to its benefits.  
The framing of their letter also suggests that as pensioners, a group who had been 
drawn back into the fold by the mid-1930s, the women were aware of their social 
position as holders of was Lovell has termed the ‘key foundational narratives’ of the 
Soviet state, and were willing to use their role to bargain for a more comfortable 
existence at the time.102 That they felt they should be able to ‘live comfortably’ and 
reflect upon their socialist achievements suggests an awareness amongst the letter’s 
signatories that their time remaining was short. For this reason, the women were 
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comfortable requesting fuller inclusion in the Soviet social system: at the end of their 
lives, they implied, they should be able to enjoy positive experiences, both due to the 
limitations of their own mortality, and the allowances made by Soviet discourse for 
elderly people, whose ‘moment in the sun’ of the Revolution’s transformation was 
limited.  
On the other hand, those girls and women who foresaw the time ahead of them as 
significant consistently referred to the Revolution in terms of the freedom it afforded 
them or the potential they now had as a result. As we have seen, ‘older’ women, who 
lived as adults prior to the Revolution, accentuated a desire to establish a sense of 
meaning – both in terms of their significance to the Revolution, and its transformative 
effect on their lives.  On the other hand, younger women and girls associated their 
present states with the possibilities their future held. For them, with what they assumed 
to be the rest of their lives ahead of them, their inclusion in the revolutionary process 
was necessary for their own socialist futures. For younger women, participation in 
socialist labour, like education, promised inclusion in the new Soviet society, and 
prevented them from being ‘forgotten’, and lost to the capitalist past.  
In 1934, a young girl named Maria Gorokhova wrote to Nadezhda Krupskaia in 1936 to 
plead for the restoration of her education, reflecting its significance to her as the key to 
labour and social inclusion, and the urgency this took on for those raised under Soviet 
power who had reached the highly exclusive conditions of the 1930s. She pleaded to 
Krupskaia: ‘I am now seventeen years old I don’t work anywhere, I am burning with 
shame in front of my girlfriends, because they are continuing their education, while I am 
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deprived of this because of the circumstances set forth above’.103 Maria wrote in part to 
express a particular understanding of the importance of literacy, but she also indicated 
an understanding of the meaning of the Revolution according both to the historical 
location of her primary education, and the seemingly unlimited horizon ahead of her. By 
stating her age as if she were in danger of becoming ‘too old’, Maria suggested an 
enthusiasm for acquiring as many skills as possible, as soon as possible. It is evident 
that she associated education with her future, and its absence as was a ‘deprivation’, 
which reflected her understanding of the Revolution as something intrinsically linked 
with potential and opportunity.  
Likewise, in 1930, a group of girls from a mountainous region in Dagestan implied that 
their ‘backwards’ gender identity had acted initially as an obstacle to their experience of 
the Revolution. They saw their failure to be ‘educated’, or to participate in socialist 
labour, as the root of the persistence of the ‘old’ life, tainted by pre-Revolutionary 
darkness. As they explained themselves: 
The Soviet regime has existed for twelve years, but we are women. Mountain girls are still so 
dark and not developed, we still have much, much to learn (uchit’sia), in order to throw off 
from ourselves the yoke of the old daily life (byt’) and finally liberate ourselves from the old 
life.104  
The letter was signed by all the members of the group that were present with some 
names signed in Russian, most in Arabic, and ‘for the illiterate, a fingerprint’. Evidently, 
the girls saw the Revolution as the key to education, literacy, and to the political status 
of ‘emancipated’.105 However, we can also gauge from their letter the degree to which 
they accepted responsibility for the transmission of this ‘Revolutionary light’: writing in 
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the first person plural, they described that it was they who had much to learn in order 
to liberate themselves, rather than that the Soviet state still had much to teach them.  
Due to the topic of the letter – socialist education – we can conclude that by ‘marking’ 
the letter with fingerprints, the girls desired not to be ‘left out’ of the Revolution, 
marking their participation in the composition of the letter and the activities it 
described. Marking the letter also reflects the degree to which the girls perceived 
‘written word’, and its use for maintaining dialogue with the Soviet project, as a textual 
marker of social inclusion. That their home in the mountains was ‘still so dark’ was not 
the fault of the Soviet state. The Revolution simply had not reached the mountains yet, 
though the simple occurrence of the Revolution provided them with the opportunity to 
seek ‘socialist salvation’ through their own self-improvement:  
And so in order to go out to the bright road which will lead us to a bright future, we at the 
aul opened a Saklya for mountain girls, to which we gave your name: “Saklya for Village 
Women [in the name of] Krupskaia”, in order to find a brighter future. This is the first [such] 
hut in our distant and remote area lost between enormous mountains. We earnestly desire 
that you take patronage over our Saklya, and would direct us dark mountain women, and we 
believe that, guided by your hand, we will arrive to/at our bright future, and finally throw off 
from ourselves the old byt.106 
By describing themselves as ‘lost between enormous mountains’, the girls also indicated 
the degree to which they perceived their lives as culturally and geographically 
peripheral to the industrial centres of Soviet power. Nonetheless, this did not present 
the women with an insurmountable obstacle to the reception of Soviet values, and 
identity. Their cultural identities were evidently not considered to be irreconcilable 
with Soviet values. Rather, their geographical separation from Soviet power explained 
to them the lack of cultural transformation that they feel has taken place. Their 
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‘marginal’ status also reinforced their grounds for assistance as a literary device, whilst 
the contents of their letter, by outlining the work they had already done to serve the 
Revolution clearly reflected the perception that the women should assume the bulk of 
responsibility for their self-improvement. It was through self-improvement, facilitated 
by the patronage of Krupskaia, that the girls could expand their horizons, and illuminate 
the road from their remote mountainous location to the bright future of Soviet power. 
However, letters from women from a slightly older age group portrayed this 
responsibility for self-improvement differently. Writing to Nadezhda Krupskaia in 1934 
about her daughter’s suicide, a woman named Maria iterated the need for state 
responsibility for the improvement of gender relations at an early age, signifying a more 
cautious approach to the emancipation offered to girls and women after the Revolution. 
‘I am the mother of two pionerkas (now one)’ wrote Maria. ‘I want to say something 
concerning my daughter’s suicide.’ Maria’s daughter had committed suicide at the age of 
12, after humiliation at the hands of some boys from her school. Maria plainly urged 
Krupskaia to help ensure the state take responsibility for its involvement in matters of 
gender: ‘Better relations between boys and girls are necessary…. I know you are busy, 
but I have my daughter to protect’. 107 Politically, Maria’s role as an adult – and crucially 
as a mother – was to shape and improve the social relations of the new Soviet 
generation, to undo un-Bolshevik vices and prevent their entrenchment. She saw her 
role as one of collaboration with Soviet power. As a grieving mother, whose primary 
concern was the well-being of her remaining child, born a Soviet citizen, Maria saw her 
inclusion in Soviet society as the critical factor in this process.   
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Finally, the letters of older women provide perhaps the most striking examples of the 
impact of perceived time left upon one’s desire for ‘meaning’ and personal 
remembrance through socialist participation. In her biography of her young daughter – 
Liza – a woman named Maria S. declared her intention in writing to Krest’ianka: ‘On the 
international day of working women, I, mother of Liza and Volodia, I want to share the 
grief and pride of women.’ Liza had worked tirelessly to help Maria raise her siblings, 
but had ultimately left home to join the Red Army, and fight in the Civil War. Upon her 
return, Liza had been ‘unrecognizable’, exhausted and ill. Liza’s brother and Maria’s son 
Volodia, was killed by bandits one evening. The following day, Liza committed suicide. 
Maria S. then sought to resume her children’s efforts for the Revolution towards the end 
of her own life, by raising awareness of their feats:  
It is hard for a mother to lose her children, such as mine, and my old eyes weep, but I am 
proud of my own children Lisa and Volodia, who sacrificed their young lives for the struggle 
against the bourgeoisie. Goodbye my dear children, sleep tight. You have to [achieve] change 
and it will bring an end to [the bourgeoisie], and your old mother as best [she can] helps 
Soviet Power.108  
 
Maria S. in her old age, sought to find some comfort in her grief, by attempting to 
continue the work of her children creating, essentially, a ‘meaning’ in their early deaths. 
In drawing attention to her children’s work for the Revolution, Maria S. referred to her 
own generational identity as making her less ‘suited’ for the work, though she would try 
her utmost. Writing in 1924, Maria’s prose reflects contemporary concerns about the 
‘suitability’ of the older generation for the work that socialist construction entailed. Yet, 
having lost both of her children, she sought not only to provide comfort for herself, but 
to consolidate their legacy for the new Soviet state. Both by continuing their work, and 
preserving it in the written word, in the press, she ensured that neither she, nor they, 
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would be ‘forgotten’ in the forward march of the Revolutionary process.  This echoed 
the letter from Arganova, who in her final days sought to underline her work and 
contribution to the Revolution, especially her contribution to the literacy of young 
women in her village.109 The metaphorical genealogy in the letters of the three women – 
Maria, Maria S., and Arganova respectively,  is telling: both sought to contribute to the 
Revolution through their work for the subsequent generation, their symbolic 
‘daughters’, and to give meaning to the deaths of their own flesh and blood daughters in 
the Civil War. 
 
Attitudes to labour and the construction of socialism, then, were delineated markedly by 
generational cohort and, crucially, generational identity. Discussions pertaining directly 
to labour and employment reflect a clear distinction between those younger women 
who see their employment as a salient part of their public identity, and those elderly 
women, who emphasise their age, and seek instead to demonstrate the meaning of their 
achievements thus far. Reading the letters more closely, a subtler distinction becomes 
apparent. Both older and younger women sought inclusion in, and recognition by Soviet 
society, and frequently wrote to authorities to ensure that they would not be ‘forgotten’. 
The grounds upon which they sought to achieve recognition in Soviet society were the 
related political cornerstones of labour, self-improvement, and education, which were 
seen as holding the ‘key’ to the transformation promised by Soviet power, and to the 
‘light’ of its salvation. However, the letters from older and young women can be 
distinguished by the manner in which they spoke of their access to Soviet salvation. 
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Generation, Revolutionary Transformation, and the Problem of 
Mortality 
 
Though it might be argued that the generational differences expressed in the letters 
were applicable simply as the effects of social and historical landscapes on women’s 
outlooks, the applicability of the concept of ‘perceived time left’ in this context is 
demonstrated by comparison of the letters of older women with the changes in 
attitudes of young women and girls who have overcome a serious illness. Anna, who as a 
very young girl wanted a friend to take on walks, was unable to because of weak heart. 
Though her parents made her stay at home, for fear that she would die, she sat and 
wished that someday she would be healthy, and could get a friend to have fun with. In 
1924, when she wrote to Krest’ianka, Anna was ‘all grown up’ and it seemed, in much 
better health. Thanks to the October Revolution, which ‘made women all free’ Anna ‘for 
the first time went to a party with [her] friend, where [they] met boyfriends’.  Though 
‘Soviet power [was] doing very well’, their boyfriends were going to Komsomol 
meetings, and they though that it was a shame that girls were shut out from the 
meetings.110 Anna and her friend, now that Anna is well, sought to expand their 
horizons, and to get involved in party activities, and ‘build the Revolution’. How far this 
was actually due to Anna’s revolutionary zeal, or her desire to be with her friends and 
boyfriend, is unclear – what is clear, is that she did not want to be ‘left out’ of her new 
environment. However, by relating the possibilities involved with her ‘new’ life after her 
period disability to the Revolution and its emancipation of women, Anna portrayed the 
expansion of her horizons as a direct result of the transformation brought about by the 
Revolution. 
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Anna described a life which had abruptly changed once she becomes stronger and 
healthier: beyond simply wanting to enjoy spending time outside with a friend, Anna 
now wanted to experience new things and participate in public life, an opportunity she 
saw as being a direct consequence of the establishment of Soviet power. However, 
beyond the simple change in Anna’s outlook once she became well, it is notable that the 
priorities described by Anna at the beginning of her letter corresponded generally with 
those displayed by Arganova in the letter she wrote in her ill health. She spoke about 
her desperation for things in her life which would increase her happiness, all of which 
related to her involvement with the Soviet society under construction: solutions to her 
loneliness; the chance to go to school, have fun with friends, and to walk around outside. 
Arganova, for her part, prioritised the parts of her life that made her feel useful to the 
new society, and therefore proud emphasising: ‘I did something useful, and that makes 
me feel good’.111 That Arganova was old enough to be referred to as the mother or 
grandmother of the young women in the village no doubt reinforced this perception of 
her own mortality in relation to Soviet power. In essence, however, the two letters are 
similar in that, though they were from women of very different ages, as a result of the 
prospect of their mortality they prioritised their present inclusion in Soviet society, 
rather than their involvement in an abstract socialist future. Ultimately, both women 
related in their letters a desire not to be left out, or forgotten by the Revolutionary 
process, a prospect with which both women had recently had to grapple. 
The ‘problem’ of mortality, and the redeeming properties of the performance of labour 
for the socialist project is highlighted in a letter from Sofia, a ‘personal’naia pensionerka’ 
(‘personal’ pensioner, or ‘personally a pensioner’) who wrote to Molotov requesting her 
reinstatement at work in 1935, having been forced to leave her job as a secretary in 
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1931, due to ill health. Though by 1935 she felt as though she had recovered, she found 
herself unable to return to her previous job. The situation ‘create[d] for [her] 
unbearable emotional oppression’, as she was left to wonder what she could do with her 
‘acquired life skills’ – perhaps she would be qualified to be an official in a sanatorium?112 
Though Sofia was, at this time, evidently infirm enough to qualify for a pension-  which, 
since no old age pensions were as yet in place, was no mean feat - the most acute period 
of her ill health was over. This had clearly affected her perception of the life she had 
ahead of her, to the degree that her goals had once again changed. Though she would 
have liked her previous job, Sofia was keen to put her skills to new use, and to continue 
to contribute to the state.113 At first glance, the pensionerka Sofia’s experience of 
recovery was little different from that of teenage Anna.  
Yet we can see that the language that she used, and the way in which she discussed the 
Revolution is distinct both from that used by the much younger Anna, and the much 
older Arganova. Sofia, at the beginning of her letter, emphasised that, though she had no 
remaining family and was odinochka (alone/loner), her brother was a ‘close personal 
friend’ of Lenin, and that she was unable to continue (rather than begin) to contribute to 
the Revolution caused her great anguish. Evidently, her prior experience of the 
Revolution as a working adult, and the social achievements that she felt affirmed her 
worth in the new Soviet society fell broadly in line with those who lived as adults 
alongside the Bolsheviks during the Revolution. Moreover, that she had no family at that 
time suggested that, whether she had ever had a partner or children or not, she 
remained keen to contribute to the socialist future through self-sufficiency and labour, 
rather than as the metaphorical ‘mother’ we see evoked elsewhere. The ‘cohort identity’ 
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she shared with Lenin through her brother therefore reinforced her rightful inclusion in 
the bright-lit Soviet society. Her inclusion meant that she would not be left under the 
‘unbearable emotional oppression’ of belonging ‘politically’ to the older generation, 
whose roles, though worthwhile, were now over – and who would only enjoy a brief 
moment of the new society.114 Ultimately, Sofia’s letter serves to substantiate the 
argument that women saw their own participation in labour, education, or other forms 
of socialist construction as their key to the deliverance granted by Soviet power.   
 
One group of young women had written to Krupskaia seven years earlier in 1928, 
evoking the language of darkness and light which had characterised both pre-
Revolutionary religious discourse, and early Soviet discussions of the Revolution. They 
complained that there was ‘still a lot of darkness, drunkenness, hooliganism in our 
everyday life.’115 Though the emphasis of the language in the two letters was slightly 
different in that the earlier places responsibility for the lack of revolutionary progress 
with those community-members of her village, and the other seems to emphasise that it 
is rural village life itself which has delayed the arrival of the Revolution what is clear, is 
that both comfortably reproduce the language associated with the Revolution and the 
new Soviet state.116  Women who identified as the ‘older’ generation displayed 
significantly less fluency in this respect. One self-proclaimed pensioner, to whom we 
will return in more detail later in the thesis, lamented the poor living conditions allowed 
by her pension in 1936, and asked Molotov: ‘Don't forget us old people, […] give us a 
piece of personal happiness, so we can be happy though at the end of our days, and from 
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the heart would say ‘our homeland is the USSR – there's a land of joy, a country of 
universal happiness’’.117 Though this pensionerka (pensioner) seems to have been 
roundly positive about the results of the Revolution, she nonetheless chided ‘the state’ 
for seeming to ‘forget’ about older people, reflecting a position somewhat ‘outside’ the 
Revolution, indicative of a life lived mostly before it. 
Another self-professed ‘old woman’ wrote to Krupskaia (via Molotov) in 1937, detailing 
her difficult material position in her request for an increase to her pension. The poverty 
of her material position was demonstrated by the holes in underwear, which made an 
unusually explicit link between the Revolution and the hardship she suffered. She stated: 
‘[i]n the first years of our revolution we had to endure the most difficult period in our 
economy.’118 The explicit allocation of responsibility for this economic hardship with 
the years following the Revolution was striking. Even letters from younger women, who 
were members of socially marginalised groups and therefore considered to possess a 
lower ‘threat level’ than others, sought to redirect the blame for the problems they 
identify away from the state.119 A 1939 letter to Procurator General Andrei Ianuarievich  
Vyshinskii from the noted graduate of the Kharkov School for the Deaf and Blind, Olga 
Skorokhodova, contained assertive and severe reproach of the treatment of and 
provision for her peers and her school, in comparison to that received by schools for 
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hearing and seeing children.120 Though Olga’s letter was clearly very critical of her 
experience of Soviet life as a deaf-blind child, she stopped short of blaming Soviet life 
itself, and spoke instead of the particular institutions in which she has been homed. She 
expressed a desire to work, to be of ‘value’ to the state, and not to be considered an 
invalid. In short, she expressed a sense of entitlement to be a real, full Soviet citizen: the 
fault lay with her care-givers. This is not to say that, by using particular language, or by 
virtue of their age, women were able to write whatever they want with impunity – but 
attention to the broad generational cohort, or to the time a letter-writer states they have 
ahead of them, helps to account for the range of permissible accounts presented to 
officials and newspapers at any given time. Old age or approaching death might account 
for some ‘slips’ in Bolshevik fluency, and frustrations with the delivery of socialist 
benefits, both due to the effort directed at adapting to the project, and the revolutionary 
credentials implied by the participation in the labour force (either in public or the home) 
– all, of course, for the revolutionary cause.  On the other hand, a sense of youthful 
exuberance and revolutionary enthusiasm for the socialist project, narrated in fluent 
‘Bolshevik’ might mask ideologically irrelevant tales in letters from younger authors. 
 
Conclusions 
 
By exploring the role of generation in the expression of emotional discourse, ‘rights’ and 
entitlement, and finally, personal relationships, we can properly understand what 
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women understood the New Soviet Woman to mean. The diversity in outlook present in 
the sources, apparently across generational lines, might at first glance negate any 
conclusions we can draw about distinct generational cohorts of women based upon the 
timings of historical events in their lifetimes. By applying socio-selectivity theory, and in 
particular the idea of ‘perceived time remaining’, it is clearly possible to mitigate this 
diversity. The concept aids understanding of how, despite the ‘separate lives, with 
individual sorrows and achievements’ involved, it is still possible to identify distinct 
generational patterns in the responses of women to the new Soviet state, and in 
particular, the New Soviet Woman.121 Since the shorter the amount of time that a person 
perceived to remain in their lives causes people to attach themselves to meaning-
focused goals, rather than focusing more upon novelty, potential and the acquisition of 
skills, ‘perceived time left’ produced clear delineations in the reception of the new 
Soviet gender discourse by women at different stages of life. Empirically, this seems to 
be a salient determinant of the content of letters. When writing about tenets of the New 
Soviet Woman, women placed a clear social premium upon literacy and labour, and the 
Revolution more broadly. Those girls and women who perceived less ‘time’ ahead of 
them tended to relate different aspects of their lives to Soviet discourse, in different 
ways.  
Since ‘perceived time left’ roughly corresponds with age, we can see how this forms a 
broad ‘framework’ upon which to understand women’s experiences. But, it is not 
enough simply to rely on chronological measures alone. Women who grew up before 
the Revolution were obviously influenced by things that were not the Soviet state, in 
terms of their experience of interpersonal relationships, language acquisition, and 
historical events. Likewise, the age at which letter-writers experienced the Revolution 
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affected their perception of it, as well as the discursive tools they possessed in 
correspondence with authorities. This combination of dynamics presents a convincing 
blueprint of the lives of women and girls in the Soviet Union from which to understand 
their reception of the gender ideology of the new Soviet state. That ‘perceived time left’ 
plays a role is important when understanding particular emotions experienced and 
(perhaps more importantly, expressed) by women and girls hinted at in the letters thus 
far examined, and which will form a portion of the analysis in the thesis.  
That Arganova found such satisfaction in her contribution to the literacy drive amongst 
women whom she described as her ‘daughters’, as part of a broader desire for meaning 
at the end of her life, in the first decades of the Soviet state is particularly interesting.122 
The role of generation as it is influenced by social and historical time was most 
pertinent when analysing women’s senses of self in their personal relationships, 
evoking depictions of the self in ‘genealogical terms’ as part of a larger Soviet family. 
The changing nature of the family and gender relationships also had a particularly 
tangible practical effect upon women’s lives: not only in terms of their social and moral 
standards, but in that social events such as marriage, divorce, parenthood all affected a 
woman’s ability to make a living in the Soviet Union, and often affected their personal 
safety and material well-being. Women were sharply affected by historical processes in 
their appreciation of what is ‘normal’, and in addition, seem to be influenced practically 
in their outlooks by social events such as marriage and motherhood that generally occur 
within particular age ranges. However, their perceived sense of ‘time left remaining’ 
also influences their framing of particular events and processes, such as the 
transformative power of the Revolution, or the social value of their labour. 
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Therefore, in order to properly understand the way women and girls consider 
themselves in terms of their emotions, rights and relationships, the understanding of 
generational cohort which appears to be most credible when assessing the voices of 
women is as a group of individuals who, broadly speaking, share both a common 
historical context for their earlier, most formative years; and a similar perception of the 
time remaining in their lives.  The scene described by Arganova, and the sentiments she 
evoked, exhibit these characteristics of generation clearly. In her discussion of the 
Revolution, she spoke of a future that she would not be part of, internalising Soviet 
generational discourse with an explicit acknowledgement of the lack of time ahead of 
her, something she saw as defining her experience, apart from the other, younger 
women of her village. In Arganova’s recognition of her role, as a woman and a mother 
(both literally and figuratively speaking), we can see the convergence of both pre-
Revolutionary, and new Soviet social norms. Her discussion reflects both the 
monumental time of pre-Revolutionary kinship both in terms of language and social 
structure, as well as an attempt to secure her ‘role’ or ‘legacy’ in the Soviet future by 
relating herself to those she perceives as having the available time to assume a 
significant role in that future.123 Arganova’s letter to Krupskaia, which we encountered 
earlier, encapsulates both elements of generational identity: socio-historical time; and 
perception of available time. 
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Chapter Two  
‘A new system of feelings, new psychology, new emotions and new 
culture’: Locating ‘un-Soviet’ emotions in the emotional landscape 
of the new Soviet State. 
 
Ruminating on the differences between their own lives and those of their mothers in 
1939, five members of a women’s reading circle in Essentuki wrote to Nadezhda 
Krupskaia, after whom their new library had been named, to ask her to approve the 
tribute to her and her husband: ‘In our country, there has been constructed and 
developed a new system of feelings, new psychology, new emotions and new culture’.1 
This new system of feelings was credited by the women to Lenin, to whose memory 
they had opened the library. They asked Krupskaia to ‘accept this modest monument to 
grandfather Lenin, who freed woman from centuries of slavery, and opened for her the 
path to the conquest of the human mind.’2 
For these women, the new system of feelings, psychology, emotions and culture was an 
intrinsic element of Soviet life and womanhood, and their letter discussed little else 
beyond its meaning to them, and to the activities of their group (which they had briefly 
listed). Yet, the phrasing of their sentiments is quite curious. The women conceptualised 
their role as women in Soviet society primarily as raising the next Soviet generations, 
stating that ‘[t]he woman as mother, and as teacher of the New Soviet Person, is 
assigned the important task of educating ourselves in the essence of high culture, high 
knowledge of contemporary science, technology, and art. Through the creation of our 
club, we strive to help women acquire all knowledge, and to raise their cultural level.’3 
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Their work, then, seems not to have been finished: in 1939 responsibility for women’s 
advancement still seems to have rested squarely with them. 
Following the Revolution, Soviet authorities sought to re-forge the Russian mind, body 
and soul in their entirety.  The New Soviet Man and Woman were to be subject to a new 
system of feelings more suitable to a socialist society, and characterised by 
revolutionary zeal and happiness, and a righteous anger towards class enemies. In 
essence, the state sought to revolutionise the private and emotional life of Russian 
citizens, deconstructing the ‘individualism’ around which emotional lives had 
previously been constructed, and destroying the causes of ‘unhappy’ emotions. This 
would be of particular significance to women in the new Soviet state. Since the newly 
‘emancipated’ Soviet woman had been granted entitlement to divorce, alimony, suffrage, 
abortion (albeit temporarily), and wage and labour equality, which would allegedly 
relieve her suffering under capitalism, neither she nor any other group of Soviet citizens 
had any real ‘need’ for unhappy emotions or negativity.  
Instead, women had a civic obligation to express public and collective gratitude and 
happiness in line with discourse promoted by the state in posters, education, letters and 
speeches. They had been granted happiness and freedom, materially and socially, by the 
Soviet state, first, under Lenin.4 Fostering what Jeffrey Brooks has called a ‘moral 
economy of the gift’ in the construction of the vanguard party as the new Soviet 
society’s ‘benefactor’, Lenin had established ‘gratitude’ as a primary feature of the 
Soviet emotional vocabulary: citizens should express gratitude for the opportunities for 
                                                          
4 C. Kelly, ‘A Joyful Soviet Childhood: Licensed Happiness for Little Ones’, in M. Balina, E. Dobrenko (eds), 
Petrified Utopia: Happiness Soviet Style, (London, 2009), pp. 4-5. 
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socialist happiness opened to them (attainable through self-sacrifice).5 Following the 
consolidation of Stalin’s leadership,  these gifts were owed to Stalin and his command of 
the state. The ‘economy of the gift’ was expanded further by 1935, when citizens were 
informed that socialism had been ‘achieved’. 6 Yet in reality, though public childcare and 
employment for women apparently now abounded, women were left in a peculiar 
position, for they had been saddled with both domestic and public employment through 
two decades of economic and political uncertainty, and experience with undoubted 
potential for unhappy experiences and feelings. In the midst of this, they were assigned 
the responsibility for building the next generation, critical to the ongoing success of the 
Revolution. 
Since they would grow up entirely free from pre-Revolutionary influences, children in 
the early Soviet state, were recognised as a key target for propaganda, and so 
propaganda for and about them absorbed and intensified through the 1920s and 1930s 
a key Soviet trope about ‘happy childhoods’.  The press throughout this period explicitly 
associated negative experiences with the tsarist past. Unhappy children suffered as a 
result of bourgeois influences, whereas in the workplaces of the home and the factory 
an adherence to the emotional and behavioural norms ‘gifted’ to the population by the 
Party produced happy children – and subsequently happy adults. A typical example 
reproduced in posters, photographs, parades, speeches and letters to, for and from 
children, was that of ‘Thank you beloved Stalin for a Happy Childhood!’. There were 
often some variations: ‘beloved’ was often replaced with ‘Father’, ‘Comrade’, or even 
‘Uncle’. A ‘happy childhood’, however, required affirmations of gratitude and 
indebtedness in performances of socialist happiness, in order to confirm the ideological 
                                                          
5 J. Brooks, Thank You Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton, 2001), 
p. 83. 
6 Brooks, Thank You Comrade Stalin, p. 83. 
114 
 
acceptability of the sentiment, and as Brooks notes, to ‘solidify’ the political hierarchy 
that was in place more broadly.7 As such, by the end of the 1930s, the emotional 
discourse of Soviet society was considered to have been fully established, with an entire 
generation of adults having reached at least the age of twenty-two since the Revolution. 
By the outbreak of war in 1941, there was an entire generation of citizens, born, 
educated, and socialised in the new Soviet state. Following Stalin’s proclamation in 1935 
that ‘life has become better, life has become merrier’, the end of the decade constituted 
a crucial milestone in the construction of socialism. In print, the ‘negative life 
experiences’ of the tsarist past that had featured in NEP-era publications took a 
backseat, replaced by internal enemies and ‘pre-Stalin’ elements, and overshadowed by 
depictions of smiling Soviet citizens.8 
Despite this, Soviet society was still in its infancy: several generations raised under 
tsarist rule remained, generating a curious dichotomy in discourse on the construction 
of socialist society and in particular, the new psychology and system of feelings. The 
language of feelings and well-being in the 1930s appears initially to have been 
unambiguously positive: life had become merrier, women had been successfully 
emancipated and as a result, a generation of ‘happy youth’ had been raised. Yet, subtly 
apparent amidst the celebration is an increased focus upon happiness as an ongoing 
‘process’ in public discourse as it relates to wider society. Though the tone is more 
rigidly and relentlessly positive tone in that discourse relating directly to ‘youth’, the 
complex identities of those partly raised prior to the Revolution were ideologically 
compelled nonetheless to participate in the process. Older people were vital 
                                                          
7 Brooks, Thank You Comrade Stalin!, p. 84. 
8 Brooks, Thank You Comrade Stalin! On p. 86, Brooks discusses the evolution of the ‘negative past’ in the 
Soviet press. As discussed in chapter one, Krokodil magazine in November 1936 ran a special edition to 
celebrate the Stalin Constitution. It depicted on its front cover a crowd of joyful, smiling citizens.   
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participants in the jubilant society in construction, as bearers of the historical memory 
of the tsarist past and Soviet foundation myth, as shown earlier in the thesis.9 Though 
life has become merrier by 1935, it has become merrier (veselee), rather than merry 
(veselaia), or happy (schastlivaia). The process was still ongoing, allowing public 
emotional discourse to retain an optimistic and forward-looking tone.10 As the women 
of Essentuki had described their aims: ‘[t]he woman as mother, and as teacher of the 
New Soviet Person is assigned the important task of educating ourselves in the essence 
of high culture, high knowledge of contemporary science, technology, and art. Through 
the creation of our club, we strive to help women acquire all knowledge, and to raise their 
cultural level.’11 Therefore, although arguably by 1939, women should have reached the 
same cultural and educational level as the socialist man, since they had been granted the 
tools to do so, it was accepted that, due to their particularly backwards state prior to 
1917, this was not necessarily the case. The women remained positive, but recognised 
their own responsibility. Lenin freed women by opening a path to them, not by raising 
them up. Their happiness, then, became their own responsibility. 
By 1939, women possessed a civic obligation to express joy and gratitude for their 
freedom, if they were not yet rid of their ‘backwardness’.12 However, whether this 
afforded them greater leeway in their articulation of negative emotions, or introduced 
greater rigidity, is not immediately clear. The ‘future-oriented’ focus of socialist 
happiness, for women in particular, created a space in Soviet emotional discourse for 
less roundly ‘positive’ Soviet emotions, such as anger and disgust for un-Soviet elements 
                                                          
9 More on the role of older generations as the bearers of historical memory of the tsarist misery defeated 
by the revolution can be found in S. Lovell, ‘Soviet Socialism and the Construction of Old Age’, pp. 564-
585. 
10 Kelly, in ‘Joyful Soviet Childhood’, discusses on p. 3 the distinctions between the variety of epithets 
related to happiness. 
11 GARF, f. 7279, op. 17, d. 38, l. 1. [italics my own] 
12 Fitzpatrick, ‘Happiness and Toska’, p. 357. 
116 
 
of society. These emotions were accessible to both older citizens, and the otherwise 
happy younger citizens, as both were expected to struggle against the anti-Soviet 
elements that had been identified and lampooned throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
such as kulaks, NEP-men and religious believers.13 What is clear, however, is that the 
discourse reproduced by women emphasised a consistently ‘future-oriented’ character 
to the conceptualisation of ‘socialist happiness’ – a path to ‘progress’, to ‘light’ from 
darkness’. Soviet work was now finished, and women’s work had begun: their lives had 
been made better, yet their equality and their happiness – their own transformation - 
was in their own hands. Thus, any residual negative, or un-Soviet emotions, would be 
associated solely with the past, or a present to which citizens were obligated to improve. 
Consequently, emotional discourse in the early Soviet state was certainly of great 
importance both in the maintenance of the public mood by authorities, in the promotion 
of particular emotional states in public discourse, and consequently in the 
rationalisation of divergent emotions by women - or in other words, how they sought to 
navigate this emotional regime with their more troublesome feelings, whilst remaining 
newly made ‘Soviet Women’. 
 
A New System Of Feelings 
 
The first decades of Soviet power were a clear demonstration of the significance of 
emotions to both power and ideology, as authorities struggled to measure and control 
the public ‘mood’, and to ensure full and total support of the project of socialist 
                                                          
13 An overview of the social crises that faced the Soviet Union in the 1920s, resulting in the emergence of 
these internal foes, can be found in: W. G. Rosenburg, ‘Introduction: NEP Russia as a “Transitional” 
Society’, in S. Fitzpatrick, A. Rabinowitch, R. Stites (eds), Russian in the Era of NEP: Explorations in Soviet 
Society and Culture, (Indiana, 1991), pp. 1-11.  
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construction. As Nicole Eustace has claimed, ‘efforts at emotional control constitute 
negotiations of power’: in other words, feelings and emotions evolve over time, either 
by direction or organically, and hold political meaning.14 Thus evidently it is, at this 
stage in the study of emotions, more useful to consider what Julie Livingston has termed 
‘the politics of emotional expression’ and the way in which individuals navigated their 
shared script, than the authenticity of their bodily experience of said emotions. In short, 
it is more fruitful to focus upon ‘smaller truths’ than universalistic claims.15 That 
individuals are constrained by their emotional vocabularies, shaped themselves by 
contemporary social and political conditions, is particularly pertinent to a society such 
as that of the early Soviet Union, in which, clearly, huge shifts in social and political 
conditions had occurred in the lifetimes of its citizens: as such, it is of great value to 
understand the way in which these emotional vocabularies might have been shaped by 
the conditions in which the citizens acquired them. 
To summarise briefly the introduction above: emotional discourse in the 1920s and 
1930s was particularly distinctive, as the state fought to redefine the emotional lives of 
its citizens. As the construction of socialism progressed into the 1940s, so too would the 
absorption into official culture of the idea that happiness could be enjoyed – but it still 
required individual work.  The Soviet Union had no real place for unhappy emotions. 
They were viewed as ‘decadent moods’, since they were considered symptoms of 
capitalism, which would, as with other such ‘capitalist’ phenomena as prostitution, 
abortion, and the nuclear family, eventually wither away. Though the tone of the 1920s 
was relatively mixed, the optimistic flavour of cultural discourse was undeniable. The 
construction of socialist happiness was underway, and by the mid-1930s, it was simply 
                                                          
14 N. Eustace, E. Lean, J. Livingston, J. Plamper, et al, ‘AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions’, 
American Historical Review, 49:2, (December, 2012), p. 1525. 
15 Eustace, Lean, Livingston, Plamper, et al, ‘AHR Conversation’, pp. 1490, 1513.  
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impermissible to fail to recognise one’s own happiness – or progress towards it. By this 
time, there was essentially a civic obligation to express public and collective happiness, 
in line with the discourse promoted by the state, intensifying after Stalin’s 1935 
declaration about life having become ‘better and ‘merrier’. Not to recognise this, as 
Catriona Kelly has argued, became ‘tantamount to a political crime’.16 However, it would 
prove impossible to enforce this ‘political requirement’ for happiness in any meaningful 
way, as realistically the remit of authorities in this respect was limited to the 
government of public expression emotional experiences. Moreover, the positive 
emotional experiences acknowledged almost by definition the existence of an 
‘emotional opposite’, forcing negative emotions back onto the political agenda. 
As Fitzpatrick has astutely noted, it is perhaps impossible to attempt to draw findings 
beyond the ‘conventions of performance’ of a society and its citizens: 
I can’t tell you how people “really” felt in Stalin’s Russia. For that matter, I’m not sure how 
accurately I can tell you how I feel today, and if I were to make claims about your emotional 
condition – individually and collectively – those claims would be very dubious. What is 
accessible to the historian is the emotional repertoire of a society – which emotions were 
most frequently performed (expressed) in a specific historical (social, cultural) setting, and 
what the conventions of performance were.17 
Moreover, and as Sheila Fitzpatrick again has noted, ‘confessional’ letters to authorities 
formed a relatively small, but significant portion of citizen communication with 
authorities, citing the definition by Dal’ in his 1881 dictionary: ‘a sincere and complete 
confession (soznanie) or explanation (ob’’iasnenie) of one’s convictions, thoughts and 
                                                          
16 Kelly, ‘A Joyful Soviet Childhood: Licensed Happiness for Little Ones’, p. 4 
17 S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Happiness and Toska: An Essay in the History of Emotions in Pre-War Soviet Russia’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 50:3, (2004), p.357. 
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actions’.18 Fitzpatrick goes on to highlight that readers of these letters ‘get an immediate 
sense of the unmistakeably personal flavour of many of the public letters that people 
wrote to political leaders, and even to newspapers and government institutions.’19 
Undoubtedly, though we might be unable to ascertain the ‘veracity’, ‘authenticity’ or 
physiological experience of the emotions expressed in letters to authorities, we might 
also reasonably assume a certain level of sincerity in these letters, in relation to their 
genre and context. Likewise, it would be implausible to root the study of emotions too 
robustly in ‘bodily experience’, as William Reddy and Jan Plamper have suggested.20 The 
process of ensuring that emotional expressions are accurate articulations of bodily 
experiences and emotional states, though hypothetically interesting, is of limited utility 
to the study. Indeed, as part of the same ‘conversation’, Barbara Rosenwein stated that:  
Even our most “sincere” and “unpremeditated” expressions are willy-nilly constrained by 
our emotional vocabulary and gestures. They are shaped as well by our conventions, values, 
and even implicit “theories” of emotion… Emotions are largely communicative tools, and if 
we are to understand one another, we are wise to express ourselves through well-worn 
paths that all of us are familiar with.21  
As noted by Anna Wierzbicka, ‘we know from introspection that, on the one hand, we 
are capable of a great variety of feelings, and on the other, that these different feelings 
are not capable of being counted’. Whether different feelings are understood to be 
shades of the same emotions, or different emotions entirely depends to a significant 
degree upon the language ‘through the prism of which these emotions are interpreted’. 
As such, attention must be paid both to the idiosyncrasies of the Russian emotional 
vocabulary, and to an appropriate ‘semantic metalanguage’ with which to analyse the 
                                                          
18 Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivago velikorusskovo iazykla Vladimira Dalia, 2nd ed, (St Petersburg, 1881), cited in S. 
Fitzpatrick, ‘Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s’, Slavic Review, 
55:1, (April, 1996), p. 82. 
19 Fitzpatrick, ‘Supplicants and Citizens’, p. 82 
20 W. Reddy and J. Plamper, part of Eustace, Livingston et al., ‘AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of 
Emotions’, p. 1492. 
21 B. Rosenwein, part of Eustace, Livingston et al., ‘AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions’, p. 
1496. 
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former.22 According to Wierzbicka, a small set of simple concepts, including ‘feel, ‘want’, 
‘say’, ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘good’, and ‘bad’, having been ‘independently verified as plausible 
candidates’ are the most appropriate for the task.23 The complexity of locating 
generically ‘good’ or ‘bad’ feelings within Soviet emotional discourse precludes the 
restriction of an analytical terminology to such ‘simple and universal’ concepts.  
Furthermore, as Kelly has shown, the vocabulary usually associated with ‘good’, or 
‘happy’ emotions, in Soviet emotional discourse in the 1920s and 1930s, created a 
number of difficulties for those citizens who wished to reproduce it. For example, the 
Russian word schast’e – a word usually rendered into English as ‘happiness’, is arguably 
quite a particular emotional state, associated with ‘good fortune’, or elation: a type of 
‘earthly bliss’, a potential force, that is not necessarily to be relied on. Similarly, radost’ – 
usually translated as joy or gladness - and vesiolost’ (fun, merriment), both suggest a 
response to some other event or condition, rather than as some permanent condition.24 
The word dovol’stvo – roughly translated as contentment, a more constant type of 
happiness - is perhaps, according to the Russian ethno-linguist Anna Zaliznyak, cited by 
Kelly, a better representation of ‘happiness’ as it is understood in the English language. 
Nonetheless, as an emotional state, this sense of ‘contentment’ is usually conceived of as 
dependent on a particular set of circumstances – and in any case, is not the language 
usually associated with socialist happiness.25 According to Zaliznyak and Kelly, it 
follows that this sense of transience imbues the language with a particular dualism: 
happiness (even as it is understood in English) tends to be a short-lived phenomenon, 
                                                          
22 A. Wierzbecka, ‘”Sadness” and “Anger” in Russian: The Non-universality of the so-called “Basic” human 
emotions’, in A. Anathasiadou, E. Tabakowska, (eds), Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and 
Expression, (Berlin, 1998), pp.4-5. 
23 A. Wierzbecka, ‘”Sadness” and “Anger” in Russian’, p. 6. 
24 Kelly, A Joyful Soviet Childhood’, p. 3. 
25 A.A. Zaliznyak, I.B. Levontina, A.D. Shmelev, Klyuchevye idei russkoi iazykovoi kartiny mira, (Moscow, 
2005), p. 167, cited in Kelly, A Joyful Soviet Childhood’, p. 3. 
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particularly once it is recognised, and is intimately connected with its opposites.26 
Therefore, happiness as presented by official discourse, i.e. as a permanent state of 
elation, joy – and gratitude - would by its nature have been very difficult to express 
convincingly, without an equivalent ‘pair’. Expressions of happiness therefore implicitly 
recognised sadness, yearning, anticipation or anxiety; all politically ‘unnecessary’, and 
not quite Soviet emotions. Thus, the difficulty of using such language as this is 
compounded. Yet, this dualism takes on a function in the reproduction of popular 
political discourse, in terms of navigating what Kelly termed ‘civic obligations of 
collective joy’, and finding a ‘place’ for un-happy emotions.27 Accordingly, the direct 
usage of ‘positive’ emotional language in women’s letters does not appear to be as 
frequent as might otherwise be expected. The articulation of ‘happiness’ and ‘gladness’, 
and other such positive emotional states, is fairly limited, and with quite particular 
functions.  
Choosing to focus upon happiness and toska (longing or yearning), two feelings which 
‘cover a fairly wide gamut’, Sheila Fitzpatrick in her exploratory study of emotions in 
pre-war Soviet Russia expanded the perspective of the historiography, to begin to 
address the use of emotional discourse by citizens, rather than particular emotional 
states.28  Moreover, Fitzpatrick begins to explore the presence of both ‘Soviet’ and ‘un-
Soviet’ emotions in the voices of citizens in the 1930s: her results indicate a flexibility to 
the Soviet emotional landscape hitherto little considered, and a process of dichotomy, 
negotiation and performance which clouds the resoundingly positive discourse 
promoted by authorities.29 In particular, the study addresses the idea that ‘grief and 
                                                          
26 Kelly, A Joyful Soviet Childhood’, p. 3.  
27 Kelly, A Joyful Soviet Childhood’. 
28 Fitzpatrick, ‘Happiness and Toska’, pp. 357-371. 
29 Fitzpatrick, ‘Happiness and Toska’, p.370. 
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melancholy’ could be expressed in the period, as long as they were not causally linked 
with the regime.  
The letters addressed thus far in the thesis support the assertion that women 
understood emotional discourse to be flexible enough to accommodate negative feelings, 
though there appears to be more to the story. It is therefore crucial to explore the 
implications of different intersections of identity for negotiations of Soviet power, and 
to public identity. Generation, in particular, has already been shown to be present in the 
way women perceived of themselves and their experiences of Soviet power. As has been 
identified in the letters discussed already, though women did not necessarily possess 
interests determined by their generational cohort, the way in which they articulated 
their narratives in letters to the state was significantly impacted by the historical 
context in which they acquired language, and to a lesser extent, literacy. Their 
generation also provided them with a symbolic frame of reference against which to 
negotiate their social value with the state. Though the previous chapter has shown that 
women were conceptually quite fluent in Bolshevik discourse, the examination of 
emotions to follow will demonstrate that the technical fluency of women of different 
generations varied. That said, their conceptual understanding of their roles as older or 
younger women would serve to ‘mitigate’ any technical inarticulacy or presumptions of 
ideological irrelevance that were present in their prose.  
Bearing in mind the basic premise that a perception of life’s finality would ostensibly 
cause a person to attach greater importance to finding meaning and satisfaction from 
life, seeking ‘positive’ emotional states, we can also mitigate any differences in the tone 
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and style of letter writing not attributable to life events or political literacy in this way.30 
Moreover, the correspondence between this desire for personal meaning and for 
broader social relevance reveals the types of emotional expression women understood 
to be appropriate for a Soviet woman to articulate. That women evoked these emotional 
devices in requests for assistance, lenience and simply acknowledgement reflects a 
broad social understanding, informed by one’s generational cohort and degree of 
fluency in Bolshevik language, of the types of emotional expression likely to curry 
favour with, or mask dissatisfaction from, editors or authorities. 
 
Vagueness, Omission, and Performance as Emotional Euphemism 
 
To pursue the assertion that the historical context of one’s upbringing affects one’s 
emotional language, it is also critical to examine the language which might be used in 
place of explicitly emotional expressions, since, as William Reddy noted with regards to 
gaps in historical document, ‘What remains unsaid can be eloquent.’31 Considering the 
particular focus upon ‘happy’ emotions within Soviet emotional discourse, ‘what 
remains unsaid’ is then particularly worthy of exploration. Grondelaers and Geeraerts, 
in their study ‘Vagueness as a Euphemistic Strategy’, provide perhaps the most 
illuminating insight into the nature and function of said ‘gaps’, addressing a 
historiographical neglect of  the communicative importance of language as emotional 
expression.32 In identifying language as emotional expression, focus is shifted to the 
emotive connotations of expressions ‘not primarily designed to denote emotions’, in 
                                                          
30 L. Carsensten, ‘The Influence of a Sense of Time on Human Development’, Science New Series, 312:5782, 
(June 30, 2006), p. 1914. 
31 W. Reddy, as part of Eustace, Lean, Livingston, Plamper, et al, ‘AHR Conversation: The Historical Study 
of Emotions’, p. 1498. 
32 S. Grondelaers and D. Geeraerts, ‘Vagueness as a Euphemistic Strategy’, in A. Anathasiadou, E. 
Tabakowska, (eds), Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression, (Berlin, 1998), p.357. 
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particular, euphemistic strategies to avoid ‘taboo’ subjects or emotions’.33 Grondelaers 
and Geeraerts use ‘euphemism’ to denote an avoidance strategy, whereby ‘an 
emotionally neutral or positive word’ is used instead of a negatively connoted, or ‘taboo’ 
word, and ‘vagueness’ to denote ‘semantic under-specification’, for example, with the 
substitution for an emotionally charged expression of ‘unhappiness’, of the intentionally 
non-specific description of one’s difficult circumstances, or emotional performance.34 
Vagueness as a euphemistic strategy thus has clear applicability in the Soviet context. 
Since, as Kelly has noted, not to recognise the joy Soviet power brought to everyday life 
had become ‘tantamount to a political crime’, negative emotions functioned as un-Soviet, 
decadent moods: essentially, as political taboo. Indeed, this was explicitly evident in the 
response of the Soviet authorities to the emotional lives of its citizens, monitoring the 
‘mood’ in the cities and villages, and forwarding ‘un-Soviet’ correspondence to 
newspapers and officials for further inquiry. Similarly, records of suicides were halted 
following anxieties about an ‘epidemic’ during the 1920s, and unwillingness by 
authorities to publicly address this.35  
Having observed the types of allegory evoked in political propaganda, such as speeches 
and posters, of darkness versus light, and forward motion versus regression reproduced 
in letters of any genre, to discuss negative feelings or situations in place of direct 
mention of ‘despair’, ‘sadness’, or ‘frustration’, the concept of euphemistic strategies 
enriches the study of emotional expression in letter writing in this context. The group of 
teachers encountered earlier, who had written to Molotov in 1936, referred to their 
                                                          
33 Grondelaers and Geeraerts, ‘Vagueness as a Euphemistic Strategy’, p.358. 
34 In their study into the use of vagueness as euphemistic strategy in discussions of cancer, which they 
substituted in euphemism for ‘disease’, Grondelaers and Geeraerts distinguished this function of 
vagueness from its alternatives in order to establish robust empirical support for the thesis, and isolate 
contexts in which the vagueness was attributable only to avoidance, rather than, for example, a lack of 
medical expertise.  
35 C. Baudelot, Suicide: The Hidden Side of Modernity, (Cambridge, 2008), p. 97. 
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perceived right to ‘be able to look back, retire, and live comfortably’, having lived and 
worked through the Revolution, strongly implying that their present circumstances 
were not the comfortable retirement they deserved.36  Similarly, Kh. Korneieva, the 
elderly woman we also encountered in the previous chapter, who wrote to Krest’ianka 
magazine in 1924, lamented the obstacles facing women’s public participation in public 
life, writing: ‘Help us … that we are not again left in the dark, we want light, we are dark 
now and many are illiterate, though many try, so few are strong […] Sorry this is poorly 
written…’.37 In addition to connotations of generation, discussed in detail earlier, 
Korneieva’s letter reflects her conception of a relationship between the emotional and 
political transformations of the Revolution, to which the allegories of light and dark 
were wedded. Moreover, the vague metaphor of ‘darkness’ as a descriptor for their lives 
reflects a rather negative appraisal of their present experience of Soviet power, which 
was intendedly diminished by the statement of their efforts at self-improvement. 
Korneieva indicated that their failure to attain the enlightenment of Soviet selfhood was 
due to their fundamental backwardness, as elderly peasant women. The sources 
discussed thus far in the thesis therefore indicated that, though women frequently 
wrote to authorities about less than satisfactory experiences, it is quite plausible that 
the outright omission of any direct reference to a negative emotional state, with a more 
factual description of the problems inherent in their lives allowed them to do so. The 
strategy of omission or vagueness, coupled either with the metaphorical evocation of 
revolutionary transformation, or a strictly factual description, was intended to 
moderate the degree of responsibility women were increasingly expected to take for 
their own ‘socialist happiness’. In this way, omission and vagueness functioned as a 
                                                          
36 GARF f. 5446, op. 82, d. 51, ll. 130-133. 
37 RGAE, f. 395, op. 1, d. 5, l. 87. 
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strategy to soften the ‘blow’ to the regime of its citizens’ dissatisfaction. The frequency 
of the strategy’s usage reflects the proficiency with which Soviet women interacted with 
their political environment.  
This chapter argues that women emphasised the impermanence of their negative 
emotions, affording the emotions a sense of physicality, and not only creating a distance 
between the performer and the act, but a sense of transience to the feeling itself. 
Moreover, of those letters examined this far, a number contain references to emotional 
performances, which offer an alternative strategy for presenting politically 
‘inappropriate’ emotions. Crying would appear to be one such performance of emotion. 
Maria S., whose biography of her daughter Liza we encountered in the previous chapter, 
described how she wept over the loss of her children: ‘It is hard for a mother to lose her 
children, such as mine, and my old eyes weep, but I am proud of my own children Lisa 
and Volodia, who sacrificed their young lives for the struggle against the bourgeoisie.’38 
The act of crying remained in the present tense, but was attributed to her eyes, rather 
than her sense of self; moreover, she describes her internal emotions as ones of pride. In 
contrast, a young girl named Lera, delighted at her receipt of a postcard from Nadezhda 
Krupskaia confirming her assistance with her acquisition of medical care, reported 
‘crying like a fool with joy’- because due to this, her mother could now go out and get 
her medicine tomorrow.39 She was able to attribute her tears to her ‘internal’ emotional 
state, because were feelings of joy and gratitude were politically acceptable in the Soviet 
context.  
Yet it is prudent not to restrict study to the analysis of particular ‘named’ emotions 
through this prism since, as noted earlier ‘we know from introspection that, on the one 
                                                          
38 RGAE, f. 396, op. 2, d. 30, l. 42. 
39 GARF, f. 7279, op. 14, d. 14, ll. 23-4. 
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hand, we are capable of a great variety of feelings, and on the other, that these different 
feelings are not capable of being counted’.40 Though studies of particular emotions in 
both the Soviet Union and in Russia have been fruitful, they are by their nature 
particular, and as such would require a vast linguistic mapping in order to be able to 
begin to assess their relationship to Soviet gender identities. It is of more use therefore 
to consider broader strategies for articulating negative emotions, in order to account 
both for the degree of communicative variation possible in women’s letters and for our 
inability to fully know the exact emotional experiences indicated.  As such, it is possible 
to locate women’s letters within the political cultural context of the Soviet Union, by 
examining their uses of direct emotional expressions, descriptions of performative 
emotions, or euphemistic uses of language as emotion.  
 
Constructing Socialist Happiness: Self-Fulfilment And Gratitude 
 
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, and indicated by many of the letters 
consulted in chapter one, women in the early Soviet Union shared common strategies, 
such as omission, vagueness, or suggestion, to eschew open criticisms of the regime, to 
avoid expressing that they are unhappy, or to safely express negative experiences of 
Soviet power. Common amongst these strategies is an acknowledgement of their own 
responsibility for the attainment of happiness, framing the enjoyment of the benefits of 
Soviet power as a ‘process’, or a struggle, to overcome the remnants of the old way of 
life, in which they should rightfully participate. Frequently women translate this 
struggle, like that of the acquisition of education, or entry into labour, into the paradigm 
of darkness and light.  
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Also notable is the extent to which women are aware that though they are responsible 
for their bad feelings, they are ideologically obligated to express the necessary gratitude 
to the state when their socialist happiness arrives. Expressions of gratitude were quite 
sharply delineated by the author’s generational identity: while younger women state 
their thankfulness for the opportunities for betterment and a productive future, as we 
might expect from the discussion in chapter one, older women tend to infuse their 
gratitude with a sense of sorrow that they will not experience Soviet power for very 
long. For example, Arganova’s 1930 letter to Krupskaia, cited in chapter one, seems, on 
a first impression, to be an expression of joy and self-fulfilment through the Soviet 
project, yet underlying its initially jubilant tone is an allusion to a sense of painful 
anonymity and sorrow at the end of one’s life, increasingly evident through the course 
of Arganova’s narration.41 Arganova’s account of her work for the Revolution indicates a 
continuing sense of grief for her deceased child, or at least a lingering sadness that her 
daughter did not live to see the benefits of Soviet power, perhaps to be forgotten after 
her mother’s death. In a similar vein, Arganova emphasised that she was ‘known’, that 
she was part of the Soviet project, indispensable to her community – and would not be 
forgotten. Both aspects of her writing suggested an underlying sadness, yet both were 
couched in the vocabulary of socialist happiness. The letter, in its totality, told of a 
woman coming to terms with her own mortality, in a society she only briefly 
encountered. ‘I know that I will die, but I know that the undertaking will never die’, she 
stated, apparently desiring acknowledgement of her contribution.  
A similar strategy for articulating dissatisfaction was employed by one self-identified 
pensionerka, who, writing on behalf of her husband and herself, for assistance in 
obtaining a state pension, implored Molotov:   
                                                          
41 GARF, f. 7279, op. 8, d. 15, ll. 33-34. 
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Don't forget us old people, give us a piece of personal happiness, and so that we would be 
happy though at the end of our days, and from the heart can say ‘our homeland is the USSR – 
there's a land of joy, a country of universal happiness.’42  
This forthright and almost bargaining tone was unusual amongst women’s letters more 
generally, though less so amongst letters from marginalized groups. As has been 
discussed, older people were for the most part sidelined in early Soviet discourse: their 
‘role’ in the Revolution was over, the socialist project to be left to the new Soviet 
generations. Yet, this elderly writer outlined her role as an active participant in the 
Revolution, suggesting that she should be able to tell of the universal joy of the Soviet 
Union, emphasizing how important it was to her, and to her legacy, that she should 
benefit from Soviet power. Her tone almost bartered with the authorities for assistance 
in building socialist happiness. In her letter, the pensionerka practically proved her 
eligibility for access to happiness: she had not withdrawn from labour ‘voluntarily’, or at 
the first opportunity, but had ‘worked until [she] fell down’. Nonetheless, the 
pensionerka wrote of happiness in the terms of a ‘conditional future’, a request for 
access to Soviet happiness, rather than permission to attain it. Clearly, she did not 
experience the obligatory socialist happiness, and seemed unafraid to say so. At the end 
of their days, the pensionerka implied, the pair had earned their ‘piece of personal 
happiness’, and in addition, sought satisfaction and meaning at the end of their lives.  
Both women, Arganova and the pensionerka portrayed their adulthood at the time of 
Revolution as evidence of their deserving efforts, rather than as evidence of their tsarist 
upbringing. Both had witnessed the misery of life before 1917 and had worked to 
construct its alternative. Considered in tandem, the letters from these elderly women 
show that women wanted to – or made themselves seem to want to - participate in the 
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collective happiness they saw the new Soviet person experience in discourse. They 
wanted their lives to correspond with that of the New Soviet Woman. They feared 
‘losing out’ on a place in Soviet society, and the ‘rights’ to which they appear to have felt 
entitled by virtue of their participation in the revolutionary project.  
This kind of consistent reference to ‘future’, as yet unattained, socialist happiness, or to 
past suffering, also reflected another significant shade of negative emotion expressed in 
letters by women to the Soviet state: feelings of alienation or loneliness from the 
positive experiences of Soviet power had by peers. It is in these letters that the 
‘vagueness’ women employed as euphemistic strategy to describe the difficult process 
of obtaining happiness is particularly apparent. A young girl named Nura wrote a 
seemingly formulaic salutary letter to Krupskaia, suggesting a meeting, at the end of 
December 1930: 
Long I have dreamt to have (imet’) a correspondence with the great leader of the young 
friends of Pioneers… I do not have the opportunity to visit Moscow, I have no father or 
mother, and I do not have the means to visit Moscow and see you. Happy are those Pioneers 
who have the opportunity to see you. But I will unfailingly work in the squad to get 
permission to visit, then I will get happiness to see you, dear friend… I hope I receive a reply 
from you, I will be very proud amongst my comrades, that I have a correspondence with you 
P.S. I’ve attached a few stamps for a speedy reply!43 
Upon closer inspection, however, many of the features of omission as euphemism 
present in the previous correspondences are present. Nura spoke of the happiness she 
would feel, if only she could ‘chat’ with Krupskaia. She evoked ‘happiness’ – but in future 
tense, not in its permanent, socialist sense. Nura also positioned herself on the ‘outside’ 
of her circle of peers. She referred to those Pioneers who had already had the 
opportunity to see, or meet Krupskaia, as happy. Nura, on the other hand, had neither 
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parents nor material means to facilitate this, and thus, was not one of those Happy 
Pioneers, though she would have been with just a letter, to prove her correspondence 
with Krupskaia. 
By relating her current condition to Krupskaia in this way – an orphan, with no 
resources for travel, and desiring the happiness of a personal meeting, and if not then at 
least a letter – Nura conveyed a sense of anticipation.  It may be that Nura simply saw a 
childish sense of pride, or competition in ‘standing out’ amongst her fellow Pioneers – 
which would be quite understandable. However, by the way that she related her lack of 
means it seems just as likely that she sought a ‘level playing field’ upon which to relate 
to peers, a just extension of the opportunities to partake in the happiness she saw them 
as possessing, either with their families, or with more material means. Nura’s sense of 
anticipation ostensibly masked a sense of loneliness, and alienation from her peers. 
These feelings of longing were reflected by other features of Nura’s letter. The timing of 
the letter just before novyi god (New Year), which assumed a secular cultural role akin 
to the Christian Christmas, added a sense of poignancy and longing to the letter. 
Touchingly, she included stamps to facilitate a reply from Krupskaia as best she could. 
Reading the letter as a whole, while paying attention to the way that Nura discussed 
happiness, and the features of her young life which were lacking, we can see clearly the 
way that she used euphemism to express a sense of loneliness, and perhaps longing or 
anticipation for the sense of socialist happiness she saw her peers experience. In doing 
so, Nura avoided attributing responsibility for her ‘un-Soviet’ feelings of loneliness and 
longing to the Soviet regime itself. Although Nura was disadvantaged by the 
circumstances of her upbringing, she had already embarked upon the process of 
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achieving happiness by engaging with authorities, and making the most of her 
membership of the Pioneers. 
This strategy of allocating responsibility for dissatisfaction with a party other than the 
author or government, in order to preserve the author’s role in the construction or 
attainment of happiness, was another common theme in letters to the state. Another 
letter to Krupskaia about women’s work in the village, this time from 1930, lamented 
the writer’s perceived sense of her own backwardness; she felt that the promises of 
Soviet power were still abstract, detached from her own experience. Yet, she sought to 
identify the cause of this dissatisfaction as ‘village life’, and her womanhood: ‘I felt that if 
I had gone to work with them one year ago, I would have made myself useful to the 
liberation of the workers, but our dark village life has confused my understanding of life, 
and I was motionless, like many peasant women!’44 The reflexive form of the verb ‘to 
make (oneself)’ here emphasised her responsibility as a citizen to participate in the 
Revolution, identifying conditions upon the benefits bestowed by Soviet power. The 
author perceived her life until this point as having failed to aid the construction of 
socialism, however by employing reflexive language, the author clearly assigned the 
culpability for this failing to herself. It is the author who was responsible for her 
dissatisfied state, and it was never the responsibility of the state to ‘rescue’ her. Still, by 
‘implicating’ the relatively generic ‘village life’, the writer was able to avoid portraying 
herself and her activities since the Revolution as actively anti-Soviet. She was unhappy, 
her situation unfortunate, yet this is because she did not experience Soviet power, not 
due to the privations its first decade granted. The author made clear that, although she 
was ‘late to the Party’, she had not rejected the Revolution’s transformative power, but 
sought to work with it, to bring its benefits to her life and her village. 
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Another letter depicting the struggle to obtain the Soviet happiness still ‘looming’ over 
the horizon can be found in a letter written to Krupskaia several years earlier, in 1928, 
by a young woman named Maria Sh. Aged twenty-three, Maria had been very unhappily 
married to an abusive man since she was sixteen. With few options for self-
improvement, and her marriage at a breaking point, she turned to Krupskaia for advice 
to improve her awful circumstances. Although she was trapped in a very abusive 
marriage, Maria was still able to portray her struggle to safety as part of the broader 
struggle for self-improvement. In doing so, she avoided direct discussion of any type of 
emotion, positive or negative. Yet, the feelings the situation evoked in her were clear: 
she did not yet participate in the socialist happiness for which she, as a young woman, 
was expected, to be grateful. Nor did she appear, at the time of writing, to be engaged 
with the ‘opportunities’ provided by Soviet power. Still, her letter was imbued with a 
poignant sense of sorrow that, due to her strategy of omission, was not necessarily in 
conflict with state discourse: 
Only after a long while have I decided to write to you, and ask you for advice. I am 23, and it 
is now seven years since I married, I have two children, and now my husband, almost every 
day tells me that, he can cheat on me anyway because I have nowhere to go… And if I leave 
him, I will have to go on the streets and sell myself. Actually he’s right, there’s nowhere to 
go…45  
Though Maria Sh. did not directly mention any feelings at all through the letter, her 
imprecision served to give full weight to the implications of each episode she recounts. 
That her response to her husband’s infidelities, and his instruction that if she left, she 
would have to engage in sex work on the streets, was simply: ‘actually, he is right’, might 
almost be described as factual. The sparse manner of her description effectively 
emphasised the desperation of the situation, and her sense of certainty of her own 
                                                          
45 GARF, f. 7972, op. 6, d. 8, l. 25. 
134 
 
powerlessness. Yet, at no point did Maria Sh. refer directly to her own feelings about her 
circumstances. 
In a similar manner, Maria Sh. tied her economic disadvantages firmly to her health. She 
prescribed her unhappy circumstances a concrete, medical basis, suggesting that her 
difficulty resulted from her husband’s coercion, rather than the material destitution 
suffered by many throughout the 1920s. However, it is clear that Maria’s financial 
conditions were attributable, at least in part, to an experience of Soviet power. Maria 
provided the necessary information to deduce that her poor material circumstances 
were related to the Civil War: Maria Sh. would have been sixteen in 1921, and the first 
years of her marriage would have taken place in the years of reconstruction following 
the Civil War: 
At sixteen years to free my mother from unnecessary burdens, I left to get married. The first 
years we lived on nothing, then children, lack, disadvantage and a few abortions undermined 
my health and now of course he says ‘who needs you?’... 
Since they followed the pregnancies in the first years of her marriage in 1921, we can 
deduce that the catastrophic abortions Maria described took place in the mid-1920s, 
several years into the life of the Soviet Union. The way she referred to her abortions 
implies strongly that they were coerced in some way, a fact which could challenge the 
Soviet Union’s emancipation of women, and concern for public health. Maria’s 
association between her unwanted abortions and her poor health was made 
unproblematic, by her husband’s culpability, with an abusive relationship with an 
individual responsible for the apparent coercion. Her husband’s control over her 
reproductive capacities was presented by Maria’s letter as an aggravating factor, if not 
the cause, of their real hardship, rather than the circumstances of their marriage. In any 
case, it is clear from her letter that her negative experiences were not a result of her 
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own inaction in the construction of socialism. Maria went on to emphasise her desire for 
opportunities for self-improvement: 
And here I ask you to give a little advice, whether to study and where, or somewhere to 
arrange to work and how to arrange it. I would of course very much like to study to know 
everything… If you have the spare time, answer at…. [ADDRESS]. Maria Sh. 46 
Though Maria Sh. from the start presented her letter as a request for counsel, she 
discussed her previous attempts to improve her situation without state assistance, and 
thus avoided the implication that state facilities have been absent or insufficient. 
Though she had tried to find work, and get a fuller education, and made the most of the 
opportunities provided for women, and had tried to go to a summer school for adults, 
she was unable to complete the class when one of her children became ill with measles. 
Maria Sh. steered clear, however, of taking credit for her efforts for herself, tying her 
choices in life to a ‘collectivist’ attitude, wishing not to burden her mother, nor to live on 
the labour of others. At the time of writing in 1928 this would have been in alignment 
with discourse on domestic life, as the nuclear family was not yet ‘rehabilitated’, and 
citizens expected to zealously construct socialist society through their efforts in labour, 
public and private life.  
Overall, Maria Sh.’s letter demonstrates the employment of vagueness and omission as 
euphemism for unhappy feelings, in order to foreground the process of self-
improvement necessary for the acquisition of the benefits of Soviet life. Maria Sh. was 
not old enough to participate in the Revolution proper, as the pensionerka and Arganova 
had done, yet unlike Nura, she was old enough to remain culpable for her inaction in the 
construction of socialism after the Revolution. Clearly, requests by both older and 
younger women for respite from wretched material or domestic circumstances 
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frequently framed this in terms of building socialist happiness and a socialist future, 
obtaining for themselves a ‘piece of personal happiness’.47 Common euphemistic 
strategies used to acceptably articulate negative experiences and feelings within the 
Soviet regime included the expansion, so to speak, of revolutionary light, as well as 
statements of personal responsibility to obtain socialist happiness.  
Yet, these attempts to ‘Speak Bolshevik’ in the retelling of individual struggles were 
sharply distinguishable according to generation. In particular, the allusions and 
strategies of avoidance stand in stark contrast to the jubilant and thankful manner in 
which the majority of missives from children were written. Nura’s sense of anticipation 
is distinct from the missives from her elders. As a Pioneer, who was raised in a 
children’s home she had essentially always been in full possession of the opportunities 
of Soviet youth at the time. Her use of the opportunities that she had thus been granted 
for the betterment of her circumstances was implied. Whereas Maria Sh., Arganova, and 
the pensionerka could ‘unlock’ a sense of belonging, and therefore happiness, Nura was 
raised entirely under Soviet power, and so her ‘unfailing work’ alone would be key to 
her happiness. The delineation of emotional expression according to generation cohort, 
then, illuminates the ambiguity of the status of adult and elderly women after the 
Revolution, and the flexibility this afforded them in their emotional experiences of 
Soviet power. 
Two letters from young girls, both addressed to Molotov, rather than Krupskaia, 
highlight this rigidity of the emotional regime for younger women, denoting explicitly 
their eternal obligation to the paternal Soviet state. One letter, from a young girl named 
Asya Omarova wrote to express her gratitude over her stay at the children’s camp Artek, 
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and followed a format common among children at the time, focusing solely on her 
gratitude to the paternalistic state. Her letter provided a striking counterpart to the 
melancholy tones of the letters discussed previously: 
Dear father, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. In July this year, I rested in Crimea in the 
pioneer camp ‘Artek’. I will never forget this happy day […] We live joyfully and well, this 
happy life was given to us by the Communist Party and our beloved father Comrade Stalin 
[…]48 
The inherent paternalism of the Soviet state is indicated by Asya’s reference to Molotov, 
as well as Stalin, as ‘father’. Though men and women might nominally have possessed 
equal status within the new Soviet society, this was, as Brooks has explained, 
necessarily in permanent subordination to a paternal – and patriarchal – benefactor.49 
The newest Soviet generation in particular were encouraged to regard authorities as 
nigh-omnipotent protectors, to whom gratitude must be expressed.50  Asya’s eternal 
indebtedness to the regime as a Soviet child was indicated by the reverence in which 
she stated she held her memory of her day at ‘Artek’: an unforgettably happy day.51 
Asya stated the obligation owed to Stalin for her joyful young life and its provision by 
state services so explicitly that it is almost beyond comment. Asya’s letter did however 
go on to describe the self-education she had performed in this respect. Asya was aware 
of her indebtedness to ‘the great Stalin’ and his ‘closest companions’ because she had 
herself read the Stalin Constitution: 
Thanks to the great Stalin and you, his closest companion, for a happy [and happy] childhood. 
I read the Stalin Constitution and understood there is a lot that is good and joyful for us […] 
                                                          
48 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 302-4.  
49 Brook, Thank You Comrade Stalin!, p. 85. 
50 A fuller explanation of the development of the Stalinist leadership cult for Soviet children is presented 
in C. Kelly, ‘Riding the Magic Carpet: Children and the Leader Cult in the Stalin Era’, The Slavic and East 
European Journal, 49:2, (2005), pp. 199-224. 
51 The Pioneer camp ‘Artek’ was founded initially as a ‘health’ camp for children, after the Civil War. Its 
status in the Soviet Union escalated, and it eventually became something of a ‘model’ Pioneer camp.  
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Take from us once again our ardent pioneer greetings. Asya Omarova, Pioneer of Zakatala 
District, Azerbaijani SSR52 
By making clear that she had read the Stalin Constitution, and understood the gifts it 
provided, Asya indicated an awareness amongst young girls, as well as women, that 
responsibility for educated and cultured socialist happiness lay with the citizen, as 
much as the state. Though Asya’s letter appeared quite scripted, showing little of the 
lived experience behind the pen, more atypical reproductions of this discourse of happy 
childhoods and gratitude reveal relationship that their young authors understood to 
exist between their political environment and their selves. Three school-friends or 
siblings (it was not clearly specified which) from Kharkov, Galia, Elia and Shura wrote to 
Molotov in a similarly jubilant tone in 1935 to thank him for the books they had 
received at their school: 
Hello, Uncle Molotov! We received your books, thank you for these books! Uncle Molotov, we 
have put your books in the library, and each taken out one for ourselves […] Uncle Molotov, 
we promise that for the new school year we will strive for excellence and success. Shura is a 
Pioneer and will wear a tie, Elia and Galia are Little Octobrists and will wear stars. Uncle 
Molotov Galia is very sick and probably will not survive. Uncle Molotov, Galia is very sick 
with Scarlet Fever. Goodbye, Uncle Molotov, we wish you well!53 
The relentlessly positive tone of the disclosure of Galia’s illness is jarring, and almost 
absurd in its juxtaposition with the children’s academic affiliations, though probably 
largely attributable to the children’s youth. Yet, by comparison with Asya’s letter, the 
tone of gratitude and opportunity imparted upon children remains striking. The 
children were aware, even at an early age, that their social identities as Little Octobrists 
and Pioneers, and related sense of public belonging, were dependent upon their 
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fulfilment of certain political criteria, such as personal endeavour towards academic 
excellence. Their emotional expressions followed suit.  
Such an awareness of the contingency of Soviet belonging upon the fulfilment of 
particular criteria – such as labour and self-improvement – was frequently expressed in 
communications with authorities, particularly among the young. A young woman, Elena 
Bykova, requested assistance from Molotov in dismantling the obstacles she faced in 
finding employment. Twenty-three years old at the time of writing in 1937, Elena would 
have been in infancy at the time of the Revolution in 1917. Having been raised in Soviet 
kindergartens, schools and youth groups, would have been keenly aware of the 
symbolic social and political significance of productive employment to a Soviet woman: 
Dear Viacheslav Mikhailovich! I appeal to you […] with a request to stop the mockery and 
lawlessness that is committed against me, a young Soviet person. The Stalin Constitution 
enshrined the right to work for every citizen. Comrade Stalin spelled out the words ‘The son 
does not answer for his father’. And now, despite the Leader’s instructions, despite the 
Constitution, I […] a young Soviet schoolgirl […] I can not find work for myself.54 
Notable in the beginning of her letter is the author’s explicit familiarity with Stalinist 
maxims. Though her father’s business had caused his classification as a social alien, 
Elena was vehement that Stalin’s assertion that ‘the son does not answer for his father’ 
should be applied to her own circumstances. Her feelings of disenchantment and 
humiliation therefore reflect that her circumstances contravened Stalin’s own words – if 
she should not be punished for her father’s political crimes, then her potential 
employers’ rebuttals were, at best, politically problematic. Though she went on to state 
that she was twenty-three at the present time, Elena took care to reiterate her Soviet 
upbringing, and consequently, the longevity of the influence of Soviet principles upon 
her: 
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A Soviet school brought me up, the Soviet government gave me the opportunity to get an 
education. I’m twenty-three, my whole life, all my views were created in our Soviet reality, in 
Soviet society. And now, now I actually have been deprived of the right to work, I have had 
taken away the opportunity to repay my debt. […] Viacheslav Molotov, I ask you to help me 
with this, give me the opportunity to work hard and I assure you, I will give my all for the 
benefit of our homeland.55 
Conspicuously, the debt of the Soviet citizen to the state reappeared in Elena’s letter, 
which reflects Brooks’ concept of the moral economy of eternal gratitude existed of 
moral and political debts to the state, which had to be repaid in exchange for full Soviet 
citizenship.56 For Elena, the deprivation of these rights was akin to ‘mockery’ and 
‘humiliation’, anathema as unemployment was to her worldview, which was ‘created’, as 
she wrote, in ‘our Soviet reality’. Elena established a sense of comradeship and common 
purpose with Molotov himself by referring to ‘our Soviet reality’, and constructed a 
‘bond’ between the pair, which she used to construe her unhappiness as an aberration. 
Ultimately, Elena’s pleas were effective. Her letter was forwarded by Molotov to another 
official, Tikhmirov, with the notation ‘It is necessary to sort out and quickly arrange the 
matter of work of comrade Bykova’.57 In turn, Elena wrote back to relay her exuberant 
thankfulness, emphasising again the relentless discursive expectations of gratitude: 
 Dear Viacheslav Mikailovich! I would like to express my gratitude to you for your paternal 
care and attention to me. Again, thank you. Thanks to your participation, I feel that I am a 
full-fledged citizen of our Great Socialist Motherland […] I wish you, dear Viacheslav 
Mikhailovich, many many [sic] years of work for the happiness of the people.58 
In addition to reinforcing the perpetuity of Elena’s gratitude to the authorities, both for 
the resolution of the matter but more generally for the paternal care for citizens, her 
note of thanks reflected the contingency upon which Elena’s sense of inclusion in the 
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happy socialist society depended: her ability to repay her ‘debt’ for the gifts granted by 
the motherland through productive labour. This was echoed, somewhat, by her wishes 
for Molotov that he be ‘rewarded’ with many, many years of work for the happiness of 
the people. The relationship between socialist labour and happiness, and a sense almost 
of indenture to the State for providing the opportunities to acquire these is palpable in 
letters from women across generations. A sense of gratitude for the gifts that women did 
have, and their completion of part of a process towards socialist happiness in the place 
of direct attention to unhappy experiences, served to mitigate euphemistic confessions 
of negative feelings and experiences. This was a strategy that was employed fluently by 
women throughout the late 1920s and the 1930s, as women of all ages acceptably 
communicated their negative experiences of Soviet power by thanking authorities for 
the opportunities of improvement, or gifts of legislation, that it provided. 
In 1936, one response to the 1936 Decree on the Protection of Motherhood addressed 
to Krylenko, from a woman named Glumova, opened with the statement: ‘I wish to 
express my deep gratitude for your great attention to women, who have been suffering 
mockery from their husbands.’59 Her letter went on to explain that the alimony 
arrangements made by the decree protected women against the abuses and infidelities 
of their partners. Women’s struggles in this respect were subsumed as part of the 
necessity of raising ‘the healthy children needed to strengthen and defend our Soviet 
country’, deflecting any direct discussion of the feelings raised by the decisions of 
husbands and wives ‘to seek sexual intercourse on the side’. Though the inclusion of the 
decidedly negative experience of ‘suffering’, in addition to the mockery of Soviet values 
posed by politically unsavoury elements is conspicuous, the letter’s confessional tone 
served the broader intention of the letter effectively. The threats to the Soviet state and 
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the healthy Soviet family lay not in the individual spousal conflicts, but ‘prostitution[,] 
as the remnants of the old tsarist life’, to which the experiences of ‘suffering and 
mockery’ by women were directly related. 
A confessional tone in the articulation of negative experiences was a common feature in 
letters of gratitude. Though the combination of gratitude and ‘confession’ might in part 
be due to the dualism inherent to such language as ‘gladness’, and ‘joy’, these phrases 
must have served some purpose within a discourse which valued permanent states of 
elation so highly, and at such great cost. This is illustrated by a letter from a ‘mother of 
many children’ to the Ministry of Justice, following the 1936 Constitution which 
rewarded mothers of large families. The writer confessed that she had been mocked and 
humiliated prior to the drafting of the Constitution (so effectively for up to nineteen 
years of Soviet power):  
Often before this time people who had no children laughed at us, because we had a lot of 
children, and sometimes scolded us, reproaches were heard everywhere… Glad we are now 
that the state wants to give us, the mothers, such a great help, for which, of course, we thank 
it!60  
This additional information was not strictly necessary to the letter, the purpose of 
which was to welcome the news of material assistance for large families. The admission 
of socialist un-happiness – humiliation and mockery by her fellow Soviet citizens, as a 
direct result of Soviet policy - seems again to be nested within a letter of gratitude for 
the purposes of legitimacy. As someone who, since she had had enough children to 
qualify for state assistance, was presumably at this point well into adulthood, it appears 
that the writer is evoking the familiar trope of having waited for the benefits of Soviet 
power – but continuing to wait. Like Arganova, whose letter to Krupskaia we addressed 
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earlier, she sought relevance to the regime as someone no longer in her youth, yet, she 
did not have the benefit of an unwritten future and a sense of dependence any longer. 
Instead, she had the responsibility of a large family. Therefore, she effectively 
‘reinforced’ her gratitude for the attention to her difficult lot. Another common aspect of 
Mother-of-many’s letter is her desire not to be left out of the Soviet public 
consciousness. In her gratitude to the 1936 Constitution, the letter-writer conveyed a 
sense that, prior to this, her existence and her role as a mother were devalued, ignored, 
or ridiculed – which was equally likely to be a result of tsarist power and the remnants 
of tsarism in her community, or the revolutionary discourse on the family that 
characterized the 1920s. The writer chooses not to specify. This sense of gratitude for 
acknowledgement after a period of unhappy anonymity was very common in responses 
to the decree. A woman named Zaelenskaia presented a similar sentiment in her 
response to the 1936 Decree: 
I read this project with such admiration, with such great joy that I have not encountered in 
my 43 years of life, that our Communist Bolshevik Party and Soviet Power are going to 
remove mothers’ hardships […]61  
Zaelenskaia’s use of the adjectival ‘maternal’, or in this context, ‘mothers’, implied a 
sense that her negative experience was shared amongst women under Soviet power. Yet, 
this implication is mitigated considerably by the sense of ‘admiration’. The inclusion of 
her age – forty-three years old – was included to suggest that she was born, and 
partially schooled prior to the Revolution, and so the novelty of her admiration was 
significant: it presented Soviet power as having been (on balance, at least) an 
improvement to mothers’ lives. The durability of the ‘maternal hardships’, which in this 
context we might presume to be material and ideological - implied that their total 
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removal is a considerable feat, having spanned at least the lifetime of the author. 
Zaelenskaia went on to propose a further stipulation to the decree: 
My personal consideration is to establish help for mothers of families of 4-7 children, as 
there are more such families in the state than [have] 7-11 children […] maybe this is difficult 
for the state, but it will be possible to establish smaller amounts as benefits […] I am making 
my proposal because it is terribly difficult to rise [this many] children [without other adults 
to help].  
The letter explained that, with a ‘usual’ rate of births in one’s lifetime in mind, ‘as for the 
help to mothers who have 11 children, the older ones, reaching the age of 22, 20 or 18, 
are able to assist the parents. I take this as an example from the life of members of our 
collective farm’.62 Zaelenskaia’s ‘personal consideration’ ostensibly pointed out a 
perceived oversight present in the decree. Yet, by framing this as an issue for the 
collective – i.e. in terms of an eternal ‘mothers’ hardship’, and drawing from the 
experience of many on her collective farm, Zaelenskaia was able to demonstrate the 
existing benefits of Soviet power, which served to amplify the sense of admiration noted 
at this new decree.  
Gratitude, and a desire to work towards socialist happiness, then, were commonly 
employed methods used by women to articulate negative experiences of, or feelings 
under, Soviet power. The discursive requirement of Soviet citizens to continuously 
demonstrate thanks to their benefactors provided the space for them to identify 
grievances, if only to suggest they had been, or could be resolved through assistance and 
a process self-improvement. This gratitude was frequently accompanied by a sense of 
‘confession’ of the hardship endured after the Revolution. Overall, the expression of 
gratitude for the rectification of a hitherto unknown grievance constituted one of a 
number of techniques used to portray happiness as an obtainable entity. Women sought 
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to alleviate the implications of their negative experiences by thanking the state for 
helping them, by demonstrating their participation in the transformation of the 
Revolution, or by choosing to omit any direct mention of their feelings. In general, it 
appears that younger women’s strategies for negotiating the Soviet ‘emotional regime’ 
were more restricted: having been raised with the opportunities for education, 
participation in labour, or collective life more generally, their negative emotional 
experiences were expressed more commonly through thanks, evidence of self-
improvement, or omission entirely. Older women, as bearers of historical memory, and 
whose futures in the Soviet state were relatively short, were at relative liberty to 
present their negative emotional states with more flexibility.   
 
Emotional Performance and Medicalised Feelings 
 
The endlessness of these expressions of appreciation and gratitude, the requirement of 
their authenticity, and the permanence of their symbolic significance compelled women 
frequently to ‘perform’ such feelings, placing distance between themselves and the 
feeling. This textual ‘performance’ served to maintain detachment for any perception of 
inauthenticity or inappropriate emotions. By performing emotions physically, or 
ascribing them a physical or medical character, women were able to describe moments 
of high emotion – and risk -  without implying their permanence. Likewise, women 
frequently constructed negative experiences or feelings as medical complaints. In doing 
so, their emotional conditions were externalised, and treatable. Emotions which were 
performed or medicalised cast no aspersions on the Soviet self.   
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A daughter and mother, Lera K and ‘M.K’, wrote to Krupskaia in 1937, to express 
gratitude for the assistance they had received from her in order to obtain medicine for 
Lera, who had been seriously ill.63 In her response to having received a postcard that 
morning from Krupskaia, briefly cited earlier in the chapter, Lera found herself was 
‘crying like a fool with joy’: the postcard reported that her mother would be able to go 
out and get her medicine tomorrow. Once she was well, Lera would be able to study, 
and read good books – ‘probably Pionerskaia gazeta or Leninskie Iskry’, if she could get 
them. ‘Grateful-to-you Lera’ and her endearing and over-excited thankfulness, despite 
the fact that she had been unable to read good (Soviet) publications, as I have discussed, 
expresses a relationship with the state typical of Soviet childhood: able to depend on a 
benevolent state for a chance at a happy childhood. Her mother’s note at the bottom of 
Lera’s letter told us more of the meaning of the exchange. M.K. describes Lera’s medical 
suffering through her illness, explaining how difficult it had been ‘to see [her] child 
suffer on the sidelines’, and that there were ‘no words’ with which to describe the 
change in her face now that her ‘joyful soul’ had returned.  
Of course, there must have been correspondence prior to this postcard, outlining Lera’s 
suffering, at least in some form, and it is not evident from this letter alone the degree of 
detail relayed in the previous letter to Krupskaia. What we can infer, however, from this 
letter of thanks, is that the emotional suffering that Lera enjoyed was most likely not 
shared with Krupskaia initially. The note from Lera’s mother, written as a post script, 
possessed an almost confessional tone: if Lera’s pain was described in their request for 
assistance, her mother’s almost certainly was not. This was appropriate only within a 
letter whose purpose was to send gratitude. Coupled with the sheer elation the pair 
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articulated, it might be gathered that the gratitude for state assistance served to 
legitimise the confession of this sorrow.  
On the other end of the emotional spectrum, having suffered financially and emotionally 
from abandonment by a husband and father one woman wrote of her highly emotional 
state, and the sorrow that her daughter suffered due to her own broken relationship. 
She described her daughter’s unhappiness as a state which was ‘performed’, rather than 
felt: ‘[My daughter], of course, understands everything. And she suffers together with 
her mother. She comes home and cries: ‘I’m not going anymore, because they tease me, 
that my father left you’… And what about the conditions of the child and mother?... We 
must punish bullying.’64 The writer evoked the image of the next generation in order to 
legitimise writing to authorities about her feelings of despair. Additionally, as it has 
been established is a common feature of letters from women of childbearing age, she 
evoked her role in the next generation as a mother; her role in monumental time: ‘… she 
suffers together with her mother… what about the conditions of the child and mother?’ 
In doing this, the writer establishes the potential permanence of her position in the 
Soviet future: if it is not her case which is properly addressed, it would be someone 
else’s; playing upon the new Soviet state’s anxieties, she suggests that the fate of the 
mother is inextricably linked to the fate of the child, the future Soviet citizen. 
Upon this context, perhaps in order to reconcile her place in women’s time with the 
collectivism of the Soviet state, the writer then suggested that ‘We must punish bullying’. 
This ‘we’ chimed with the collectivism that would expected by authorities from citizens, 
yet the writer also positioned herself as working with the state, allowing her to subtly 
transfer some responsibility for her unhappy circumstances, should they continue, to 
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the authorities. Perhaps due to the potential repercussions, the writer stopped short of 
making a formal complaint (zhaloba) against her ex-husband; her tone remained 
throughout grateful for changes in legislation, and forward-looking in its suggestions to 
work together. Nonetheless, the letter retained a sense of the physical performance of 
this suffering: far from existing in a continuous way in this state of suffering, the mother 
– and in particular, her daughter – act out the emotions, through crying, as though to 
remove themselves from any permanent emotional state. The letter also sought to limit 
the temporal space occupied by this negative experience, requesting a ‘trial’ for the 
cruel and mocking former spouse. In this way, through the textual construction of a 
performance of emotional justice, and subsequent ‘punishment’ for the emotional 
suffering wrought on the family, the mother and child suggested that the negativity 
should be ‘fleeting’, that Soviet power should not allow these feelings or experiences to 
remain. Depictions of emotional performance, both physical and symbolic, therefore, 
allowed women and girls to depict highly emotional moments in their letters to 
authorities, without suggesting their permanence. In essence, the reduction of negative 
experiences and feelings serves to remove the politically unsavoury emotion from the 
person’s sense of ‘self’ in relation to the Soviet project. 
Crucially, where problematic emotions were not able to be ‘performed’, women often 
ascribed them a medical, or physical character. Their negative feelings under Soviet 
power were therefore externalised – and critically, made treatable. In this manner, Olga 
Dmitrieva forwarded a concern for her material well-being to Mogilny, medicalising her 
sense of distress in their description of ‘heart attacks’. Worried that the lack of response 
from Molotov implied that he had refused her request for an increase in her pension, 
she framed her request to Mogilny in an apologetic tone: 
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Dear Comrade MOGILNY! First of all, I apologise for the trouble, forgive me for writing to you, 
but I’m very concerned that I did not receive anything from Viacheslav Molotov, that he 
refused my request […] I am completely alone, I have no one else to ask, and no one helps me, 
except Viacheslav Mikhailovich. I’m so worried about this that I’ve frequently started to have 
heart attacks […] Olga Ivanovna Dmitrieva (Kharkov)65 
Of course, it seems unlikely that Olga was really suffering from heart attacks with worry 
about her situation, and common wisdom about the experience of panic attacks would 
suggest that this is a more likely explanation for her physical distress. Significant in this 
context, however, is that the physical symptoms of her despair are the primary 
explanation for her repeat communication to authorities. Being able to assign her 
psychological distress a physical character serves as a justification for the urgency with 
which she makes her request for assistance. Her anxiety is not considered a ‘permanent’ 
emotional state, nor a basic flaw in Soviet social provision, but a medical issue solvable 
with special attention to her material needs as women eligible to draw a pension. 
In a similar manner, Kondratieva, whose husband (a scientific researcher) had been 
imprisoned, sought to ‘medicalise’ the reasons for her opposition to her husband’s 
incarceration, stating that though her husband has already served more than half his 
sentence, the time left ahead seemed endless and her husband’s health could not take it: 
At the end of the summer, the doctor found his heart and nervous system so shaken that he 
claimed to need to transfer him from Suzdal for special treatment. My husband is currently 
feeling so unwell that he is forced to interrupt his scientific studies, and this alone supported 
him in his cheerfulness of spirit. I am afraid, that if it goes on like this, he will lose the 
opportunity to work in the field of science.66 
The physical medical symptoms Kondratieva describes were tied clearly to her 
husband’s ‘cheerfulness of spirit’. Though the exact nature of Kondratiev’s health 
problems was unspecified, it seems as though his imprisonment, which interrupted his 
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scientific research, had caused his mood and subsequently his mental health to decline 
significantly. Kondratieva’s prognosis of her husband’s conditions suggested that his 
unhappiness – or the inability to undertake scientific endeavour, which in turn 
undermined his ‘cheerfulness of spirit’ – would lead to the failure of his ultimate 
rehabilitation into productive labour, as he would be unable to return to his work. 
Though Kondratieva seems to have been contesting the principle of her husband’s 
imprisonment, and its effect on his wellbeing, she took care to ascribe his overall decline 
a physical character – that of the heart and nervous system – as well as to emphasise the 
socialist value of his scientific work, to mitigate any apparent criticism of the arrest and 
imprisonment itself. No mention was made of his alleged crime. That Kondratieva 
explained her husband’s mental health condition as a physical ailment may in part be 
related to the physical symptoms that often accompany mental health conditions. 
However, she made clear that the illness is related to the loss of his ‘cheerfulness of 
spirit’, implying that she did not wish necessarily to hide his depressive symptoms. The 
substitution of physical for mental health, therefore, appears to have acted as a means 
of externalising the symptoms. By placing his illness outside the Soviet self, Kondratieva 
emphasised that neither Kondratiev’s crimes, nor his loss of ‘spirit’ reflected his inner 
being, which remained that of a healthy and productive Soviet citizen. 
Nonetheless, many women’s letters took less care to ‘mask’ mental health conditions, 
instead explaining them simply as illnesses, or related to ‘triggers’ of a temporary 
nature. A woman named Yeva Friedlander sought to defend her husband in response to 
his arrest by medicalising his state of inaction in his own defence: 
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My husband is mentally ill, gravely mentally ill. His illness is not outwardly detectable, and it 
was not detected by investigator Dolgov in Cheliabinsk, it does not show up in fevers or in 
rashes, but it suppresses his desire to live.67 
Yeva’s letter took clear issue with her husband’s treatment by authorities, calling into 
question the grounds for his arrest by raising the issue of his mental health, alleging that 
the investigators were mistaken in their assessment of him. The authenticity of Yeva’s 
medicalization of her husband’s circumstances may be assumed to be correct, yet 
beyond a simple statement of medical fact, the disclosure functions as a strategy for 
delivering criticism of the acts of authorities. Their correct diagnosis, as Yeva frames the 
matter, would result in the possibility of treating the illness, and dispelling the un-Soviet 
behaviours her husband had demonstrated. Yeva delivered the information about her 
husband’s mental illness astutely, mitigating symptoms of his illness deemed un-Soviet 
(such as dissatisfaction, sadness, and lethargy) by focusing on the urgency of his lack of 
‘desire to live’. This leaves the reader to assume that, had her husband the desire to live, 
he would undoubtedly participate meaningfully in the Soviet project. Beyond this, Yeva 
stopped well short of stating explicitly that investigator Dolgov was incorrect. Rather, 
she stated clearly the invisibility of her husband’s condition, to lessen the error she 
perceives in the authorities’ actions, placing responsibility for the unfortunate situation 
abstractly ‘with’ the illness. 
A similar strategy was employed under quite different circumstances in a letter to 
Molotov from a woman in Leningrad, requesting material help, in 1934. She limited the 
instance of her unhappiness to a single instance, imploring Molotov: ‘Forgive me for 
taking up your time. I decided to turn to you in a moment of despair’.68 The author – 
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whose signature could not be deciphered - went on to suggest, writing herself into 
Molotov’s revolutionary narrative, that she had been close with his brother and aunt. As 
time passed, however, she found herself in ‘extremely difficult conditions’. She was low-
paid, and supported both herself, and her sick and elderly ‘substitute mother’. Though 
her conditions were described as difficult, they are separated from the fleeting negative 
feelings, the ‘moment of despair’, about the experience. Unexpectedly, she went on to 
claim that ‘life is not worthwhile on such a small salary’ – a particularly unusual 
statement of desperation, directly associated with her state salary, particularly since it 
implies that the future would not change for her or her mother.  
However, the emotional narrative established effectively allayed the responsibility 
possessed by the state for the author’s desperation. Having been acquainted with 
Molotov (in reality or fiction), the author implied the longevity of her revolutionary 
credentials. By suggesting that the low pay she received for her labour was used to 
support an ailing adopted relative, the author underlined her collective outlook, and her 
actions to this end. Finally, by suggesting that, in her moment of despair, she felt that life 
was ‘not worth living’ on such a low salary, she afforded her plea a temporary, and 
crucially, a remediable quality: by granting her request for a wage increase, the 
government could alleviate the conditions which had triggered the lapse in the woman’s 
psychological health. In letters to authorities which sought to pathologise or medicalise 
problematic or high risk emotional states, or negative feelings, therefore, it was feasible 
for women to internalise the difficulties of their surroundings, so long as they provided 
a solution. This solution could, women understood, be material assistance, earned 
through the longevity of the author’s commitment to the Revolution, or self-
improvement.  
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This is demonstrated further in the letter from a young teacher, Gardovskaia, who in 
1929 described the sorrow with which she struggled against religion in her community, 
as well as the resistance her instruction of gender equality faced, as a source of physical 
pain. She wrote to Krupskaia, as the Deputy Minister for Education, for reassurance: 
It's painful to hear this in the twelfth year of the revolution. We do not want to understand 
that a woman is also a person […] As soon as one looks at these peasants how much one 
wants to do in order to enlighten them a little, it would be like that, and they would turn over 
their old way of life to a new one, but they will not work when you work, you work and you 
can not see the benefits of results[…]69 
The familiar allegories of enlightenment, and the transformation from old to new are 
present in her letter, explaining the source of her frustration and unhappiness as the 
remnants of the ‘old way of life’, which could be remedied by the ‘illumination’ Soviet 
political consciousness provided. A reply from Krupskaia, in the same file, apologised 
for the delay in her response, reassuring the writer of the value of her efforts:  
Dear comrade,  
I did not answer your letter for a long time, there are so many jobs this year that I do not 
have time to do anything: I send you my last books, they can help you a little in your work 
with the pioneers […] Can it be [already] obsolete at twelve years old, what has been 
maintained for centuries? Rural life and working conditions delay the emancipation of 
women.70 
Krupskaia’s response related neatly to the ideological language in the letter she 
received: the old way of life was to blame for the sluggishness with which the benefits of 
Soviet power were dispersed, to shed light on the corners of the rural regions of the 
Union. Nonetheless Gardovskaia’s work was not in vain – she was to maintain her belief 
in the potential of her socialist labour to bring results. Self-sacrifice – still the flavour du 
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jour of the 1920s – and tenacity through the painful process would, it was implied, 
eventually succeed in educating the peasant children, bringing the emancipation of 
women to the Gardovskaia’s village for the next generation.  
Soviet women and girls used a variety of methods to mask and articulate unpleasant, 
unhappy and negative emotions in communications with the state. The ‘moral economy 
of gratitude’ was employed, with considerable effect, to emphasise the gifts bestowed by 
the state, and bargain for assistance, or allege un-Soviet behaviour against lower level 
bureaucracies. Generational identity was demarcated by the selection either of 
gratitude for the opportunities for self-transformation, or gratitude for the happiness a 
Soviet childhood provided. Additionally, the transience of negative emotional states was 
frequently suggested by the euphemism of physical performance or treatable physical 
symptoms. Women used these strategies assuredly and effectively to produce sincere 
and often personally meaningful correspondences with the state, frequently in defence 
of their individual agency, while toeing the line of individual versus collective interests. 
 
Exceptions To The Rule?: Grief and Motherhood 
 
Though at face value, grief appears to be a highly individual feeling, in women’s letters 
to authorities, the expression of grief, and particularly of grief for a child, took on an 
atypical character in the letters of Soviet women through the increasingly collective 
expectations of emotional states in though the 1920s and 1930s. Frequently, women 
delivered descriptions of desperately personal grief through the vehicle of social 
struggle. As we know from the discussion of generational cohorts and motherhood in 
the previous chapter, Maria’s daughter had committed suicide at the age of 12, after an 
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incident of humiliation. Maria – ‘the mother of two pionerkas (now one)’ - plainly urged 
Krupskaia to help ensure the state take responsibility for its involvement in matters of 
gender: ‘Better relations between boys and girls are necessary…. I know you are busy, 
but I have my daughter to protect’. 71 Maria’s grief-stricken concern for her remaining 
daughter was presented in tandem with the socialisation of the next Soviet generation. 
In doing so, Maria located her daughter – presumably the ‘true’ object of Maria’s worry – 
firmly amongst her peers in her generational cohort. 
Employing a similar strategy, a woman named Larisa wrote to Krupskaia in 1930 
following the death of her infant daughter from the measles, to request her assistance 
having been denied time off to care for the child by the school board. Along with a 
description of her sense of grief, her letter expressed a strong sense of her personal role 
as a mother, and professional role as a teacher, as separate, yet intrinsically linked, 
identities and commitments: ‘How I could get weary, with a sick child in my arms, to 
raise the productivity of a class, and what now can I give to my own [family] members?... 
I'm sorry, a thousand times sorry dear Nadezhda Konstantinovna, I have wasted an 
hour of your precious time, but it is hard for me.’72 Larisa explicitly linked her grief to 
her social role and purpose, which was to ‘raise the productivity of a class’ of children, 
simultaneously bargaining for a reappraisal of her case, and emphasising the difficulties 
of her bereavement. Crucially, like the women of the Essentuki reading group, Larisa 
treated the roles of mother and educator in tandem. Her role as mother – and mother 
teacher – allowed her to describe her individual grief, through its practical social 
effects.73 Thus, it is evident that though women’s roles had been ideologically reoriented 
away from motherhood, the role of ‘the mother’ continued to be a powerful rhetorical 
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tool for women to express sorrow, dissatisfaction, or the need for change in Soviet life. 
There is no reason to doubt that a mother’s grief, as articulated in letters such as these, 
would be genuine – undoubtedly, it would be. However, its particular framing in this 
case is remarkable in the sense that by aligning her grief with the struggle against un-
Soviet forces, the writer’s feted role as a mother was reinforced in the construction of 
socialist society.  
Framing one’s grief in the terms of social injustice or work towards the socialist struggle 
was far from uncommon in letters expressing personal grief. Maria S, whose 1924 
biography of her young daughter, the civil war veteran Liza we encountered in the 
previous chapter, juxtaposed her individual mourning with her children’s feats in the 
struggle for the Revolution, and thus her hopes for the Revolution, lamenting that: ‘It is 
hard for a mother to lose her children […] and my old eyes weep, but I am proud of my 
own children Liza and Volodia, who sacrificed their young lives for the struggle against 
the bourgeoisie’74 Maria S articulated her grief through the ‘vehicle’ of stating her own 
commitment to their work. By transferring her voice to the second person, referring to 
herself as ‘your old mother’, Maria expressed the sense of comfort she finds in relating 
her own life to their work, essentially, finding a ‘meaning’ in their early deaths. This 
search for ‘meaning’ substantiates the argument that, later in life, and as one perceived 
less time ahead of them, people seek positive meaning in their experiences.  
The function of this device appears to work in tandem with that of public legitimacy. 
Maria S’s biography of Liza was written in 1924, for International Women’s Day: at 
which time, as we have seen, the Soviet commitment to the emancipation of women was 
still (relatively) strong, and the collective mind set of the new Soviet society was not yet 
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so strongly established. Despite this, the ‘social’ significance of Maria S’s grief was 
heightened by the chronological proximity of the Civil War, and the uncertainty which 
surrounded so the uncertainty of the allegiances of citizens at that time.75 Overall Maria 
S’s evocation of her children’s revolutionary commitment allowed her to legitimately 
sentimentalise her grief in her public monument to her daughter: the letter, after all, 
was a biography, and so this emotional device works both to rationalize Maria’s grief, 
but also to allow her to do so comfortably and without risking ‘individualism’ in the 
public forum of Krest’ianka’s pages.  
Finally, Arganova, with whom we are familiar, sought in her final days to underline her 
work and contribution to the Revolution, in her contribution to the literacy of young 
women in her village.76 Though Arganova wrote of the joy she felt at the legacy she has 
left, the basis of her letter was that she would soon die. As such, her account expressed a 
sense of rationalisation, primarily of her own grief at the end of her own life, and 
arguably that she will die childless and illiterate. In rationalising these aspects of her life, 
Arganova evoked a maternal role, which was increasingly, by 1930, a valuable social 
identity in relation to the collective: However, what marked out Arganova’s sense of 
grief from those expressed by Larisa, Maria, and Maria S, is that Arganova’s letter sought 
to rationalise her coming to terms with the end of her own life, rather than that of a 
child. As such, her letter focused primarily on her commitment to the goals of the 
Revolution highlights the way in which the awareness of one’s impending mortality 
amplified the search for positive emotional experience – but also perhaps the extent to 
which one might be expected to legitimise a sense of private grief. This might be gleaned 
from the continued relevance of the identity of ‘mother’ in Arganova’s statements, as a 
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public role: it is possible to comprehend, from her repeated assertions of her social 
relevance, and her maternal role in the lives of local girls, the collective character with 
which motherhood was conceived – particularly by 1930. 
In light of this argument, it might tentatively be supposed that Maria S’s daughter’s 
suicide was, in some way, connected to a perceived need for stoicism as a soldier for the 
Revolution, and an inability to face one’s grief. Thomas Ewing’s study of the suicides of 
young female teachers in the 1930s has indicated that the potential space in the system 
for the assertion of any self-determination was so small that suicide may be interpreted 
as the ‘last effort by each woman to gain a measure of control over her immediate 
situation’.77 Thus, it might feasibly be posited that since the expression of sorrow was 
considered by the party faithful, at least, to be at odds with Soviet values at this time, 
Maria S.’s daughter (Lisa), felt ill-equipped to cope with her brother’s murder.78 
Grieving mothers in the Soviet Union’s first decades employed many of the techniques 
engaged by other women in the period, in particular, a sense of revolutionary 
commitment, and a strong sense of the collective – often, in solidarity with other women. 
Nonetheless, they possess a degree of licence in the period, in the direct expression of 
their sorrow. Though all the women take care to relate their lives to the ‘big’ family of 
the Soviet Union, all are clear in their retention of their identity as mothers, and defend 
the social value of the role for society more broadly. 
 
Conclusions 
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It is clear that euphemistic strategies, such as vagueness and reflexive indications of 
responsibility were employed to express un-Soviet dissatisfactions, including alienation 
from society, and its collectivism. As Fitzpatrick has demonstrated, grievances could be 
acceptably expressed by their re-direction to other sources: a partner; an employer; a 
neighbour; or one’s own previous ‘backwardness’. 79 However, upon discussion of the 
sources, ‘vagueness’ as a euphemistic strategy is more properly understood 
accompanied by omission as a strategy for the discussion of unhappy experiences and 
feelings. In cases where women neither discussed, nor vaguely addressed negative 
emotions, the omission of the emotional experience altogether served to highlight its 
existence. Women ostensibly learnt that negative feelings were not a subject for 
discussion with authorities, yet still felt able to describe particular miserable situations. 
This served to imbue the experience or feeling with a sense of ‘separation’ from the 
Soviet person in the situation, emphasising the degree to which it was superficially or 
temporarily felt – or, not ‘felt’ at all. Another strategy used to present un-Soviet feelings 
was the use of a verb rather than a noun or adjective, from which the reader infers a 
sense of the transience of the emotion, which was equal or greater than that of the 
intrinsically fleeting nature of ‘happiness’. 
Also of note as a strategy which presents un-Soviet emotions as ‘outside’ of the person, 
is the reflexivity of the verbs that women use in their writing. Though often when 
describing an emotional response to one’s circumstances the writer stated that she may 
have wept or have begged, a feature which was almost always present was the use 
either of reflexive verbs, or of verbs requiring an object in the accusative. This evoked a 
sense that the women’s situations have been ‘done unto’ them, either by themselves or 
others: whether they have, or that they wish to better themselves or enlighten 
                                                          
79 S. Fitzpatrick, ’Happiness and Toska’, pp. 357-371. 
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themselves; or whether they are tormented by other, un-Soviet elements.80 The 
pervasiveness of these strategies is emphasised by the extent to which more direct 
expressions of negative emotions was mitigated by one’s relatively marginal role in 
society. Upon this foundation, what is evident is the range of emotions – including 
negative emotions - that could make up a New Soviet Woman. That ‘happiness’, and 
‘gratitude’ appeared frequently in letters about miserable experiences as the 
counterpart to negative experiences, serves to underline the extent to which positive 
emotions were increasingly expected of women, who had been dragged out of domestic 
slavery as socialism was constructed. Since life had become ‘merrier’ following the 
construction of socialism, rather than ‘merry’, or joyful, which would be possible only 
upon the achievement of communism, the experience of a ‘hard’ time, or of some 
encounters with un-Soviet elements was tacitly accepted. So too was righteous anger, 
on behalf of the Soviet state by its citizens in the face of class enemies, or in defence of 
the rights it granted to its citizens. Perhaps surprisingly, shame appears to have been 
admissible, in quite particular contexts. Shame about low educational status, or 
attainment, for example, for an inability to find and retain employment, for abuses of 
one’s rights to employment or education, to motherhood, or even one’s Soviet morality.  
Most interestingly, appearing so frequently in letters, in so subtly nuanced a range of 
expressions, grief emerged an emotion not considered to be wholly un-Soviet. Despite 
its associations with individual loss, it was an emotional state quite frequently linked 
with the Soviet project. Yet people sought to explore their new identities, in ways that 
did not necessarily correspond with the state’s emotional aspirations for them. In 
addition, the closeness of mortality to the lives of women of all ages seemed to erode 
generational differences, in the articulation of grief and experiences of loss. What 
                                                          
80 GARF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 1476, ll. 89-92. 
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appears most pertinently to have marked generation in articulations of loss and grief 
instead was the presence of responsibility in one’s life. Younger women and older 
women all spoke of the responsibilities they have lost; that they retain; or that they have 
acquired as a result of the grief they carry, whether that be from the loss of a partner; a 
parent; or a child. More broadly, this makes sense: one might be accused of 
individualism by dwelling too much on personal grief.  
Since motherhood was part of the Soviet project, so too was a mother’s grief, and this 
seems to have been sharply perceived by women themselves, as reflected in the 
‘responsibilities’ named in their letters to the state, in the 1920s and more explicitly and 
assertively in the 1930s. Though initially, the articulation of grief is one aspect that does 
not appear so readily to be determined by generation, due to the near omnipresence of 
mortality during the 1920s and 1930s, and discussions of responsibility present in 
many letters, upon closer inspection, there does appear to be a positive correlation 
between a woman’s cohort identity as older women, and the readiness with which 
women evoke feelings of grief in their letters to authorities, beyond simply the degree of 
fluency in ‘Soviet’ language. 
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Chapter Three 
‘The State Begins to Wither Away’? The Rights and Responsibilities 
of the New Soviet Woman 
 
The rights afforded to citizens of the Soviet Union were tied to their fulfilment of certain 
obligations to the state. For women, these obligations were distinctly gendered: though 
all citizens had the responsibility to participate in the socialist labour force, or be 
eliminated as ‘parasitic elements of society’, as has been outlined by the introduction to 
this thesis, women also retained their obligations to domestic labour, caregiving, and 
the good of the younger generation of Soviet society, for the ‘future’ of socialism. Since 
the fulfilment of ‘rights’ was explicitly dependent upon the fulfilment of practical and 
political responsibilities, this chapter will reveal how women understood the 
relationship between their rights and their responsibilities by examining two aspects of 
the relationship of women with the Soviet state. Firstly, the chapter will examine the 
rights and obligations of women in the 1920s by exploring the case study of women 
involved in education and librarianship: two professions of clear importance for the 
‘betterment’ of Soviet society. This will be followed by an examination of the responses 
made by women in response to the 1936 Decree and Constitution respectively. In doing 
so, the chapter demonstrates that women were deeply conscious of the fact that their 
rights were dependent upon their engagement with ‘productive labour’, as well as the 
degree to which the principles of this labour were politically constructed. The chapter 
also argues that women were quick to defend rights they felt they had earned, 
reproducing Bolshevik language and employing a variety of strategies to communicate 
this to authorities.  
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Before proceeding, it is necessary to establish what exactly did rights ‘meant’ in the 
context of the early Soviet state, and the total reconstruction of its society. Or, as 
succinctly put by Benjamin Nathans, ‘What happens to human rights when ‘the human’ 
is understood as a work in progress?’1 In her examination of the meaning and 
accessibility of rights and equality for the Russian deaf in the revolutionary period, 
Maria Galmarini-Kabala has suggested that ‘rights’ within socialist society were ‘neither 
natural nor inalienable, but man-made and politically determined – something to be 
conferred by the state in its effort to transform society’.2 In light of this, we might argue 
that ultimately rights constituted a tool for the construction of the new human.  Yet, the 
state’s efforts to transform society shifted significantly between 1924 and 1941, and 
these legal and discursive shifts corresponded with the changes in discourse which 
were expressed by citizens in their communications with the state. 
While, as Stuart Finkel has argued, ‘late imperial Russia’s legal order was a morass of 
contradictions’, the legal consciousness of subjects of the Russian empire was growing, 
and encompassed a clear comprehension of their rights within their legal framework.3 
Following a series of reforms after 1832, and up until around 1905, peasants possessed 
a core of rights, and sense of independence from their former landowners, and 
frequently made use of legal regulations to advance or protect their interests and 
defend themselves for perceived infractions upon their rights. The sole route to ‘rights’ 
of any kind in imperial Russia, was the ‘estate’ system, by which peasants (as well as 
members of other estates) would be legally identified, and by which marriage, trade, 
                                                          
1 B. Nathans, ‘Soviet Rights-Talk in the Post-Stalin Era’, in S. Hoffman (ed.), Human Rights in the Twentieth 
Century, (Cambridge, 2010), p. 169. 
2 M.C. Galmarini-Kabala, ‘Ability to bear rights or ability to work? The meaning of rights and equality for 
the Russian deaf in the revolutionary period’, Historical Research, 90:247, (February, 2017), pp. 210-229. 
3 S. Finkel, ‘The “Political Red Cross” and the Genealogy of Rights Discourse in Revolutionary Russia’, The 
Journal of Modern History, 89:1, (March, 2017), p. 85. 
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residence, and inheritance were regulated.4 Though the estate system was the sole 
means to legal status and associated rights, its absence would, as Burbank has 
suggested, ‘hardly have occurred as a possibility for most peasants. Instead, they took 
their estate based rights for granted, as the ordinary way of things’.5 
The final statute in the first section of the General Regulation on Peasants (the first book 
of the 1861 legal code The Regulation on the Rural Estate) which regulated former serfs 
and state peasants, declared that ‘[p]easants may not be deprived of the rights of the 
estate, or limited in these rights other than by a court or a verdict of society, confirmed 
according to the rule established in this Regulation’. Yet, identification with an estate 
did not inevitably result in interests in common between its members. Estate-based 
rights were held and exercised as individuals – so rather than improve the lot of one’s 
entire estate, peasants sought to improve their own circumstances, seeking to join a 
higher estate, and serving the larger ‘community’ of the Russian empire. That said, 
peasant interest in politics and law were not been necessarily limited to individual 
interests, and could quite conceivably coexist with collective allegiances. As Peter 
Waldron has noted, the flood of petitions produced by peasants following the edict of 
1905 was not lessened by suppression of the first and second Dumas, or by the 
reduction in representation in the June 1907 election. Both phenomena were evidence 
of significant communal loyalties.6 As such, pre-Revolutionary peasant communities 
displayed similar behaviours to their ‘reconstructed’ Soviet communities, since Soviet 
citizens also occupied a (perfectly reasonable) middle ground between individual 
interests and communal loyalties. Moreover, it is likely that the binding of particular 
                                                          
4 J. Burbank, Russian Peasants Go To Court: Legal Culture in the Countryside, 1905-1917, (Bloomington, 
2004), p. 12. 
5 Burbank, Russian Peasants Go To Court, p. 13. 
6 P. Waldron, ‘Late Imperial Constitutionalism’ in I.D. Thatcher, (ed.), Late Imperial Russia: Problems and 
Prospects, (Manchester, 2005), p. 41. 
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rights to certain ‘class’ or ‘estate’ identities also functioned to establish a political 
culture possessing a blindness to conflicts of interest between individual and corporate 
or collective rights, which can be traced forward into the Soviet Constitutions, and in 
responses to them.7 
Urban workers prior to 1917 lacked meaningful clout in local politics, since their 
concerns and affronts were never seriously addressed by government or by employers, 
or the scantly distributed factory inspectorates. This led to an upsurge in strikes in the 
late imperial years.8 There were, as we might imagine from the discussion of emotional 
responses in the previous chapter, numerous reasons for strikes during which workers 
often raised issues of individual dignity and political and civic freedom. Strikes 
frequently addressed specific and long-term economic grievances, such as the 
reinstatement of sacked colleagues, the length of the working day, or general changes to 
working conditions (which, predictably, were not usually made in favour of the worker). 
Ian Thatcher draws attention to the concern of being treated ‘like a human being’, which 
is expressed in documents ranging from the writings of worker authors, to specific 
demands and resolutions during strikes. Thatcher also notes that ‘[t]he workers also 
connected a desire for human recognition to the need for the rights and freedoms of 
citizens if they were to protect their interests’.9 This is corroborated by Finkel, 
according to whom, by 1905 politically conscious workers were framing their demands 
in terms of their ‘rights’, and even the ‘inalienable rights of man’.10 Mark Steinberg has 
shown that this was rooted in concepts of dignity of personhood, or lichnost’ developed 
                                                          
7 S.A. Smith, ‘‘Workers and Civil Rights in Tsarist Russia, 1899-1917’, in O. Crisp, L. Edmondson (eds), Civil 
Rights in Imperial Russia, (Oxford, 1989), p. 169. 
8 I.D. Thatcher, ‘Late Imperial Urban Workers’, in I.D. Thatcher, (ed), Late Imperial Russia: Problems and 
Prospects, (Manchester, 2005), pp. 113-4. 
9 Thatcher, ‘Late Imperial Urban Workers’, p. 114. 
10 Finkel, ‘The “Political Red Cross” and the Genealogy of Rights Discourse in Revolutionary Russia’, p. 91. 
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by the workers’ ‘intellectual’ contemporaries.11 As Mark Smith has suggested, by 
foregrounding the issue of human dignity in its relationship to class oppression, the 
proletarian discourse of ‘freedom’, or svoboda may have facilitated in some way the 
principles of the Soviet system that followed. In particular, the exclusion of certain 
categories of citizen (such as the bourgeoisie), from the enjoyment of rights by fault of 
their contribution to class oppression are pertinent in this respect.12  
At the same time, it is arguably in terms of ‘human dignity’, and the categorisation of 
citizenship that engagement with public life and labour acquired its greatest 
significance for debates over women’s rights in the late imperial period. Thatcher has 
suggested a link between urban industries prone to strike, and those employing a 
higher percentage of women, who would likely have felt their personal dignity 
encroached upon to a greater degree than men – for example, when undergoing daily 
body searches to check for stolen items. Thatcher identifies strikes as a form of action 
through which female labourers could attack both property and ‘the world of male 
domination’, identifying the necessity to recognise and protect their own, gendered, 
humanity.13 Moreover, William Wagner in his study of women’s rights and civil rights in 
legal discourse, highlighted the vulnerability of women in domestic situations, due to 
the inconsistent and unsympathetic personal and socioeconomic status afforded them 
by the state and the Orthodox Church. For example, since marriage was considered a 
‘personal’ affair, within which women were under the patriarchal authority of their 
husbands, a husband’s efforts to ‘discipline’ his wife were considered outside the remit 
of the law, unless they resulted in serious harm. In this circumstance women were often 
                                                          
11 Finkel, ‘The “Political Red Cross” and the Genealogy of Rights Discourse in Revolutionary Russia’, pp. 
91-2; M. Steinberg, Moral Communities: The Culture of Class Relations in the Russian Printing Industry, 
1867-1907, (Berkeley, 1992), pp. 112-5, 235-45. 
12 Smith, ‘Workers and Civil Rights in Russia, 1899-1917’, p. 168. 
13 Thatcher, ‘Late Imperial Urban Workers’, p. 115. 
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reluctant to go to the courts, as the difficulty in accessing divorce meant that they would 
face the repercussions of this action once their husbands returned from prison.14 In 
contrast, the Soviet state sought to ‘make the personal political’, bringing marriage, 
divorce and family life into the public sphere, and altering the nature of social identities 
and their associated rights. ‘Wives’ were no longer simply ‘wives’, but women, workers, 
and peasants, gaining rights within the previously private domain of marriage. The 
Revolution ultimately realised novel social identities for men and women, nominally 
distinct from their pre-Revolutionary counterparts. 
The substance of the Soviet constitutions in 1918 and 1936 applied a gradated 
exclusionary system of citizen’s rights, according to which those deemed 
‘representatives of the exploiting classes’ were subject to a reduction in economic, social, 
and legal status. As a result, Alexopoulos has argued, ‘Soviet society consisted of citizens 
who experienced various and often paradoxical states of civic belonging’.15 Although 
‘fundamental human uniformity’ underpinned the Russian socialists’ understanding of 
equality, citizenship operated within set boundaries, and functions on the principle of 
exclusion, a principle which is rooted in contemporary understandings of what it meant 
to be ‘human’.16   The protections implied by this system of ‘bestowed’ rights and 
citizenship status’ were arbitrary, and vulnerable almost by definition to political 
engineering at the hands of Party leaders. In theory, this model of Soviet rights would by 
                                                          
14 W.G. Wagner, ‘The Trojan Mare: Women’s Rights and Civil Rights in Late Imperial Russia’, in O. Crisp, L. 
Edmondson (eds), Civil Rights in Imperial Russia, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 67-8. 
15 G. Alexopoulos, ‘Soviet Citizenship, More or Less – Rights, Emotions, and States of Civic Belonging’, 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 7:3, (2006), pp. 487-528. 
16 Alexopoulos, ‘Soviet Citizenship, More or Less’, p. 212; A. Zaharejivić, ‘How to know a citizen when you 
see one? The sex of a citizen’, IDENTITIES: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, 1:2, (2013), p. 72. Here, 
Zaharejivić identifies the moment that citizenship and humanity became inextricably linked as the 
publication of the Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, in 1789: ‘To be a human, to be a man 
meant to have certain natural and imprescribable rights which belonged to an individual by dint of his 
humanity. This was, however, also a basis for his being a full member of a community as the possessor of 
rights’. She goes on to suggest that those possessing fewer civic rights – such as women, non-white 
persons – were subsequently deemed less ‘developed’ persons, p. 72. 
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1936 ensure that full citizens had the right to a job and quality-dependent pay – which 
in practice, was a duty as well as a right. The fulfilment of this right established access to 
workers’ clubs, sanatoriums, annual leave, medical care, limited social pensions and the 
right to education in preparation for work. 17 Yet, if the equality afforded those 
belonging to the proletariat implied the potential to ‘achieve’ a fundamental standard of 
human uniformity, the repercussions of this was that, the very humanity of the social 
alien was in question.  
By 1936, the basic framework of Soviet rights was fully delineated, and categorised 
according to three mutually dependent classes: socioeconomic, political and personal. 
Socioeconomic and political rights ensured such formal standards as the right to work, 
to access welfare and a decent standard of living, and to vote: personal rights 
theoretically guaranteed Soviet citizens the right to pursue their conscience and identity 
in the security of the legislative framework.18 In practice this proved to be complicated, 
since this framework was rooted in traditions of the commune, and subsequently, in the 
collectivist ideology and compounded by the ‘unity model’ of the Soviet system.19 
Ultimately, since in theory this ‘unity model’ meant that state, individuals, and ‘para-
state’ organs such as labour unions were by definition incapable of conflict, there was in 
reality no mechanism in place to protect the rights afforded by the government. This 
was compounded by the contradictory rhetoric of Soviet liberation – that access to 
certain (political and socioeconomic) standards of living for citizens was an inalienable 
                                                          
17 M. Smith, ‘Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship: The Constitutional Right to Welfare from Stalin to 
Brezhnev’, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development, 3:3, 
(Winter, 2012), p. 387. 
18 Smith, ‘Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship’, p. 386. 
19 D. Healey, ‘Defining Sexual Maturity as the Soviet Alternative to an Age of Consent’, in F.L. Bernstein, C. 
Burton, D. Healey (eds), Soviet Medicine: Culture, Practice, and Science, (Illinois, 2010), p. 112. Also 
relevant here are Svetlana Boym’s discussions of the relative absence of a ‘private life’ in pre-
Revolutionary vocabularies: S. Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia, (London, 
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right, previously denied the people of the Russian empire, but at the same time, a 
generous gift bestowed by the benevolent Party.20  
Though the Soviet government constantly proclaimed the unique nature of the 
privileges it granted its citizens, the Soviet system drew on a pre-Revolutionary 
tradition in which there was an understanding of rights as something both communal 
and individual, and at the same time contributed to a much broader conception of rights 
which would encompass both labour and welfare. Though in late imperial Russia, civic 
rights had generally been conceptualised as a parliamentary or republican phenomenon, 
which absolutist monarchs were forced to grant by sufferance, the revolutionary 
situation emerging by 1917 posited that political rights could not reasonably exist 
without socio-economic rights, which would later be accepted by a number of states 
throughout Europe in the post-war world. Though the Russian concept of social 
community is to some extent distinctive, with the Empire being based on the principle 
of reciprocal rights and obligations as community members, it was arguably this 
principle which both the Soviet state and international covenants would have in 
common. This was due to the establishment of a common standard for ‘rights’ by the 
covenants, which sought to inculcate a similar sense of international solidarity, with 
reference to all members of the human family.21  Indeed, this is supported by the 
argument made by Anja Johansen, that the distinction between ‘civil liberties’ and 
‘human rights’ in this period was primarily terminological, since the organisations and 
thinkers who promoted them all sought to protect individuals against the state.22 
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Moreover, the socialist response to ‘bourgeois’ liberal ideas about civil rights, served to 
inextricably entangle itself in the predicament posed to it by these same bourgeois 
values.  
Although Marx himself was openly hostile to the very idea of the ‘rights of the person’, 
which he decried as inescapably individualistic, his work recognised the mutual 
dependency between political and (corporatist) civic rights. However, as Smith has 
noted, Marx’s own ideas never actually became the ‘orthodoxy’ on the matter for the 
Second International. Rather, the Second International saw civil rights embedded in the 
programmes of affiliated movements, as a necessary feature of the bourgeois revolution 
to which Russia was fated, before socialism encompassed them in a far superior, more 
authentic, and inviolable liberty.23 Late imperial Russian socialists had paradoxically 
inculcated an awareness of the necessity of civic rights to labour forces, which had 
hitherto been largely ‘insulated’ from liberal influence. ‘Humanity’, then, and its liberty – 
and associated rights - were by 1917 firmly entrenched in Bolshevik assumptions about 
the standards that Soviet political rights should meet. In this sense, the dynamism of the 
relationship between liberal and socialist ideas about civil rights after the nineteenth 
century is clear.  
Linda Edmondson’s study of women’s rights and debates over citizenship in 1905 
suggests that working women inherited, via the socialists, the ‘emancipatory and 
egalitarian philosophies’ of the 1860s. The rhetoric of rights that characterised the 1905 
Revolution spoke of the ‘equality before the law of all citizens’, the ‘inviolability of the 
person’, and ‘freedom of conscience, speech, movement, assembly and association’.24 As 
                                                          
23 Smith, ‘Workers and Civil Rights in Tsarist Russia’, pp. 146-7. 
24 L. Edmondson, ‘Women’s Rights, Civil Rights and the Debate over Citizenship in the 1905 Revolution, in 
L. Edmondson (ed.), Women and Society in Russia and the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, 2009), p. 89. 
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we have seen, women’s inherent equality was part and parcel of the Soviet system of 
rights as a matter of principle, so long as they were members of the toiling classes, 
though little attention was paid to how this would unfold practically for women until at 
least 1917. As Soviet citizens, after 1918, women enjoyed the same opportunities to 
access Soviet rights as men, facilitated (again, in theory) by a system of childcare and 
maternity provisions. This was reinforced by the 1936 Decree, which rehabilitated the 
nuclear family. However, the role of citizenship status in the Soviet system of rights had 
particular implications for women, who had long been considered ‘backward’ as a result 
of their oppression. As elsewhere in Europe (and beyond), women were a project for 
improvement, having long occupied a liminal space in historical processes of citizenship 
and personhood.25 Indeed, due to gendered standards of citizenship across Europe, and 
of scientific assumptions about the essentialism of gender, ‘[w]omen, as sexed humans, 
were hence rightfully positioned within the boundaries of humanity, but without the 
limits of citizenship’.26 Correspondingly, in nineteenth-century European discourse (and 
in particular Russian discourse), women were considered by those across the political 
spectrum to be biologically predisposed to irrationality, childishness, vanity, biological 
‘unfitness’ and moral depravity, all of which were a result of their inferior development, 
of course making them unfit for full citizenship. Where their assumed biological traits 
were not straightforwardly problematic to public life, their ‘natural femininity’ and 
‘modesty’ – and even their ability to bear children(!) were considered by those liberal 
                                                          
25 Carole Pateman’s analysis of the fashioning of the ‘civil body politic’ as a masculine individual and the 
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opponents to women’s rights to be actually threatened by the full involvement of 
women in public life.27 
Similarly, conservative opponents to civic equality in late imperial Russia contested that 
existing law had developed not only in accordance to the ‘natural equality of rights’, but 
to the historical development of Russia, thus embodying the unique national and 
Orthodox traditions that Russia possessed.28 Clearly, since the Bolsheviks had sought to 
dismantle the legacy of tsarism, the bourgeoisie and the Orthodox Church, this 
conceptualisation of the historical progress of the Russian Empire was quickly replaced 
with an almost eschatological Marxist narrative, whereby the oppressed were ‘saved’ 
from their backwardness, and set on the path leading from darkness to light. 
Accordingly, the Soviet state attempted to cast this quasi-dehumanisation of women as 
redeemable, inflicted in part by political and economic circumstance. Though, this was 
not without considerable anxiety about sexual difference and the dangerous ‘tragedy’ 
for the establishment of the state that womanhood and maternity posed.29 Women 
could be ‘rescued’ from their slavery and rehabilitated as fully developed humans, and 
full Soviet citizens, worthy of the complete system of rights. As Galmarini-Kabala has 
asserted, ‘[o]n one hand, these populations [such as women, and the disabled] were 
formerly enslaved groups that needed liberation through the acquisition of rights. On 
the other hand, they were backward peoples who could achieve enlightenment and 
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better socio-economic conditions only through the support of the socialist state.’30 Since 
a key factor in these policies was the involvement in productive activity, labour, as 
explained in chapter one, became the only viable path to rights, not only for industrial 
workers but also for all other layers of Soviet society.31 For women and other 
‘minorities’, the rights ‘granted’ by the state were the only route out of their degradation, 
yet their obligations to labour ensured their own responsibility for their fate. This 
dynamic, mutually dependent relationship between state and citizen (or would-be 
citizen) resulted in the fragmentation of citizenship statuses in a number of dimensions. 
Alongside the distinctions in the nature of the rights associated with full citizenship – as 
gift and/or a goal – were several dimensions to the nature of their possession.  
The labour that constituted ‘useful’ work – particularly with regards to familial child-
care and domestic labour – would continue to be redefined. Moreover, it is necessary to 
uncover the processes of inclusion and exclusion that constituted the conferral of rights 
from state to woman as they were made fully ‘human’, in light of the historical 
limitations placed upon citizenship for women due to the scientific naturalisation and 
essentialism of biological sex in nineteenth century political thought.32  In the early 
years of the new Soviet state, their continued engagement in domestic labour 
constituted one such ‘obstacle. The persistence of the demands associated with 
domestic labour – and the failure to fulfil it – also presented a political obstacle to 
authorities as they attempted to reconstruct the economy, and emancipate women. Both 
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the responses of citizens, and the financial constraints faced by the state, compelled a 
reformulation of theory and policy regarding domestic labour and family life through 
the first decades of the state, until its formal rehabilitation in 1936. Women of all ages in 
the 1920s and 1930s lobbied the state for the fulfilment of the rights to which they felt 
entitled, by virtue of their contribution to society in the roles of revolutionaries, 
workers, students, and mothers. Since women often occupied more than one of these 
social categories, their letters display a careful consideration of the social value 
associated with each role in their negotiations with authorities. 
 
Domestic Labour versus ‘Socially Useful Labour’ 
 
Marx and Engels established the basis for policy on the ‘woman question’ in communist 
states of Eastern Europe, providing a series of accounts of gender within their treatise 
on politics and economics. The German Ideology clearly stated that the division of labour 
was ultimately ‘based on the natural division of labour in the family’, which had 
relegated women to the role of domestic labourers. It continued that this ‘latent form of 
slavery’, was the first form of private property, which would be liberated under 
socialism.33 The role of women, though, was not considered in any depth in this work, 
showing gender to be of peripheral importance to class in Marxist thought, even when 
Engels’ The Origin of the Family is taken into account.34 As addressed in the introduction 
to the thesis, the Bolsheviks possessed a quagmire of anxieties about women, their 
bodies, and their dubious potential for socialist salvation following the Revolution.35 
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This culminated not only in intrusive policing and public health policies aimed at the 
eradication of prostitution and venereal disease, but also in an abundance of demanding, 
yet contradictory instructive propaganda aimed at women and their redemptive use of 
their time and bodies with social obligations.  
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, images of socially and politically emancipated women 
appeared alongside those subordinating the agency of women to the supposed 
‘demands’ of the next generation, associating women with domestic labour in addition 
to their public responsibilities. Elizabeth Waters has shown that, as mothers reappeared 
in the imagery of political posters by the mid-1920s, they were rarely depicted 
accompanied by any family members (male or female), but their infant children. She 
notes that the exclusion of husbands and fathers was most likely due to ‘respect for 
social verisimilitude’, as they traditionally had very little to do with childcare, reflecting 
our earlier conclusions about the attention paid by Soviet policymakers in the 1920s 
and 1930s to the meaningful redistribution of domestic labour. 36 These conclusions are 
also reflected in time budget studies in the 1920s which, despite being skewed towards 
the representation of married urban citizens,  show that even in the early twenties, 
though women spent on average the same time on activities associated with their 
employment as their male counterparts, they had more than three times as much 
housework as men. They devoted as much as one fifth to one quarter of every twenty-
four hour period to domestic labour, whilst (married) men devoted the majority of 
theirs to ‘free time activities’.37 Figures for young, childless and single women – 
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concentrated at this time in the new factories in the provinces - show a larger 
proportion of their time spent on leisure activities. No solution to this was every 
presented. Lenin, in his typically condescending tone, conceded that domestic labour 
continued to be left to women, stating with what we might, with our own hindsight, 
consider as foreboding: 
You all know that even with the fullest equality in their labour force participation, women 
are still in an actual position of inferiority because all housework is thrust upon them. Most 
of this housework is highly unproductive, most barbarous and most arduous, and it is 
performed by women. This labour is extremely petty and contains nothing that would in the 
slightest degree facilitate the development of women.38  
As the attention of Soviet policymakers and theorists to the issue of women’s 
association with domestic labour diminished, as no obvious solution that was both 
practical and politically acceptable presented itself. Though Aleksandra Kollontai did 
suggest a programme of socialised domestic labour, with communal kitchens and teams 
of domestic labourers, this was ultimately rejected as being neither economically 
practical nor a sufficient priority to Party leaders. Moreover, the low political value of 
domestic labour – and that of its labourers - was never fully resolved at all.  
Despite the glorification of motherhood and child-rearing, which characterised the 
1930s (as shown by the thesis’s introduction), the economic and social rights 
established by the Stalin Constitution also included the right to employment, to leisure, 
to material security in old age and in the event of illness or incapacity to work, and to 
education - up to and including higher education. Article 122 of the 1936 Constitution of 
the USSR, which was circulated on December 5 stated that ‘Women in the USSR are 
accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and 
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political life’, clearly indicating that women were absolutely free to perform their heroic 
duty to the state. 39 These rights would be realised by affording women ‘equally with 
men’ the right not only to labour (trud) and its related rights (pay, rest, social 
insurance), but also by ‘state protection of the interests of mother and child’.40 The 
protection of these interests would be covered by: state assistance to single mothers 
and mothers of many children; paid maternity leave; and the ‘broad’ (shirokoj) 
provision of maternity homes, kindergartens and nurseries.41 Women’s share of 
industrial labour increased rapidly after 1930, coinciding with the sharpest drop in 
birth rates recorded, decreasing overall family size from 4.26 in 1927 to 3.8 in 1935.42 
Wendy Goldman has argued that ‘by 1932, women had become one of the most 
important sources of labour in the drive to industrialise’.43  
For this reason, the role of women in the workplace required the protection of social 
provisions for domestic labour. This included socialised dining, childcare, and 
provisions for prospective and new mothers, all of which and were outlined in the 
second phrase of article 122.44 Yet, as Ilič has demonstrated, though the Constitution 
displayed the inclination to protect the interests women and their participation in the 
workforce, the focus of labour legislation in the decade shifted firmly toward ‘equality’, 
reinforcing women’s presence in industry, rather than facilitating their meaningful 
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integration, since  disparities in the distribution of all rights based on gender, race and 
nationality were ‘forbidden’. 45  
Although the rights of women were by 1936 protected by the Constitution, their overall 
importance seemed in part to be gauged by the Stalinists as an economic demographic, 
a human resource, rather than as women. Stalin himself stated that: ‘The women in the 
collective farms are a great force. To keep this force down would be criminal. It is our 
duty to bring the women in the collective farms forward and to make use of this great 
force’.46  Women were extolled by Stalin himself as ‘the greatest reserve of the working 
class’, an economic powerhouse in industry and agriculture as well as in the home as 
mothers to a new generation of Soviet workers.47 The frequency with which they 
appeared in posters as urban and rural workers arguably reflects this prioritisation of 
the political agitation of the growing female labour force.48  Demonstrating the 
expectation that women would perform both public and domestic labour, in ‘The 
Political Education of Women’, Stalin asserted that ‘working class and peasant women 
are mothers; they are rearing our youth – the future of our country.’49 Alongside the 
labour demands of the Soviet state in the 1930s, women’s entitlement to the fullest 
protection of their formal equality hinged increasingly upon their engagement with this 
labour. 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, time budget studies from the 1930s have shown that the 
dual burden for Soviet working women continued. In addition to working full-time 
outside the home, women averaged four to six hours per day on domestic chores. In 
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contrast, the time men spent on household chores averaged at one hour per day.50 What 
is also clear is that the time spent on education or cultural activities (which had been 
included in studies from the 1920s as ‘work, or time connected to work’) declined, in 
favour of time spent on domestic responsibilities.51 Women’s participation in the 
domestic sphere was in the 1920s portrayed as a remnant of tsarism which was ripe for 
eradication. However, women’s domestic labour appeared simply to have been 
sanctioned by the Stalin Constitution as a valuable and necessary contribution to 
socialist construction, in addition to their labour outside the home. So, the shift in 
discourse by 1936, which is typically understood in Western historiography as an 
‘abrupt’ shift towards social conservatism, is more accurately understood as a process 
of continuity: the utopian ideals of the immediate post-revolutionary period, which 
extended the Soviet system of ‘rights’ to women, through their entry into the labour 
force, was maintained. In theory, women’s presence in the labour force was facilitated 
by the protections of the equality achieved by socialism, which should have eased the 
burdens on their time caused by their maternity and domestic labour. Women appeared 
with greater frequency because they had allegedly been emancipated by Soviet policies 
before 1930.52 In real terms, little changed for women’s lives but the words and images 
used to depict them, with the exception perhaps on the time they were afforded to 
participate in cultural or educational activities, which decreased. As we might imagine, 
the dual (or triple) burden was - at all times - a heavy one. The multiple spheres within 
which women existed, and within which they possessed certain duties, with 
corresponding rights, clearly contained the potential for conflict.  
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Therefore, although Soviet policymakers ostensibly doubled down on their commitment 
to women’s equality as the 1920s proceeded into the 1930s, it continually failed to 
acknowledged the labour women performed in the domestic sphere upon which the 
state depended to function at a basic level. Far from passively accepting this double 
burden, women’s letters express an awareness of the conflict between their equality, 
and their working and living conditions, which are particularly apparent in their 
responses to the 1936 Decree and Constitution. Though they did not necessarily 
consider their occupation of multiple social roles as inherently problematic, they were 
quick to defend their rights within each role on occasions that their associated 
obligations came into conflict. 
 
The Rights and Obligations of the New Soviet Woman in the 1920s 
 
Women in possession of a thorough education – often teachers and librarians - were 
often ready and eager to assert certain material rights, both according to the basis of the 
law, and on the basis of the political value of their profession. They demonstrated a 
strong self-awareness of their own implications for the future of the Soviet project, and 
wielded this in their letters to emphasise the material rights they were due by law. The 
political premium held by education was therefore evident in the ways in which women 
would assert their rights as citizens, based upon these contributions to society, or 
express anxiety about the potential political consequences of their lack of education. 
There was manifest evidence amongst the writing of women to state organs and officials 
of a sharp awareness of the significant responsibilities of educational work, and the 
heightened obligations to satisfactorily fulfil this role, in order to merit its associated 
rights.  
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A sense of these obligations was palpable in a letter from a librarian named Elizaveta, 
who dramatically decried her semi-literacy in a letter to Krupskaia following the latter’s 
Pravda article of April 10, 1929. In desperation, Elizaveta turned to Krupskaia for advice 
as to whether she was really suitable to be a librarian, due to her low level of literacy. 
Having been working as a librarian for six months at the time of writing, Elizaveta made 
clear that she understood ‘the importance and seriousness of this work completely.’ She 
explained that her studies had been interrupted in part by the Revolution, but mostly 
due to the impact of her father’s death. However, she took care to demonstrate that, 
though her studies were interrupted in 1917, it was her family’s poverty – and 
associated proletarian status – that prevented their resumption: 
The thing is that I had to study for three years only, because my father died (and in general 
in 1917-18 studies were bad) and then I had to go to work to support my family […] now, 
now I’m already an employee and [so] the path to learning is closed to me. I’m self-educated 
[…] And now I’m faced with the fact that I do not deserve my post as a librarian, I’m poorly 
acquainted with literature, I know hardly any literature I’m semiliterate, and I’m a librarian 
but I can’t satisfy such demands, study their interests, and teach them systematically to read 
about reading is what I need – it torments me terribly […]53 
Though Elizaveta claimed to be semi-literate, this was clearly not the case – though her 
prose is quite rambling, it was generally reasonably well written. Instead, it was her 
political literacy which Elizaveta saw as being the core of her ineligibility to be a 
librarian. The torment that Elizaveta felt that she was not qualified for her role echoed 
the sentiment of letters encountered earlier, that their authors feared being forgotten 
by, or excluded from, the revolutionary process. This sense of exclusion from Soviet 
society, though largely hypothetical in this case, allowed her to state her emotional 
turmoil, which was a direct result of her inability to properly fulfil her obligations to the 
state: 
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The further I read about the library business, the more I see myself disappearing […] Would 
it not be more honest on my part to say that I am not fit for purpose and leave? Answer me 
please and advise me […]54  
Though the head of Elizaveta’s local Party organ evidently took no issue with her 
capabilities, Elizaveta was convinced that her lack of formal technical and political 
education was an almost insurmountable obstacle, and that her political naiveté, 
prevented her from fully meeting the requirements of her job:  
I’ve already talked about it for a long time with the head of the regional CPSU Ushakova, but 
she advises me to stay on and says that if I have the desire, a real librarian will emerge from 
me, especially in our workers’ libraries where I feel that with my own weight with the 
workers I can give something. But in fact desire alone does very little.55 
In turn, she appeared to suggest that she did not deserve the right to employment the 
state had granted her and that she was cheating them in some way, even suggesting that 
she should be ‘honest’ and leave the position. The suggestion indicated a sense of guilt 
over her feelings of dishonesty, something omitted from explicit mention in the letter. 
This euphemism elucidates to some extent the relationship between rights, the duties 
upon which they were contingent, and the emotional effects of their degree of fulfilment 
for Soviet citizens. Elizaveta considered herself undeserving of her employment as a 
librarian, aware of the political significance of her duties, and so felt guilt and 
dishonesty by her continued receipt of the right to employment in this field. Her highest 
priorities moving forward were clearly self-improvement: her political education thus 
far had been self-taught, but she sought to arrange courses to facilitate her further 
education as well as that of others. Indeed, she brought evidence of her continued 
efforts in this vein despite her departure from the library, stating towards the close of 
the letter that ‘But I like work! I especially like anti-religious work, almost every day 
                                                          
54 GARF, f. 7279, op. 7, d. 18, l. 56. 
55 GARF, f. 7279, op. 7, d. 18, l. 56. 
183 
 
now I engage in debates’, and detailing the anti-religious reading and games in which 
she participated. 56  Elizaveta’s letter, therefore, reflected a comprehensive 
understanding of the system of rights and obligations in the Soviet 1920s as it pertained 
to the (broad) field of  education. Though it was largely her (implied) proletarian 
background that had prevented her from obtaining the necessary education to 
responsibly undertake the role of a librarian, Elizaveta was nonetheless sensitive to the 
obligations held by Soviet citizens for self-improvement.  
Library workers, more secure in their professional and educational skills demonstrated 
a similar awareness of the significance of their work for the socialist project. In contrast 
to Elizaveta’s angst that she did not deserve the benefits associated with her position, 
other library workers were keen to defend the benefits they had ‘earned’ through their 
labour in the field of education. Writing to the trade newspaper Red Librarian in 1930, P. 
Maksimtseva, in a formal ‘declaration (zaiavlenie), stated: 
 I hereby request the editor of Red Librarian to help me out in getting the salary from [the] 
village Council Region at the rates established and published in the resolution of the Central 
Committee and the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, in "proceedings of the CEC of the USSR"57 [...] 
Ask the editors not to refuse my request.58  
Maksimtseva shared an apparent sense of legal entitlement with her peers in her 
request for due payment. Emphasising her status in her place of work, Maksimtseva 
instructs the recipient of her letter to aid in the resolution of remuneratory problems. 
Yet, rather than emphasise the centrality of her lauded identity of worker (rabotnitsa) in 
order to make clear her entitlement to her due pay, Maksimtseva foregrounded her 
constitutional right to due payment outlined by the Central Committee, censuring her 
                                                          
56 GARF, f. 7279, op. 7, d. 18, l. 56. 
57 The Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the highest governing body of the Soviet Union at the 
time, which existed from 1922 until 1938. 
58 GARF, f. 5462, op. 12, d. 226, l. 35. 
184 
 
local Council for their breach of this right. In this sense, Maksimtseva portrayed herself 
as having been denied the rights to which she was entitled to for her labour, alleging 
that, far from it being her responsibility to demonstrate her entitlement to her pay 
increase, it is instead local (and not central) authorities that were responsible for any 
violation of Soviet policy.  
Letters written to the editorial board of Red Librarian in pursuit of unpaid wages were 
assertive in their requests for proper attention to their entitlements. Another letter 
from the same collection read: ‘We ask that you immediately inform us whether this 
situation is a violation of TsIK and Sovnarkom from 10/08/1930, and if so, to take 
action to correct this violation, since here in Aleksin, we were unable to do anything, 
despite the fact that we ourselves and our Groups sent information of a corresponding 
character to the City Soviet.’59 Though it is unclear to which ‘Groups’ the writer referred, 
the picture emerging from this collection of letters is that for the librarian, their trade 
publication was seen to function with reasonable efficiency as a mouthpiece on behalf of 
its readership and related organisations. That so many of its correspondents were 
women, unlike, for example, the correspondents of the sugar-workers’ trade magazine 
Golos sakharnika (Sugar worker) ostensibly reflects that the profession was reasonably 
feminised, arguably producing a small ‘community’ of sorts within which women felt 
quite confident in their voices, and ability to vocalise their rights as workers in the 
socialist state. Having examined the corresponding files for Golos sakharnika trade 
magazine, only one letter from a woman appears to have been received (or at least 
archived). The letter was signed anonymously, by ‘a girl from the factory’ (devushka s 
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zavoda), and detailed the abuse in her factory of the working conditions of an elderly 
male colleague.60 
Significantly, however, there was a perception among the librarians that their work, 
though not undertaken in a factory, or a farm, was vital to the construction of socialism, 
as it provided an educational environment in which the education of proletarian 
communities might thrive. Timofeeva perhaps verbalised this most articulately, writing 
that she ‘Should have been given a pay increase of 13 rubles […] No increase has been 
received […] Please provide assistance, with the inclusion of the creation of favourable 
conditions for workers in political education [...] Timofeeva.’61 There is some indication 
here of a possible explanation for the assertiveness of librarians and teachers in their 
claims to certain rights or entitlements. Certainly, their style of prose was more 
confident than those of letter-writers from professions less associated with education 
and literacy. The significance of this factor was demonstrated by the ‘semi-literate 
librarian’ Elizaveta, whose command of the written word did not seem poor enough to 
qualify her as ‘semi-literate’, but was indicative of a relative lack of confidence in her 
abilities and her political education. This is reiterated by the fact that at one point, late 
in her letter, Elizaveta asked Krupskaia if she would mind receiving a few of Elizaveta’s 
poems about Lenin, stating that although she ‘still did not dare to do it, but [would] 
probably send them to mark May 1st’.62 Moreover, as Natalie Delougaz has pointed out, 
the 1930 issues of Red Librarian (from the archive of which the above examples are 
drawn), were published in the wake of a series of decrees from the Commissariat for 
Education and the Central Committee, recommending a series of organised library 
campaigns promoting library service, and the establishment of a nationwide network of 
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larger library units respectively.63 This increased emphasis on the importance of library 
work (and no doubt the associated pay rise) arguably imbued the women with a sense 
of confidence in their own value to the regime, and subsequently in their claims to 
proper payment, in tandem with their confidence in their writing style. 
In this respect, the significance of the intended audience of the letters to Red Librarian 
should not be underestimated. According to Natalie Delougaz’s 1945 review of Red 
Librarian issues from 1924 until 1940, its list of contributors included a considerable 
proportion of ‘non-librarians’, indicating a relatively broad readership to whom issues 
relating to libraries were pertinent.64 Indeed, Delougaz notes that the most frequently 
covered topic in Red Librarian was the general ‘role’ of the library in public life, with the 
majority of these articles – both by the publication’s editorial team and its contributors 
– deal with the importance of libraries in political education. We might also submit, then, 
that the high worth afforded to political education led (at least among the readership of 
Red Librarian) to a sense of boldness in the claims made by library workers to certain 
rights. Yet, with reference to the ‘semi-literate librarian’, these claims were contingent 
upon a particular standard of professional achievement, as evidenced by the semi-
literate librarian’s pleas for assistance in raising herself to the standard of literacy and 
professional ability that she sees to be appropriate.65 
This emphasis on the significance of education for the consolidation of the Revolution 
was not limited to librarians. The letter on pensions from a group of elderly teachers to 
Molotov encountered in chapter one demonstrates a sense of indignation at the 
disregard for their entitlement to material assistance, as veterans of the Revolution. 
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Justifying their right to a larger pension by stating that ‘not only had [they] been 
teachers, but were… in the midst of the Revolution, the party, and the defeat of 
capitalists – [they] should be able to look back, retire, and live comfortably.’66 Despite 
the discursive preoccupation with youth, and the risk posed by the pre-Revolutionary 
generations and their tendency to bourgeois individualism, the women plainly stated 
that due to their revolutionary contributions the women were angered by what they 
saw as a breach of their entitlement to a comfortable living. The letter, signed by the 
women under the word: “pensionerki” (female pensioners), presented the women’s 
clear sense of their entitlement to those rights because of, rather than in spite of, their 
old age.67 The letter was undoubtedly critical in its tone, yet the women mitigate these 
criticisms of the Soviet pension system by presenting their contribution to the 
Revolution as an entitlement to the privileges of Soviet power, aligning ‘human dignity’ 
with Soviet values.  
The discursive and political obligation of women to perform productive labour outside 
the home was, of course, very familiar to women themselves. Generally speaking, the 
fact that rights and entitlements to the benefits of full citizenship were so intrinsically 
tied to labour outside the home did not conceptually present women with a sense of 
unease, or of conflict with motherhood, or the expectation by the state of motherhood 
form women. Yet practically, conflict often arose between the fulfilment of the labour 
obligations, and personal rights of women as mothers.   
Larisa, who we briefly encountered in our earlier discussion of grief, wrote to Nadezhda 
Krupskaia in 1929. In describing her grief, she clearly explained the burden placed upon 
mother-teachers, and the conflict between her working and maternal responsibilities. 
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Her daughter had died of the measles, apparently due to the unwillingness of her school 
board to allow her to take leave to seek appropriate treatment. Having had little 
opportunity either to spend time with her daughter before her death, or to grieve 
following the loss, she explained the magnitude of this injustice to Krupskaia, an extract 
of which reads as follows: 
I have come to the conclusion that we, who remain strong for the upbringing of the new 
generation, must not have our own children, the flowers that colour and illuminate our 
lives…  
How could I, tired, and with a sick child in my arms, raise the productivity of the class, what 
now can I give my pupil? All the cheerfulness, the desire to build freedom of the pupil that I 
have is gone. I function mechanically, and am afflicted by this […] but such unfortunate 
teachers and children’s tales are scattered around the clutter of our Union. We mother 
teachers work not to improve our material position, but because of cases of family 
misfortune[…] or the absence of a husband[…]68 
Written in 1929, (obviously) prior to the 1936 Constitution, and to the 1930s closure of 
the Zhenotdel, her letter nonetheless implied to the reader a sort of equivalence 
between the work of a teacher and a mother, stating in no uncertain terms that she did 
not teach for the money, but to provide a parental, or care-giving role as an educator, in 
‘cases of family misfortune… or the absence of a husband’ (a telling acknowledgement of 
the persistence of absconding husbands…). Larisa reinforced this through her 
references to the time and self-consuming obligations of her two roles held, and the 
conflict this presented. She highlighted the significance of her commitment to either one 
of these roles by reference to the engagement with the next generation of Soviet society 
that both entailed. Likewise, Larisa also wrote also of her desire to feel the joy that she 
had previously felt in ‘building freedom’ for and with her pupils, reiterating in this way, 
reflecting the priority that the construction of Soviet society and introduction of Soviet 
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power represented – though this element of the letter was no doubt heightened by 
Krupskaia’s role as Deputy Minister for Education. We can, however, see reflections of 
this priority elsewhere in letters to authorities, and particularly in letters to Krupskaia. 
Evident also is the way in which this prioritisation of the rights of the younger 
generation of the first ‘native Soviet citizens’ was used to articulate the perceived 
transgression of the author’s rights as a mother: 
For us there is not regulation… The power that stands in the country of the interests of the 
toiling people should forbid us to have children.  In the country of the Soviets, there must not 
be unfortunate children and unsupervised, neglected (beznadzornie) children, who spend 
most of their time under the supervision of semiliterate nannies, with whom childhood 
passes by grey, and unprepossessing. I'm sorry, a thousand times sorry dear Nadezhda 
Konstantinovna that I took from You an hour of precious time, but it is very hard.69 
Larisa’s writing, clearly, was coloured by a deep sense of private grief – deemed 
emotionally ‘appropriate’ for her in her association with the rearing of the new Soviet 
generation. Yet, the manner with which she expressed this to Krupskaia is striking in its 
clear evocation of the ‘emancipatory’ discourses presented by the state – including its 
shift back towards the ‘stable’ nuclear family. Larisa foregrounded in this passage the 
supremacy of the ‘de-gendered’ (or de-feminised) ‘toiling class’ against all others, 
placing it in a passive relationship with the state. Against this context, Larisa’ discussion 
of the nannies she seemed to hold responsible for the neglect of children portrays them, 
in their ‘semi-literacy’ as almost bourgeois, despite their role in socialised childcare. 
They were unmistakeably female, and, not having fully engaged with the emancipatory 
process of liquidating their own illiteracy, were engaged ‘only’ in domestic labour, 
unable to meet the standards expected of them in Soviet society. Yet, as we have seen, 
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the role of ‘mother’ in the nuclear family was considered to be distinct from this social 
category of domestic labourers. 
By demanding that teachers should be ‘forbidden’ from having children, to protect the 
childhoods of Soviet children, a page after having referred to children as ‘flowers that 
colour and illuminate our lives’, Larissa’s letter served two purposes. Firstly, she 
implicitly suggested that her work as a teacher would be a sufficient ‘substitute’ in her 
identity formation and sense of purpose, and well-being in such a relentlessly purpose-
driven society. Secondly (though more explicitly) she suggested that the obligations of a 
teacher, without regulation in some way, were an infringement of the rights of mothers 
– the other part of Larissa’s compound self-identification as ‘mother teacher’. In this 
way, Larisa depicted to Krupskaia her over-fulfilment of her obligations to the Soviet 
state, and her entitlement to sufficient recognition by the state for the sacrifices she had 
made through her fulfilment of duty. 
However, women were not able to assert whichever rights or entitlements they had 
themselves identified as due with impunity. The significance of women’s strategies of 
‘Speaking Bolshevik’, as well as the evocation of particular categories of politically 
acceptable labour, is highlighted by comparison to one of the rare examples found in the 
archives in which direct criticism – and a clear abuse of rights, if the writer is to be 
believed – were articulated to Soviet authorities. A woman named Natalya Kudialeva 
sent an angry exposé of her local volunteer militia to Pravda in 1925, in a letter entitled 
‘Where to complain about the police?’. The letter was stored in a file of correspondence 
forwarded from the editors of the newspaper Krest’ianka to the NKVD for investigation, 
and contained allegations of police brutality in a local village. 
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The police in Bielsko County, beyond the rules and laws during interrogations, [set upon] a 
citizen as if in an ambush and in a drunken manner commits violence against the person and 
health of the interrogated, such measures as terror to the peasants are alleged to be Soviet 
power. So, beaten by representatives of the police, the citizen is forced not to seek help from 
a doctor, after such interrogations. Here is a recent example. Comrade Antonov, a policeman 
at Zemtsovsky ox with witnesses, beat up during the interrogation of a citizen of the same 
parish Ivan Lukanov, and Ivan Nikifor… Show him the decree on interrogations, which he 
probably lost while drunk. 70 
Natalya K.’s letter displayed a sarcastic and dismissive rhetoric taking care to localise 
the issue by consistently identifying the individuals involved, thus removing the 
culpability for these abuses from the Soviet state. Like other letters, retained in the files 
of their original recipient, or filed simply as ‘comments’ or ‘suggestions’ in the 
bureaucracies regarding specific policies, the letter is ostensibly concerned with rights, 
citizenship, and the state. Yet, Natalya’s attempt to localise the problem proved to be 
insufficient, and failed to mitigate her anger. This is perhaps due either to the degree of 
social marginalisation of the writer as a rural woman, the tone of the letter, its details, 
its target – or some combination of the four features. As we know from discussions of 
negative emotions in chapter two, other letters criticising authority measures tended to 
frame these criticisms in terms of the impact of errant individuals towards ‘protected’ 
or marginalised groups. Natalya K.’s letter, however, condemned the behaviour of 
members of the local police as ‘hooliganism’, drunkenness, thuggery. Though she 
criticised the violence and terror committed by police against the peasantry, she did not 
present this as an affront to Soviet values, but makes a sarcastic reference to the 
suggestion that this violence was Soviet power.  
Moreover, Natalya K.’s letter, unlike other letters of criticism, did not reference her 
status in society as a party member, worker, or revolutionary, and as such did not 
attempt to align herself with the Soviet project. Nor did she emphasise particular 
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membership to a ‘marginalised’ group in Soviet society, or suggest any efforts she had 
made with respect to ‘self-improvement’. In fact, Natalya K. included in her letter no 
details about herself, other than that she was a ‘rural correspondent’; a vast element of 
the population whose ‘mood’ was closely monitored in the 1920s, due to its reputation 
of ‘backwardness’. That the audience was the readership of Krest’ianka, a newspaper 
aimed at rural women, the most ‘backward’ element of the rural population would only 
have compounded the anxieties that Natalya K.’s letter stirred. This disparity in the 
response to letters detailing perceived infringements of rights, and more generally the 
persistence of issues of rights in letters detailing frustration, unhappiness and gratitude 
is clearly a very significant question to address. That women sought such a variety of 
strategies throughout the 1920s to articulate these perceptions of rights provides 
important evidence that there were a number of ‘entitlements’ considered to be rights 
intrinsic to the Soviet Woman. 
 
Tracing Changes in Rights-Speak in Women’s Responses to the 1936 
Decree 
 
As a result of the 1936 ‘Decree on the Prohibition of Abortions’, the traditional nuclear 
family was officially ‘reinstated’. Wendy Goldman’s work on women, abortion and the 
family suggests that prior to the reinstatement of the family, women had managed their 
reproductive lives effectively, responding flexibly to their circumstances, and seeking to 
preserve their autonomy. Although contraception was absent from most official 
discussions of women’s emancipation, some Soviet demographers estimated that a 
significant proportion of Soviet women – including peasants – practiced some form of 
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contraception.71 Goldman suggests that although doctors and OMM (Department for 
Maternity and Infancy Protection) officials were aware of the need for available 
contraception and abortion, it was women themselves who held the most thorough 
understanding of the relationship between reproductive control and liberation, pointing 
to the evidence that among both peasant and urban women, the groups who most 
frequently chose abortion were women who were already mothers.72  
This understanding is corroborated by Ransel’s study of reproductive discourse among 
rural women. Ransel’s interviews make a convincing case for a transformation in the 
reproductive culture of villagers, arguing that village women were open to learning new 
methods of managing their reproductive lives, giving birth, and raising children. He 
notes that ‘many [women] were quick to take advantage of whatever assistance proved 
convenient and did not ask them to sacrifice whatever little autonomy they enjoyed’73 
Though often presented as evidence of the latent conservatism of the Soviet population, 
upon this basis, women’s letters can be seen as a defence of their own ‘space’ for 
existence within society. Women were not inherently opposed to changes in legislation 
which affected their domestic lives, but sought to preserve their own autonomy in these 
spheres. 
Many responses to the decree – again, solicited by the state via newspapers - criticised 
the strains of Soviet life and its conflict with the maintenance of a family (albeit in 
strictly acceptable language). Indeed, women’s response to the 1936 decree was far 
from meek, indeed their letters contained considered responses to the legislation and 
its effects.  Citing poverty as the primary motivation behind the need for abortion, 
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peasant and urban women alike were acutely aware that if abortion was prohibited, 
women would seek illegal abortion in its place. That said, Evans notes that the majority 
of these letters were written by students, professional women and female shock 
workers, while instead, ‘ordinary’ women tended to write on issues of alimony, divorce 
and state benefits. 74 The letters archived in response to the 1936 decree broadly 
corroborate much of the work undertaken in the field by virtue of their sheer diversity: 
women’s proposals for the decree responded to a vast array of ‘stimuli’ from their own 
environments – which we might broadly categorise according to class or background, 
but should be careful not to view too rigidly. 
Complaining about the ready availability of divorce, and the sense of insecurity this 
created for women, a typist from Stalingrad wrote that ‘We need in the future, the very 
best pilots, farmers, artists, professors, so give women the opportunity for calm and 
normal conditions [in which] to nurture.’75 Another woman, who argued that  further 
protections were required for new and nursing mothers, wrote: 
Living side by side with collective farmers (kolkhoznami), I see how in almost every family 
the birth of a child is still a burden, because the mother-peasants (materi-krest’ianka) want 
to make money, and not to give the child to anyone, such as the nursery. The farm though, 
signed a contract for the opening of the nursery and the Foundation has allocated, both food 
and cash, but the Chairman of which has already spent half of the funds on the purchase of 
seeds and the nursery, he says it is not needed, as there are no means [to set it up].76 
The author’s letter has much in common with other criticisms of Soviet legislation: she 
presents her own life squarely within a collective framework, living ‘side by side’ with 
peasants. Like other women, she compounded the identities of mothers with their 
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occupation outside the home. It is notable, however, that the author continued to 
articulate the rights of the working mother with her child as the ‘main subject’ of the 
proposal she made. By highlighting the misdirection of funding for her proposed 
nursing facilities, the author of the letter suggested that the intended effect of the law 
would have been to establish nursing facilities for new mothers, to preserve the bond 
between mother and infant, and prevent any conflict between the obligations of 
workers and mothers. Like Larisa, the dual identity possessed by working mothers is 
evident in her letter, and though the candour with which the author asserted the value 
of the maternal relationship and rights of the mother (and child), there is a strong 
continuity between the language used by Larisa seven years earlier. Crucially, the 
author of this letter claims that the work of peasant woman was impossible without the 
arrangements for nursing that she described: ‘For the work of peasant women, pregnant 
or with young children, to leave your young ones for 5 and 6 hours without a breast to 
go is not allowed [should not be allowed]’.77 The clear implication of this statement that 
child-rearing – as well as farm labour – were integral components of the work of a 
peasant woman: a succinct acknowledgement of the responsibility formally re-assigned 
to women by 1936 for both public and domestic labour. 
In spite, or perhaps because of, the heavy load of ‘obligations’ for which women were 
responsible in the first decades of Soviet power, a  number of women wrote of the 
gratitude they felt for the material and ideological protection of their large families by 
the 1936 Constitution, and the endorsement they feel of their desired role as mother of 
a large family.78 M.M. Kuzovokva, whom we first encountered in our discussion of 
emotions, when writing on behalf of her colleagues on her farm, expressed such an 
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appreciative sentiment: ‘After reading in the newspapers of the great care of our 
proletarian state towards mothers of large families, we want to express many thanks for 
showing us feeling’.79  By presenting herself in opposition to the ‘people who had no 
children’ that had laughed at her, Kuzovovka created a clear sense that being a mother 
of a large family was an intrinsic part of her own identity. She was grateful that she had 
been given greater appreciation under the legislation, and as a result of financial 
assistance from the state, now possessed the opportunity to fulfil this role more freely. 
Moreover, her choice of the term ‘mother of a large family’, rather than ‘mother to many 
children’, implies that not only does her sense of her role as mother encompass the 
raising of children, but a wider role as matriarch of a family unit which is valuable and 
appreciated in public life. 
A more striking example of the shift in emancipatory discourse relating to labour and 
motherhood that accompanied the politics of the 1936 Decree, was the letter of an 
expectant mother found in the same file, which begins: 
I want to tell you the attention our kolkhoz pays to women. I have three and a half months 
left of my pregnancy. Up to three months, I worked at all jobs, true, I felt pain, but nothing 
extraordinary. At four months, I went to the doctor to find out what it is – the doctor told me 
you get it from heavy labour, and gave me a certificate for light-medium labour. I threw out 
the claim, because [even] this work is unbearable for me. I began to ask the management of 
the kolkhoz for easier work.  
Though the letter was in fact a response to the 1936 Decree, the letter began as if it 
sought to ‘inform’ the authorities of the grave misbehaviour of her superiors on the 
kolkhoz. As it proceeded, the author explained that, far from an excuse to ‘shirk’ her 
responsibilities on the kolkhoz, she had already borne the implications of heavy labour 
on her pregnancy for four months. Her inability to continue with heavy labour had been 
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medically certified – as had the impermanence and the possibility of resolution of her 
problem. Though she was confident in the certification of her inability to perform heavy 
labour, the kolkhoz had rejected her request to be reallocated to a less laborious role on 
the farm: 
This was not granted, but rather I was compelled to attend a board meeting […] Listening to 
all this ridicule and blackmail, I cried, I begged, that I can’t go to heavy labour. I was put to 
particularly great shame then, when [the Chairman] spoke with insult and mockery about 
my pregnancy. 80 
It is improbable that the author’s description of the mockery and ‘blackmail’ she had 
endured was embellished for the purposes of the letter, due to the level of specificity. 
However, located so shortly after her explanation of the due legal and bureaucratic 
process she had undertaken to ensure her legitimate transferral to ‘light or medium’ 
labour, the mockery is escalated to the implication that it is ‘illegitimate’, and a 
contravention of the legal protection of mother and child by the Decree. The author 
went on to evoke her potential Soviet motherhood, which reinforced the gravity of her 
situation:  
After all, I’m just in my first year of marriage, and I want to become a happy mother, but 
because I have been so bullied and forced into a ruinous job, they extorted from me and with 
tears I said that I would go to work. Then everything calmed down, and they said: ‘So, that’s 
how to disassemble the sick women, and everyone will go to work’.81 
The expectant mother’s mistreatment at the hands of her kolkhoz board was presented 
as a risk to the well-being of other sick or pregnant mothers on the kolkhoz. Though the 
author was plain in her descriptions of the un-Soviet behaviour of her local superiors, 
she had until this point, made only veiled references to her emotional response to the 
situation, having been ‘put to shame’ in the context of the meeting. The author’s return 
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to heavy labour was ‘extorted’, through her tears, evoking one of the strategies common 
amongst women wishing to articulate unhappy emotions or experiences of Soviet 
power: emotional performance. In this chapter, that the author was brought to tears by 
the board was particularly significant. Though her despair was physically performed, 
and removed from her internal life and ‘true’ experience of Soviet power, it should be 
noted that the source of her unhappiness was also external to her, attributed to the 
contravention of her rights by the kolkhoz board. Indeed, her own participation in the 
decision was claimed to have been ‘extorted’ from her by their bullying. Nonetheless, 
since she ‘want[ed] to be a happy mother’, our maligned author intended to successfully 
contribute to the upbringing of the next generation, relating her own emotional state to 
that of her role as a mother. She also went on to relate her own negative situation to her 
own, present struggle to ‘join’ the Soviet authorities in their protection of the interests 
of mother and child, and ultimately the emancipation of women, defiantly stating that: 
Of course, when I heard these words I decided not to work, without paying any attention to 
these zeroes at the last minute, because I see that these brutish attitudes towards women 
are impossible to break […] I just want to ask you, can such relationships with women be, or 
not, because you still have others such as I, and they too suffer the same pain, but I tried and 
made sure that not simply I, but all women receive help. And one outcome is that each of us 
will be paid her own allowance, which is a relief for women on our kolkhoz...  
I know that if this year I successfully carry to term, next year I will be able to work and 
return to the ranks of the Stakhanovites as it was before… But I should not be thrown out as 
a quitter, because I am not able to work. I urge you not to delay your response to me. I hope, 
wait with anticipation, that I will not leave work until I receive an answer.82 
Though this author’s prose was slightly convoluted and excitable she clearly associated 
her unfortunate situation with that of other working mothers, with whom she 
expressed a sense of solidarity and collectivism. Much of the letter discussed her 
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personal responses to her situation, but its framing was determined by the discursive 
emancipation with which she had been granted, both as a Soviet woman, and as a 
mother. Her decisions to ignore the directives given to her by male superiors in the 
workplace ‘condemned’ them as somehow ‘un-Soviet’ aberrations. Her inherent ‘rights’ 
as a working mother provided her with the authority to overrule directives by 
employers that were perceived to transgress them. 
Regarding the more punitive alimony legislation outlined by the decree, one woman 
complained that the decree refers to ‘the first family and forgets about paying alimony 
to the second family. For Soviet power every living person possesses the right to live 
and to live well… Please act on our request, and care for the children and wives of the 
first marriage and second.’83 By clearly couching her request in terms of the right of a 
Soviet person (chelovek), the author emphasises both her expectation that the state is 
obligated to provide her and her family with the means of a comfortable living, but 
additionally reflects the sense of equality outlined by the Constitution. By choosing the 
term person, rather than citizen (grazhdanin/grazhdanka), the author presents her 
right to a decent standard of living as a basic right regardless of gender, making clear 
that her understanding of herself as a Soviet woman involves no conditions upon the 
state benefit she receives as a mother and wife. Moreover, the use of the word chelovek, 
or ‘person’, rather than the more overt use of the word ‘citizen’, implied a discursive 
conflation between full citizenship and personhood, corroborating the work of Finkel, 
Alexopoulos and Thatcher, who have between them demonstrated that the ‘paradoxical’ 
states of civic belonging that emerged as part of the Soviet system of ‘rights’ was related 
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to the demands of workers in the pre-Revolutionary period to be treated ‘like a human 
being’.84  
Attention in responses to the right of all women ‘to live and live well’, as Soviet people, 
was not uncommon. A young woman named Zakusova, discussing her husband’s 
alimony payments, introduced herself simply by stating: ‘I am 22 years old. I am the 
fourth wife of my husband’85 Despite arguing against her husband’s alimony payments 
to his remarried first two wives, Zakusova recognised that as a single mother, it must be 
difficult for his third wife to make ends meet, conceding that:  
the third works herself – though only gets 300 rubles. Yet it is certainly necessary to help – 
she needs child support. Yet I, because those two women are married and take child support 
– I can not have a child… I want children, and the law gives the possibility for me to have 
them.86  
Clearly, Zakusova expected to be able to enjoy her own family life, and while she 
objected to the burden placed on her husband by his first two wives, she did not object 
to the financial requirements of her husband’s third wife, accepting that subsistence 
would have been difficult for her on only one income. Moreover, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that Zakusova, aged twenty-two in 1936, would have lived her life in its 
entirety either in revolutionary uncertainty, or under Soviet power. Her status as a 
‘fourth wife’ held little shame for her, presumably having grown up accustomed to the 
easy availability of divorce and remarriage. In this respect, her disclosure of this 
information serves to emphasise her right ‘to live and live well’.87  
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The matter of fact self-identification in many letters, as a subsequent wife or family can 
be seen to have a specific semantic purpose, imbuing this identity with a sense of public 
legitimacy: seeking to assert a presence worthy of recognition within this paradigm, 
these wives presented themselves as a lauded role amongst the Soviet pantheon of 
heroes, as the cultivators of a new generation. Several women in their responses to the 
1936 decree, voiced concerns that women’s rights and interests were, when in a secure 
relationship with a family, actually harmed by the availability of divorce, due to the ease 
with which a husband might leave for another woman. This was perhaps most 
articulately expressed again by the typist from Stalingrad who we met in chapter one: 
‘when people [are married] 10-12 years or more, have children and then one of them 
decided to "retire." Is departing right in such a case, leaving the other half-way, and 
maybe at the end of life, with family and with a broken life?’88 
 
‘Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres 
of economic, state, cultural and political life’: Women’s Responses to 
the 1936 Constitution 
 
The invitation to comment on the contents of the Draft of the 1936 Constitution was 
extended to citizens in the five months prior to its publication in December 1936. As 
Nathans has explained, ‘[T]he economic and social rights pioneered in the Stalin 
Constitution included the right to employment, to leisure, to material security in old age 
and in the event of illness or incapacity to work, and to education, up to and including 
higher education.’ Articles 122 and 123 ensured that any impediment to the fulfilment 
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of these rights based upon gender, nationality, or race, were prohibited.89 Though 
nominally ensuring full equality for all citizens, the Constitution distinguished between 
‘having’ rights, and having rights conferred, or granted by the state (along with the 
means to attain them). In other words, though it would be possible to obtain rights – up 
to a more or less uniform standard – these were neither innate nor an entitlement. 
Rather, they were obtainable from the state in return for meeting a particular set of 
socio-political criteria, the most significant of which was participation in socially useful 
labour. The Constitution also categorised the conditions on which the different degrees 
of citizenship might be conferred. Nathans has suggested that, according to the Stalin 
constitution ‘[l]abour [was] the indispensable link between duties and rights, the only 
activity listed under both categories’.90 Ellen Wimburg cites one letter to Izvestiia from a 
woman named Gavrilova which encapsulated the relationship perfectly, while at the 
same time toeing the party line of criticism against corrupt or bureaucratic local officials, 
suggesting that ‘such heartless bureaucrats who ignored the pleas of their constituency 
ought to be deprived of the right to lead Soviet organs’.91 As this extract indicates, 
following the publication of the draft Constitution newspapers did carry portions of the 
national discussion of its contents. Though as John Arch Getty has warned, it is 
impossible for us to know either the inclusion and exclusion processes for the archiving 
of responses to the draft, or the views of those citizens afraid or apathetic to chime in, 
the responses to the draft display a considerable variety of opinion across and within 
social groups – in particular with regards to the rights that citizens would receive.92 
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Wimburg has noted that of the letters (from citizens of all genders) detailing specific 
articles of the Constitution, the vast majority were written regarding rights to material 
protection, rest and education, as well as the electoral system: the statistics she 
provides show that 53% of responses to the Constitution dealt with chapter 10 of the 
Constitution: ‘Citizens’ Basic Rights and Duties’.93 Given the preponderance of letters 
from women on related subjects – and in particular education – prior to the drafting of 
the 1936 constitution, this is perhaps unsurprising.  
In his study of the language of ‘rights-speak’ resulting from the 1936 Constitution in the 
post-Stalin era, Benjamin Nathans has suggested that ‘complaints [by citizens] appear to 
have been couched in the language not of common citizenship but of a specific form of 
parity and fairness: If workers get such-and-such, so should peasants’.94 After twenty 
years of the Stalin constitution, Soviet citizens appeared to have a nuanced 
understanding of the complexities of the conditions of full citizenship, and their 
associations with duty, and constantly fluctuating constructions of socially valuable 
labour and behaviour. Yet, responses to the draft of the Constitution from citizens prior 
to its ratification indicate that such attitudes appear to predate the constitution, rather 
than emerge as a result of it. Upon its circulation, article 122 of the 1936 Constitution of 
the USSR had, as we know, established the theoretically non-negotiable principle of 
gender equality, with a brief provision of measures which would be taken by the state to 
protect the stipulation and ‘the interests of mother and child.’95 
Though brief in its framework of the codification of gender equality, the comments and 
suggestions the Constitution solicited from citizens were detailed, and thorough in their 
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conceptualisation of the rights and responsibilities it laid out. Arch Getty has 
demonstrated the distinction that the Stalin Constitution re-drew between workers and 
peasants, in the alteration of the former statement that the USSR was a ‘state of free 
workers of farm and country’ to Stalin’s version, a ‘socialist state of worker and 
peasants’. Though hypothetically all citizens were guaranteed the rights laid out by the 
Constitution, its wording, specifically that rights were guaranteed for ‘the working 
people’, called into question the relationship between them and the newly reclassified 
peasantry. Arch Getty has noted that, long before Nathans’ peasants demonstrated a 
keen awareness of the potential implications of these distinctions, rural Soviet workers 
were sharply critical of the second class status with which they felt they had been 
lumbered by the  Constitution.96 
Indeed, the language women employed in their responses to this article reflects the 
‘specific form of parity and fairness’ that Nathans notes as being present in post-Stalinist 
rights-talk, as well as this sensitivity to the ambiguity of their eligibility for the rights 
guaranteed citizens by the constitution. A woman named Eframova suggested that the 
constitution should ‘[e]qualise kolkhoznitsi near labour (kolkhoznits-rozhenits) in the 
provision of maternity leave with working women and employees’.97 Similarly, a woman 
by the name of P’iavkina suggested that the constitution should ‘[s]ave the wages for 
kolkhoznitsi women (kolkhoznitsi-zhenshchinii) on maternity leave, and moreover, 
equalize the maternity leave of working and kolkhoz women’.98 Her sentiments were 
echoed again by Razorenova a kolkhoznitsa from Dzherzhinskii kolkhoz who suggested 
that this should be enshrined in writing: ‘Include a special point to article 122 […] 
providing for leave for kolkhoznitsi-women for pregnancy equal to that of rabotnitsi-
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women.99 All three proposals to the Constitution compound the status of their authors 
as specifically female toilers, or collective farmers on the one hand, with their status 
biologically as women, or indeed as childbearing women on the other. By stating these 
professional aspects of their identities in their calls for ‘equality’ – or parity – with 
working women, the authors emphasise the sense of ‘fairness’ amongst different social 
strata they feel the Constitution should entail, rather than a sense of ‘common 
citizenship’.100 Yet, compounding their professional status as collective farmers with 
their sexed identities, as (child-bearing) women, the suggestions of Eframova, 
Razorenova and P’iavkina all contain subtle reminders to the reader that they are all 
distinctly female citizens.  
A large proportion of propositions to article 122 were similar in the nature of the 
requests they made, however they were far from uniform in their form or implications, 
reflecting the individual conception of each woman of the value of her circumstances, 
their place in Soviet society, and the rights to which she was entitled. Perhaps one of the 
most striking examples of the varying degrees with which women endorsed article 
122’s vague provisions for gender equality, is that suggestion made by Zhukova, a 
resident of Budyonnovsk who proposed that the Soviet state should ‘PROSECUTE men, 
who try to break (directly or indirectly) the equal rights of women (wives), in public or 
in the household.’101 Zhukova’s proposition is suitably vague, perhaps hopefully leaving 
considerable room for the prosecution of smaller transgressions of the rights of women 
without too much fuss from the courts. Evidently, article 122 was understood by 
Zhukova in its broadest sense, and the value she placed upon the breadth of this 
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legislation of gender equality was reflected in the scope of prohibited behaviour she felt 
should be codified within it. 
By way of contrast, a longer addition to the article was made by Kuzmina, who 
identified herself as a working woman of the Svordlov factory. It appears to suggest that, 
although she did not disagree with the principles the article entails, she was not quite as 
convinced by their inclusion in the 1936 Constitution. She stated:  
I want to add one thought to article 122 about which it is said, that the woman in our 
country is provided with equal rights to the man. It seems to me, that this formulation is not 
necessary. 
Our country is already nineteen years old; the rights of man and woman we have always 
been uniform. In life we do not encounter and will not encounter such things, that woman 
would be limited in her rights. The truth is evident, it is absolutely undeniable.102 
The conception of the rights and citizenship of women that Kuzmina put forward 
offered several suppositions. First of all, though at first glance her criticism for including 
an article ensuring the rights of women appears to have been a negative reaction, upon 
closer inspection, it could be read as a celebration of the fact that nineteen years of 
Soviet power had already achieved gender equality. Kuzmina did not discuss the pre-
Revolutionary situation: for her, the nineteen-year-old Soviet state marked the 
beginning of ‘time’. Anything occurring before the Revolution was clearly unworthy of 
note in her historical narrative. Though she does not state whether women have ever 
had their rights restricted, women do not and will not experience limitations of their 
rights under Soviet power. 
Nonetheless, Kuzmina’s evaluation of gender equality also spoke volumes of her 
conception of citizenship and gender, recalling Zaharejivić’s illustration of the impact of 
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the nineteenth century scientific naturalisation of sex upon the formulation of the 
boundaries of citizenship.103 Her choice of the word ‘uniform’ (odnorodnie) to describe 
the rights of men and women in the Soviet Union strikes a contrast with their usual 
description as ‘equal’ (ravniie), and association with equality (ravnestvo or ravnopravnie 
– the latter being literally, equal rights). Though women’s experience of life after the 
Revolution was in no way ‘uniform’, by any account, in suggesting that their rights have 
been uniform, Kuzmina suggested that the article on gender equality was redundant, 
since she felt that women were already guaranteed equality their respective rights as 
citizens.  
However, the majority of responses from women to article 122 saw no reason to 
question the necessity of the legislation on women’s equality itself, instead suggesting 
the inclusion of additional clauses, either to codify the rights of their particular 
demographic, or to facilitate the rights they already possess as members of different 
social categories. For example, Evdokia Belitskaia in her proposal to the Constitution, 
stated that: ‘In my opinion, it is necessary to provide in the Constitution for the 
establishment on each kolkhoz, of birthing homes and crèches, in order to give the 
possibility to all mother-kolkhoznitsi to give birth to happy children for our wonderful 
motherland‘104 Though it is not possible to gauge the generational cohort of the women 
responding to article 122 from their brevity, written nineteen years into Soviet power, 
the language in which Evdokia’s letter was couched is strikingly ‘Soviet’ in tone, not 
least because of its reference to ‘happy children’. In addition to this, though we cannot 
be certain as to whether Evdokia was herself a mother or not, by compounding ‘mother’ 
and ‘kolkhoznitsi’ in the order that she does, Evdokia expressed her professional status 
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as a worker as the ‘core’ of a woman’s identity, presenting motherhood as its potential 
modifier. Likewise, as a self-identified rabotnitsa, or ‘working-woman’, L. Kirbakova, 
suggested that ‘to article 122 [I would] propose the addition ‘to organise specialist 
circles for woman-mothers with infants’.105 The degree of specificity of this proposal 
indicates that this is a circumstance with which Kirbakova is familiar, either through her 
own, or through a peer’s, personal circumstances. In this respect, Arch Getty’s claim, 
that peasants proved themselves more than adept at using the language and norms of 
the state to express personal criticism of the 1936 Constitution, does hold some weight.  
Nonetheless, Arch Getty’s claim that the Soviet state was ‘startled to find a sullen, 
critical, unliberal, class conscious peasantry more interested in corporate rights and 
punishing perceived enemies than constitutional niceties’ is a little unfair, at least to the 
women of the peasantry with whom this study is concerned. 106  Beyond their 
commitment to parity between working and peasant women, and occasional outburst 
against particular women who they felt had caused them personal injury, peasant 
women often delivered thoughtful and personal responses to the Stalin Constitution. 
Present in many of the proposals made by women were reflections of their personal 
experience of Soviet life. Efrosina Ragulina suggested that ‘For a mother, regardless of 
how many children she has, if she has another, award her a cash prize’.107 Efrosnia was 
presumably familiar in some way with the financial pressures an expanding family 
might pose.  Similarly, a kolkhoznitsa of the kolkhoz ‘Svoboda’ wrote: ‘to article 122, 
speaking of rights and of state help to woman, it is necessary (nado) to make an addition: 
to grant the right to local authorities to release women with large families and pregnant 
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women from meat supply and milk supply/requisition for a certain period’108 Since her 
proposal criticised the requisitioning of kolkhoz produce by the state (the use of the 
word ‘release’ implies a seizure of assets rather than a voluntary or dutiful contribution) 
the author of this suggestion declined to leave her name. Similarly, Comrade T.N. 
Ostretsova was similarly vague about her circumstances, and her personal investment 
in her proposal, which suggested that ‘[t]o article 122, [one should] add that the right 
during pregnancy to take leave with pay from 30 to 50 roubles per month for 
kolkhoznitsi.’109 Ostretsova reinforced her eligibility to make policy suggestions to the 
authorities not only by retaining a certain objectivity from her suggestions, but simply 
by referring to herself first and foremost as ‘Comrade’ Ostretsova.  
Thus, we find evidence of several common features of women’s letters to the state by 
1936 regarding their rights as women and mothers. As we might expect by 1936, 
women evoked with considerable fluency the terminology and concepts commonplace 
in materials produced by or for the Soviet authorities and their organs. The discussion 
of ‘specialist circles’ for mothers, the political significance of the well-being of the ‘next 
generation’, of the remuneration of motherhood, and of course the self-reference by 
women as ‘comrade’, all indicate conscious attempts to write in a language to which the 
recipients of the letters might respond more favourably. Likewise, the ‘compounding’ of 
socially valuable social identities served to emphasise not only the social value of the 
writer, but of her proposals to the Constitution. The ease and nuance with which 
identities such as ‘mother’, ‘worker’, ‘woman’, ‘peasant’ and so on were combined, and 
the implicit prioritisation of their constituent parts, again reflects a sense of confidence 
in the re-articulation of Soviet language amongst the women. Quite strikingly, we also 
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find evidence of the recurrent use of vagueness or omission as euphemistic strategy. 
Women frequently omit details of their lives, or speak vaguely about themselves, 
articulating only the details they consider to be ‘useful’ to their proposal, such as their 
peasant or worker identity. In doing so, the women not only express their proposal 
plainly and directly, they also avoid the direct implication the difficult or unhappy 
experiences lying behind the proposals – such as the implications of grain and meat 
requisitions; the insufficiency of maternity; and ultimately, as in Kuzmina’s letter, any 
mention of life (good or bad) prior to the Revolution. 
In contrast, some women readily divulged details of their lives and identities, beyond 
allusions couched in proposals for rights for particular groups. ‘Comrade Motyleva’, who 
identified herself as a housewife (domokhoziaika), for example, noted that the 
Constitution should ensure: ‘[t]he involvement of housewives in public 
(obshchestvennaia) work and the provision of a wide network of kindergartens, 
nurseries and playgrounds for schooling, where children can be left with round-the-
clock service.’110  ‘Comrade’ Motyleva’s assertion of the proper civic entitlement of 
housewives is interesting. As discussed in the introduction ‘wives’ were almost invisible 
as a social category in the first years after the Revolution.111 Yet, in their responses to 
article 122, women were not uncomfortable asserting their rights as wives and as 
housewives. Zhukova’s request that all men who break the equal rights of women (and 
wives) be prosecuted specifically denoted the inclusion of women as independent 
citizens and within partnerships be protected equally. Motyleva’s use of the epithet 
‘comrade’ certainly indicates that she possessed a sense of enthusiasm to be considered 
as a full citizen. Beyond this, however, by stating the necessity of childcare, to enable the 
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undertaking of other forms of social labour, she clearly asserted her faith in the value of 
domestic labour outside the realm of childcare, which was ‘worthy’ of the same benefits 
as other forms of labour.  
In this way, women responded to article 122 of the 1936 Constitution in a way that 
sought to protect their own interests, and prevent the breach of their rights to equality 
not only with their male peers, but also their female counterparts from alternative 
social categories. The reluctance of these women to divulge details of their own lives in 
addition to the strategy of ‘avoidance’ of direct negative emotional expression identified 
in chapter two, arguably reflects an unwillingness to present themselves or their peers 
as the beneficiaries of the Constitutional supplements they propose, preventing 
accusations of individualism. Yet, since one’s frame of reference dictates one’s world 
view, reflections of individual circumstances and senses of right and civic entitlement 
permeate. It seems that Mlovaiskaia’s abrupt proposal ‘to add a point on punishment of 
mothers who abandon infants’, for example, must have been rooted in some event in her 
frame of experience in her community.112 
Moreover, it is clear that the particular words women chose to articulate their 
understandings of their rights as Soviet women convey their attempts to negotiate their 
contemporary discourse, which categorised and hierarchized different social groups. In 
doing so, they assert their socialist value along with the rights and entitlements that this 
entails. Throughout the corpus of responses to article 122 of the 1936 Constitution of 
the USSR, respondents demonstrated an appreciation for the complex categorisation of 
‘degrees’ of citizenship afforded individuals within the Soviet state. They were also able 
to nuance and blend certain categorisations of their identities by aligning themselves 
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with applicable alternative social categorisations: collective farm workers and women; 
mothers and women; comrades and housewives; and collective farm workers and child-
bearers. As might be expected, due to the status workers enjoyed in the new Soviet state, 
‘working women’ appears to have been the sole social category which did not require 
qualification.   
Conclusions 
 
Upon reflection, then, it is evident that women considered their statuses, rights, and 
responsibilities as women to be in no way distinct from their status, rights and 
responsibilities as citizens. It is evident that, to an extent, Soviet full citizenship came to 
be equated with full humanity, and maximum social value, in a similar manner to which 
full citizenship, humanity, and white masculinity were equated as in the previous 
century. The familiar language of darkness and light also remained present in 
discussions of rights and their emotional ties, in particular with relation to self-
improvement, and the quest for education. 
Since the concept of citizenship was predicated on exclusion, particularly during the late 
nineteenth century, the exclusionary nature of Soviet citizenship evident in official 
discourse, and reproduced by Soviet women in their letters was not necessarily 
exceptional. However, one might have expected that the scientific naturalisation of sex 
and race that had previously delineated the confines of citizenship would ultimately be 
replaced by ‘Sovietness’ and labour value – particularly in light of the expectation of the 
withering of the nuclear family. Yet it is apparent that to a certain extent, Soviet 
citizenship incorporated the scientific rationalisation of sexual difference into its 
implicit understanding of ‘equality’ as the period progressed. The conceptual, essential 
‘difference’ between man and woman in Soviet thinking in the period is encapsulated in 
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Stalin’s declaration that ‘many of you underrate the women, and even laugh at them. 
This is a mistake, comrades, a serious mistake’. 113  Despite overtures towards 
meaningful equality, the value seemed often to be evaluated by their contemporaries as 
an economic and demographic tool: Stalin speaks about them as an Other, and not to 
them as peers. Kuzmina’s allegation in the following year that legislation for the equal 
rights of men and women was ‘unnecessary’, it having existed (at least) since the 
inception of the Soviet state, appears to contradict the state of affairs portrayed by 
Stalin himself, yet, inherent in the statements of both are the underlying assumption 
that men and women are ‘different, but equal’; though they may be treated differently, 
the rights pertaining to both respectively were, or should be met uniformly, to their 
fullest extent 
Many women appropriated these ideas, ‘accepting’ them to varying and questionable 
degrees, but nonetheless reproducing the ‘essential’ nature of woman. In particular, the 
duty of women to the state as ‘mother’ was frequently emphasised, in order to benefit 
from the rights this entailed. For most, there was no conflict for women between civic 
responsibilities for labour, and motherhood. Yet, the persistence of the Soviet 
preoccupation with ‘youth’ and the rearing of a Soviet generation was consistent, 
justifying, the entitlement of mothers to certain benefits. Correspondingly, rights of the 
working mother were often articulated through those of the child, or a new Soviet 
generation. Though this was generally more pronounced prior to 1936, this is a feature 
of the writing of mothers that was sustained (at least) until the close of the 1930s. Maria, 
whose daughter we know committed suicide following a ‘humiliation’ at the hands of 
boys in her school, plainly urged Krupskaia to help ensure the state take responsibility 
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for its involvement in matters of gender for the next generation, ostensibly as means of 
justifying her right to private grief for her daughter. 114 
Yet, such an emphasis on the rights of mother and child as synonymous is perhaps less 
pronounced following the 1936 Constitution, though references were made to the 
relationship between mother and infant. Following the rehabilitation of the nuclear 
family and the heroisation of motherhood, women appeared to be more comfortable 
asserting rights as mothers, even beyond the fact that they were invited to respond to 
the proposals in the Constitution. M.M. Kuzokovka, as we have seen, portrayed clearly 
the way in which her matriarchal pride was restored after the provisions made by the 
1936 Decree for mothers of large families, expressing a clear sense of vindication in the 
faces of her colleagues, who, she confessed, had been cruel to her before the publication 
of the Decree, due to the large size of her family.115 
Thus, it is evident that the role of ‘the mother’ continued to be a powerful rhetorical tool 
for women to express sorrow, dissatisfaction, or the need for change in Soviet life. Yet, 
though it hardly needs explaining, many women did not have children, due to choice, 
circumstance, or loss. Their letters indicate that, in their employment of Soviet language 
many girls and women positioned education – either as an educator or student – as a 
central ‘purpose’ in its place, rather than labour, and often with direct reference to 
maternal roles. Where a particular right, or obligation in this regard went unfulfilled, 
women and girls expressed clear emotional responses, highlighting the constituent 
parts of civic belonging for Soviet women, and aiding understanding of the types of 
negative feeling women felt comfortable sharing with authorities. 
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Chapter Four 
Personal Lives in Revolution: Kinship, Fidelity, and the 
Legitimisation of Alternative Families 
 
That the language representing Soviet women’s emotions, personal and civic rights, and 
familial and filial relationships was subject to shifts in public discourse exposed much of 
the personal lives of women in the Soviet Union to state approval, particularly if 
assistance, material or otherwise, was required. This intervention into private life was 
far more pervasive under Soviet power, but was not entirely new. The place of social life 
– and particularly that of women – in the plans and anxieties of Soviet theorists was 
rooted in a tradition at least generations old, a product of the remnants of the tsarist 
‘estate’ system.  
According to Robin Bisha and Jehanne Gheith et al family membership in the Russian 
Empire had provided subjects with ‘the principal basis for the identity’: social, economic 
and political roles had typically been determined by the status of one’s family, and 
family members identified by their relationship to their father.  Women, in particular, 
were publicly ‘defined’ by their relationships with men, taking their husband’s name 
upon marriage in addition to their patronymic. Social custom, Orthodox teaching, and 
political pressures all defined women’s roles practically in these terms: as daughters, 
wives, and mothers (or – alas – as the dreaded ‘mother-in-law’). Though the ‘procedures’ 
of family life, so to speak, evolved in particular throughout the nineteenth century, Bisha 
et al suggest that amongst contemporaries, there was little room for variation in the 
cycles of family life, and consequently, in the behaviours expected of women.1 Common 
proverbs in the Russian Empire reflected and reinforced women’s identities as in 
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relation to male relatives, as well as the strictly patriarchal nature of these relationships. 
One such proverb ‘A good husband is father to his wife’ infantilised women, with 
significant implications for her public role and value - something implicit in the 
European theories of rights developing throughout the nineteenth century discussed in 
the previous chapter. The belief that a woman’s social value was finished once her 
reproductive and child-rearing days were over is reflected in the proverb that ‘I escaped 
from a bear in the woods and my mother-in-law at home’. 2 
The Bolshevik vision for the social life of the Soviet population was no less ambitious 
than those for their emotional and civic lives, yet as with the latter projects, the roots of 
their ideas lay firmly in the pre-Revolutionary past, made possible by the negotiations of 
those whose personal lives they sought to reconstruct. As Barbara Alpert Engel’s study 
of marriage and divorce in late imperial Russia has shown, individuals ‘across the social 
spectrum’ – and in particular women - had grown more assertive in their pursuit of 
autonomy and self-fulfilment in their interpersonal relationships, in addition to civil and 
political rights.3 This was exemplified by the ‘marriage crisis’ present in the Russian 
Empire at the end of the nineteenth century as a result of the changes wrought by the 
emancipation of the serfs , intensified by the economic ‘modernisation’ it underwent 
from the 1880s and 1890s. The system of estates (soslovie)– according to which, as we 
know, legal status and associated rights had been determined – remained in existence. 
However, its social identities weakened, with groups (such as urban migrants from 
peasant backgrounds, and educated professionals of diverse origin) emerging outside of 
the ‘estate’ system. This resulted in what Gregory Freeze has termed a ‘disparity 
between social origin and social status’, which affected Russia’s gender order, creating 
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novel possibilities for self-definition within the home, as well as in the public sphere, 
laying the foundation for creative solutions to domestic dissatisfaction, outside of the 
nuclear family.4 Though changes in legal practices were enabled by the existence of 
reformers in the Russian intelligentsia, they were prompted by women themselves, who 
presented the chancellery with carefully crafted narratives in pursuit of separation. In 
this way, women’s narratives both shaped and responded to the values of the 
Chancellery officials, constructing a particular and mutually understood vocabulary 
with which to communicate with state organs. The dynamism of this process provides 
us with another clear continuity between Imperial and Soviet processes of social and 
civic change, as well as a clear precedent of women living in ‘alternative’ family units 
outside traditional multi-generational, patriarchal families. 
Thus, marital separation became a possibility for women across the Russian Empire de 
facto, though not de jure, in order to accommodate these social changes and maintain 
the existing imperial system. Yet, the longevity of the social and legal acceptance of 
meaningful affective ties for a functional marriage must be accommodated in any thesis 
regarding the familial and marital ties of societies with significant rural populations - 
which Russia certainly possessed.5 Z.Z. Mukhina’s study of the Russian widow in the 
countryside from the late nineteenth century, has demonstrated that widows remained 
central characters within their communities following the deaths of their husbands, and 
that frequently, those who did not remarry, or whose new partners were sent out of the 
village to work, were responsible for their farming almost in its entirety.6 From 
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Mukhina’s conclusions it is evident that – at the very least – Russian women remained 
active participants in their community regardless of their marital circumstances, and 
often cultivated atypical domestic circumstances.  
Moreover, letters from long-married peasant women themselves suggest a sense of 
pride in the longevity of their relationships. The issue of the necessity of affective ties 
between partners is intensified by changes in self-definition that women underwent 
upon their mass migration to urban centres. As Engel has demonstrated, the general 
increase in recognition of selfhood within the Russian Empire, and subsequently of the 
right to self-determination, meant that married couples of any background might find 
themselves incompatible after several years of marriage.7 Imperial Chancellery records 
of marital separation requests show an overwhelmingly peasant clientele, many or most 
of whom had returned at their husband’s request from a period of labour in major cities, 
to find that they ‘had changed so much that they could no longer return to [their] former 
life’, thus laying roots with distant relatives, colleagues, friends, or lovers upon the 
breakdown of a marriage.8  
Though access to wealth and education determined the resources and responses 
available to women seeking escape from unhappy home lives, as well as their ability to 
articulate their wishes, the growth of a ‘cult of domesticity’ mirroring that of the West 
undoubtedly altered the outlooks of women across the social spectrum. The domesticity 
prescribed to ‘wives’ in the early twentieth century ‘raised expectations of marital 
felicity’, and in the popular arts, romantic love and personal choice in intimate life 
became more visible than they had been before. 9 Therefore, though it would be a far 
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stretch to assume that marriages in rural and urban areas were exclusively love 
marriages by 1917, we can reasonably assume, based on a variety of studies and 
sources, that women did possess certain expectations about the affective contents of 
their marriages, and strong peer relationships within their communities. 
The coincidence of two critical processes of social change prior to the Revolution – of 
the increased significance of love relationships, and of the civic and political rights of 
men and women – therefore resulted in a shift in long-standing norms of gender-
relations, and in the relationship between personal and political. By the early twentieth 
century, women in the Russian Empire were in possession of a vocabulary by which 
they might voice their discontent, and an awareness of the possibility of marital 
separation. Bolshevik notions regarding the rights of women in state and society had, as 
was explored in the previous chapter, evolved in the context of these much larger-scale 
socio-political developments. In this sense, by 1917, despite the tumult of the war and 
revolutionary years, ordinary women were increasingly capable of negotiating their 
roles and social status, and identifying unsatisfactory circumstances in the ideological 
lingua franca required by their given environment. More crucially, they were 
increasingly willing to do so, where their wealth and personal circumstances allowed.  
As a result, when the 1918 Code legalised and secularised divorce, state registry offices 
were overwhelmed by applications for divorce – especially as literacy was no longer 
practically pre-requisite in order to petition the Chancellery for separation.10 The 1918 
Code was, in many ways, truly revolutionary, despite the lack of theoretical consensus 
on the direction of Soviet social policy hitherto, and had been designed to cause the 
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‘withering’ of the nuclear family, and essentially, ‘with its own obsolescence in mind’.11 
Following the abolition of religious marriage, in 1917, and the legalisation of women’s 
applications for divorce, the 1918 Code abolished the tutelage of the church and family 
over a women’s personal life, and of the church over divorce, legalised no-fault divorces, 
and reduced the obstacles to abortions.12 Soviet sociologist S. Ia. Vol’fson, almost 
directly quoting Engels’ famous remark, quipped in Sociology of Marriage and the Family 
(Sotsiologiia braka i sem’i), that ‘[the family] will be sent to a museum of antiquities so 
that it can rest next to the spinning wheel and the bronze axe, by the horsedrawn 
carriage, the steam engine, and the wired telephone.’13 The 1918 Code went much 
further than its precursors, for it entailed a total revolution in the personal lives of 
women, allowing her to construct a sense of ‘self’ and subsequently remedy their 
backwardness, participating in socialist construction as a Soviet Woman.  
However, in truth, the ameliorations intended by the Code came to fruition only 
partially, and met with mixed reception. Though women certainly embraced the 
opportunities made possible by the Revolution, for many women concern was raised 
over the social changes that resulted, and the impact of these changes upon their own 
relationships. In particular, the implications of the new ‘communist morality’, and the 
presumed promiscuity that decrees on divorce and alimony entailed prompted alarm 
amongst women who sought to protect their own versions of family life. Those 
behaviours that women viewed as breaching community standards, threatening the 
stability of their own family lives, were easily articulated through the prism of ‘anti-
Soviet behaviours’, and concerns about the ‘loss’ of potential of Soviet youth. Maria Sh.’s 
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comments in chapter two about her marriage to her abusive husband at just sixteen 
were compounded by claims elsewhere that girls are ‘throwing themselves away’ into 
extra-marital relationships at the age of just seventeen.14 These relationships were cast 
in stark contrast to those displaying long-standing honesty and fidelity, the implication 
that those qualities reflect both the nature of the relationship, and the ‘Soviet-ness’ of 
the citizen. Women throwing themselves frivolously into vice, entering into ‘dishonest’ 
adulterous relationships, were therefore stained with their ‘anti-Soviet’ behaviour, 
recalling arguments by Hearne and Waters about the dichotomy in the early Soviet state 
between ‘redeemable’ and ‘irredeemable’ sexual behaviour.15 What underlay many of 
the accusations made by women were concerns about rivals ‘relying’ on alimony, and 
about the effects of prostitution, adultery, and abuse of position. They were expressed in 
terms of the need to collectively defend Soviet values against dangerous women, who 
were prone to subterfuge, dishonesty and selfishness. Highly personal feelings of 
jealousy, frustration, and sorrow were therefore framed most frequently in terms of 
concern for the future Soviet society. 
Women utilised this concept of ‘the future Soviet society’ to legitimise otherwise 
‘dangerous’ ideas about private relationships with children or family members. 
Arguably, the social significance of mother-child relationship and the paternalistic 
narrative adopted by the Soviet state allowed women to defend their personal bonds 
between mother and child throughout the fluctuations of the ideal of child-rearing 
throughout the period in question, forging equally legitimate ‘alternative families’ 
throughout the 1920s into the period of ‘consolidated Stalinism’. The variety of 
                                                          
14 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 160-166; GARF, f. 7279, op. 6, d. 8, l. 25. 
15 S. Hearne, ‘the “Black Spot” on the Crimea: Venereal Diseases in the Black Sea Fleet in the 1920s’, Social 
History, 42:2, (May, 2017), pp. 181-204, and E. Waters, ‘Victim or Villain? Prostitution in post-
Revolutionary Russia’, in L. Edmondson (ed.), Women and Society in Russia and the Soviet Union, 
(Cambridge, 2009), pp. 160-167. 
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strategies identified in letters from working mothers to the state indicated that 
women’s carefully crafted narratives remained, as they had in pre-Revolutionary 
separation petitions, one step ahead of legislative attempts at total control, appearing in 
ideologically appropriate wording from the early 1920s at least. 
Striking throughout women’s discussions of the circumstances of their relationships is 
the clear flexibility of social institutions in the Soviet Union – particularly that of the 
family. The idea of the family as a flexible unit with a matrilineal backbone – throughout 
generations in both rural and urban areas – theoretically lent motherhood and a ‘stable’ 
family life, a particular status. Unable to cause its ‘withering away’, the state capitalised 
upon it as a source of low cost social labour. Women, for their part, managed their 
expectations of their relationships according to the principles of the era, embracing 
fluctuations in the precise form of family life, but maintaining a core belief in their 
kinship ties throughout the period, across generations. A key component of this 
flexibility in family life appears to have been the long-standing dynamism between the 
expectations women had of their relationships, and its accommodation by state 
institutions. Prior to the Revolution, women were able to craft narratives of their 
relationships in relation to public life; those with the necessary resources were able to 
use these to negotiate a better life for themselves – often, in cases of marital separation, 
at the expense of ‘traditional’ family life.16 These practices were maintained throughout 
the period of the study in question, resulting in a remarkable diversity of family and 
kinship circumstances, and marking the resilience of family life under Stalinism, and 
allowing women to accept mutations in the ideological form of their families. Yet, 
constant throughout the corpus of letters, again reminiscent of the divorce petitions and 
                                                          
16 Engel, Breaking The Ties That Bound. 
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factory strikes of old, is the expectation of real ‘comradeship’, and companionate 
relationships with male peers. 
The varieties of loves, marriages and family roles present amongst interwar Soviet 
women were matched by the variety of theoretical outlooks of Bolsheviks themselves. 
In the public sphere, at least, though evidently a premium was placed by women on 
companionate marriage, there was little moral condemnation surrounding divorce. 
Rather, it was notions of disparity and unfairness, or dishonesty, which could ‘condemn’ 
a former spouse under the terms of the collective morality that had evolved by 1936. 
Similarly, accusations of adultery frequently employed vocabularies of inequality, the 
abuse of rights (to labour, etc), or anti-Soviet social elements. Complaints about 
prostitution in the village, of fathers absconding with secretaries, and husbands with 
managers, offer insight into the particular language used. Often, women evoked the 
language of ‘abuse’ with relation to their rights within their communities, or fidelity to 
the socialist goal, possibly to articulate feelings of jealousy or betrayal, avoiding 
individualism in this way. 
Most letters on the subject of social circumstances related, if not to workplace or party 
issues, to family matters or close relationships, rather than friendships or non-specific 
social matters. This was most likely due to a widespread desire not to be seen as 
prioritising individual relationships, away from party activities or the institutions of 
marriage. Close and affectionate relationships between peers were portrayed, at least 
when considered in relation to official discourse, as a form of alternative ‘family’ bond, 
and it would appear that women had little problem, through the upheavals of the 
Revolution and post-Revolutionary period, reconstructing their family units as 
circumstance dictated, articulating their alternative families through the prism of the 
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Soviet ‘big’ family. Though the discursive power of the revolutionary new families of the 
commune; of the community family managed by socialised domestic labour; and free 
love relationships within society’s family had waned by the 1930s, their heritage was 
long established in the social imagination of Soviet women, dating back well before the 
Revolution. That women should envisage their own lives as located in a public and 
political sphere was emblematic of a long held social understanding of the meaning of a 
‘private life’, and this informed both the idiosyncrasies of Bolshevik visions for social life 
and the ability women possessed to negotiate their rights and feelings within their 
personal relationships with public bodies.  
In essence the tripartite relationship between rights, emotional responses and 
interpersonal relationships is essential to a proper understanding of the comprehension 
of the New Soviet Woman. Women from across the Soviet social spectrum selected and 
articulated particular elements of their diverse lives to express a multiplicity of 
relationships to the Soviet project. The common features of these strategies highlight 
the agency and perspicacity with which women from all backgrounds navigated their 
worlds in the interwar Soviet Union. E. Okvortsova’s suggestion in response to the 1936 
decree inadvertently presents an astute appraisal of the nature and resilience of family 
life after 1917: suggesting that ‘we need to approach each family individually […] For 
each family a special approach is needed, and is right’.17  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 GARF, f. 9492, op .1, d. 1476, l. 127. 
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Bolshevism and the Family 
 
The 1926 Code on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship might be seen as a first 
attempt to retreat on the permissiveness afforded to social relations, which had initially 
been encouraged following the Revolution, and its language was seeped in that of the 
protection of gender equality, and the financial protection of women and children.18 
However, the claim that the 1926 Code represented a ‘retreat from free love’ as many 
have argued, should not be dismissed outright: many amongst the Bolshevik ranks were 
profoundly uncomfortable with the type of permissiveness they felt was a potential 
consequence of the rapid liberalisation of divorce. Where Aleksandra Kollontai stated 
that ‘the sexual act should be recognised as neither shameful or sinful, but natural and 
legal, as much a manifestation of a healthy organism as the quenching of hunger or 
thirst’, Lenin wrote: ‘to be sure, thirst has to be quenched. But would a normal person 
lie down in the gutter and drink from a puddle?’19 In this (albeit indirect) exchange, it is 
clearly evident that little consensus was attained between Bolsheviks regarding what 
the precise nature of Soviet relationships should be. 
In this context, the growing numbers of vocal and politically literate citizens who were 
able to communicate their policy suggestions to the state provided a sense of political 
legitimacy to those vying for control of the future of Soviet society. Beatrice Farnsworth 
has explored the ways in which rural women responded to the expansion of divorce in 
the 1920s, suggesting that though women experienced a ‘heightened sense of self’ as a 
result of their improved literacy (both practical and political), their self-images changed 
                                                          
18 J. Quigley, ‘The 1926 Soviet Family, pp. 166-174. 
19 A. Kollontai, ‘Tesizy o Kommunisticheskoi Morali v Oblasti Brachnykh Otnoshenii’, Kommunistka, 12-12 
(1921), p. 31, quoted in Goldman, Women the State and Revolution, p. 11, both cited in W.Z. Goldman, 
Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936, (Cambridge, 1993), p. 7; 
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quite slowly in ‘a revolutionary process in the long run’. Though women often clung to 
traditional values in their marital disputes, evident nonetheless is a type of social 
reorientation amongst women: they increasingly used the voices made accessible to 
them by the Soviet state, in ways which, as we have seen, these voices were not 
necessarily intended to be used.20 In doing so, however, citizen complaints and 
suggestions about social policy as the 1920s progressed provided a rationale for a shift 
away from the politics of ‘free love’.  
More practically, neither marital relationships nor the nuclear family had withered 
away by 1930. Instead, problems of child abandonment, destitution, female 
unemployment and subsequently prostitution proliferated. Goldman has identified the 
problem of bezprizornost’ as the trigger for the resurrection of the family that was to 
follow: the traditional family unit would be able to ‘feed, clothe, and socialise a child at 
almost no cost to the state’.21 Alongside the apparent inability of Bolshevik policies to 
cause the withering of the family and ‘fetters of man and wife’, the very idea of the 
family proved a crucial metaphor with which to negotiate loyalty between state and 
citizens – the ‘big’ and ‘small’ family. That Stalin, who would become the figurehead of 
the Party, was cast as the ‘father’ to the Soviet peoples, afforded some new lease of life 
to the traditional (and ultimately patriarchal, in principle if not in absolute terms) 
nuclear family, lending the appearance to the population of a return to normalcy.22  
                                                          
20B. Farnsworth, ‘Rural Women and the Law: Divorce and Property Rights in the 1920s’, pp. 168-181; B. 
Engel, Breaking the Ties that Bound explores the way in which uses of the word ‘despot’ multiplied in 
separation and divorce applications in the early Twentieth Century, implying that women increasingly 
sought to defend a sense of inviolable selfhood as she won access to her own rights in practice and 
principle. 
21 W.Z. Goldman, Women, the state and revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936, p. 100. 
22 C. Hooper, ‘Terror of Intimacy: Family Politics in the 1930s Soviet Union’, in C. Kaier, E. Naiman (eds), 
Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia, (Indiana, 2006), p. 62. 
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Cynthia Hooper’s study of family politics during Stalin’s 1930s suggests that, as far as 
the nuclear family provided a useful metaphor for the relationship between state and 
society, in addition to much cheaper childcare than their initial, socialised alternative, 
its continued existence was fraught with ‘danger’ for authorities. As competition with 
the bonds of kinship waned, officials began to fear that ‘small’ familial loyalties might 
surpass, and undermine, civic loyalty to the ‘great’ Soviet family.23 This ambivalence (as 
it might be considered at best) toward the ‘small’ nuclear family, and along with it, 
individual personal ties, inadvertently encouraged family members to strengthen their 
ties. Robert Thurston contends that the interviews of the Harvard Project report a 
strengthening in family ties, citing that families often closed rank in the face of arrest, 
and continued openly to discuss politics in the home.24 In fact, Soviet social policy 
continued to appear to ‘retreat’ on a number of key policies of the 1920s, accepting the 
risk of ‘small’ family loyalties. As examined in the previous chapter, 1936 saw the 
introduction of the ‘Decree on the Prohibition of Abortions’, and the 1936 Constitution 
between them reinforced the state’s commitment to gender equality, and 
simultaneously undermined access to divorce and reproductive choice, on the heels of 
the 1930 closure of the Zhenotdel. According to Wendy Goldman, ‘in the two decades 
between 1917 and 1936, the official Soviet view of the family [and by extension Soviet 
social life more generally] underwent a complete reversal’.25 Acknowledging that this 
ideological shift occurred in an uneven and contradictory manner, Goldman juxtaposes 
the 1930 closure of the Zhenotdel and the renewed focus upon women’s emancipation 
that accompanied the first Five Year Plan, to demonstrate a vague sense of pragmatism 
underlying the successive ‘retreats’ Soviet social policy made. Goldman’s thesis suggests 
                                                          
23 Hooper, ‘Terror of Intimacy’, pp. 61-91. 
24 R.W. Thurston, ‘The Soviet Family During the Great Terror, 1935-1941’, Soviet Studies, 43:3, (1991), p. 
563. 
25 Goldman, Women, Revolution and the State, p. 337. 
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that this u-turn in Soviet social policy was a result primarily of the social problems that 
persisted in Soviet society in the 1920s, and was, ultimately, prompted by the 
suggestions of women themselves, who were dissatisfied with the burdens the total 
overhaul of family life had created.26 The shift in social policy in the 1930s was seen to 
amount to a compromise of Soviet ideals in order to stabilise the regime, and the thesis 
has typically been interpreted as suggesting a return to pre-Revolutionary family values 
after 1934. This shift, most commonly known as the ‘Great Retreat’ has been hitherto 
shown to have been a process of negotiation between state and society, which did not 
entirely throw out the utopian principles of its origin.27  
Indeed, regarding marriage and romantic relationships, Fitzpatrick’s statistical analysis 
on the sexual mores of students provides further evidence for the experimentation and 
breadth of thinking about utopianism and equality within Soviet relationships, dating 
back into the 1920s. Fitzpatrick’s study examines the conflict between the idealisation 
of free love and sexual permissiveness, and recommendations of sexual restraint, 
monogamy and ‘the sublimation of sexual energies in work’.28 As ‘official’ opinions of 
the ideal Soviet or Bolshevik relationship appeared in every shade between these polar 
opposites, so too did the ideas of students about the model romantic or sexual 
relationship.29 Fitzpatrick concludes that, stronger than the ideological commitment[s] 
present in student views on relationships, was the consensus that some definitive 
norms of sexual behaviour be ‘firmly established’, reflecting the lack of consensus at any 
level of society, regarding the recipe for a happy Soviet relationship.30 Women sought to 
                                                          
26 Goldman, Women, Revolution and the State, pp. 340-341. 
27 N. Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia, (New York, 1946). 
28 S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Sex and Revolution: An examination of Literary and Statistical Data on the Mores of 
Soviet Students in the 1920s’, The Journal of Modern History, 50:2, (June, 1978), pp. 253-256. 
29 Fitzpatrick, ‘Sex and Revolution’, pp. 261- 276. 
30 Fitzpatrick, ‘Sex and Revolution’, p. 276. 
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defend whichever personal circumstances were most satisfactory, demonstrating the 
adaptability and multitude of preferred or adopted domestic contexts long 
demonstrated in petition with the state. 
Nor had the maternal relationship been officially ‘blueprinted’ in any meaningful way. 
Among Soviet theorists, though all vaguely agreed that the state should take over the 
practicalities of child-rearing – in public nurseries, schools and so on – the exact role of 
mother in a child’s life was never subject to consensus. Goikhbarg, for example, the 
author of the 1918 Family Code, believed that parents should abandon their ‘narrow 
and irrational love for their children’, considering individual parents as ‘ignorant’ and 
significantly less capable of raising a child well than the state.31 Others, such as the jurist 
Iakov Brandenburgskii, envisaged a gradual weakening of the family bond over time, as 
the institutions of state care grew more established and the family unit lost its social 
functions, withering away. Kollontai, on the other hand, saw the continuation of the 
maternal bond as inevitable, seeking instead to expand the role of the state in child 
rearing, to allow women to easily combine their roles as mothers and labourers without 
any detriment to their well-being or that of their children. She foresaw children as 
growing up within state care facilities, but with ‘on-demand’ access for mothers to their 
children. Zinaida Tettenborn envisaged a more involved role for biological parents, as 
part of an ‘upbringing committee’ for their children, who would be resident in public 
children’s homes.32 
Central to debates over the future of the bond between mother and child was the 
biological function of reproduction: a function that, as we have discussed, was 
                                                          
31 A.G. Goikhbarg, Brachnoe, semeinoe, i opekunskoe pravo Sovetskoi respubliki, (Moscow, 1920), p. 5; Ia. N. 
Brandenburgskii, Kurs semeino-brachnogo prava, (Moscow, 1928), p. 20, cited in Goldman, Women, 
Revolution, and the State, pp 8-11. 
32 Z. Tettenborn, ‘Roditel’skie Prava v Pervsom Koekse Zakonov RSFSR’, Proletariskaia revolutsiia i pravo, 
1, (1919), pp 26-27, cited in Goldman, Women, the State and Revolution, p. 9. 
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considered to ‘bind’ women to the past, through a cyclical and nonlinear ‘monumental 
time’, and creating not inconsiderable anxieties for male policy makers after the 
Revolution.33 In ‘Women on the Edge of Time’, Hannah Proctor has explored the ways in 
which during NEP motherhood was required to be re-construed as a revolutionary act 
against a backdrop of happy socialist children, revolutionary baby names, and secular 
relationships and sexual encounters.34 Sexual relationships, having been theoretically 
reduced to a chemical act following the October Revolution as part of a developing 
‘crudely material understanding of libidinal economy’, contained the potential to 
involuntarily entrust women with the future of the Soviet population.35 Policy-makers 
were therefore compelled to construct a ‘revolutionary’ identity for mothers, reshaping 
the relationship between mother and child, and (perhaps against the wishes of those 
who saw parental roles as a bourgeois relic) embedding the Soviet mother deeply in the 
fabric of Soviet society as early as 1921, and legitimising the emotional component of 
motherhood.36 It is in this sense that we might hypothesise that the 1936 ‘resurrection 
of the family’, rather than constituting a retreat from socialise child-rearing, signified a 
legal legitimisation, or protection, of the role of motherhood, which had been 
ideologically (and consequently emotionally) legitimate since the early years of the 
Revolution. 
Therefore, the sheer plurality of opinion on the future of the family and social relations 
amongst Soviet theorists, and as we have seen, amongst women in response to the 1936 
                                                          
33 J. Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’, Signs, 7:1, (Autumn, 1981), pp. 13-35. 
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231 
 
decree and Stalin Constitution, ultimately corroborates Lauren Kaminsky’s assertion 
discussed in the introduction, that the ‘Retreat’ displayed much stronger continuities 
with utopian Bolshevik thought than it did a synthesis of pre-Revolutionary and Soviet 
cultures. In other words: though the concept of the Great Retreat was ground breaking 
in its identification of the remnants of pre-Revolutionary culture within the Soviet 
project, it is more accurate to suggest that this is a result of the broader continuities in 
Bolshevik utopianism than a pragmatic synthesis of old and new.  
As such, it is possible to reconcile the fluctuating notions of ‘correct’ family life in the 
1920s and 1930s with the notions held by the population: the state was arguably able to 
find support for its changing family policy amongst the diverse and conflicting beliefs 
held by the citizens of the Soviet Union throughout the period, and so families and 
relationships of all types were made to adapt to shifting circumstances. It is possible to 
construct a picture of Soviet society in which the family unit was neither destroyed nor 
survived in its pre-Revolutionary form. Rather, it remains a key institution in women’s 
lives, but takes on a somewhat fluid nature. The character of family life both responded 
to changes in discourse and negotiated with them: the bonds between people could be 
broken; stretched across distances; and re-forged entirely, yet the meaning of these 
relationships remained variable and personal. 
As the Soviet state sought to re-forge the daily lives and relationships of its citizens, 
official discourse throughout the 1920s and 1930s focused its visions for the family 
firmly in the future. Yet, as women continued to shoulder the majority of domestic 
responsibility, the institution of the family remained a multi-generational matriarchal 
unit. Moreover, the roots of the transmutations in the relationships of citizens with the 
state and with each other were embedded firmly in the past: in forces of change 
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originating long before the turn of the century. The longevity of these processes 
ultimately determined the ways in which women adapted to their contemporary rights 
discourses and emotional norms, and the variety of ways that women rationalised 
themselves and their relationships in their letters to authorities. Nonetheless, the 
discursive focus on the socialist future demarcated the generational cohorts present 
after the Revolution: bound by common primary experiences and upheavals, successive 
generations of women grappled with concepts of the ‘new communist morality’ 
particular to their own coming of age, renegotiating the contemporary meaning of the 
traditional ‘matrilineal backbone’ of the family, and the self-identity of its constituents.37 
 
 
Truth and Fidelity in Companionate Marriage 
 
Women’s letters display a tendency to temper criticisms of early Soviet social policy 
with discursive nods towards ideological normativity, as we have seen, but that social 
values or moral ‘turns’ that women felt chimed with their beliefs of circumstances often 
elicited a particular emotional response – resulting in certain patterns in responses of 
certain issues – such as rights to education, literacy and the practicalities of family life, 
but produced a more unpredictable response  in terms of individual personal 
relationships. Women frequently sought certain standards of education and literacy that 
they saw as critical to their standard of living, and likewise, parity in terms of their 
material family circumstances, often seeking to justify their own autobiographies 
according to socialist values. However, when it came to the particular compositions of 
their families, and the nature of their relationships, the flexibility of the family unit and 
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its emotional bonds remained constant, and relatively ‘unjustified’ by the socialist 
project. Indeed, present in women’s accounts of their diverse family circumstances is a 
continuity in the principle emerging in women’s expectations, and in their exercise of 
agency in the late nineteenth century, that the marital bond should be characterised by 
partnership and a sense of genuine commitment. This quietly revolutionary idea is 
visible across a variety of interactions with the state, in which very different women, 
from very different backgrounds, share certain assumptions about the importance of 
companionate marriage. 
A long, confessional missive written by a young woman named Nastya conveyed such a 
tale of fidelity and betrayal within her village community. Nastya’s letter is emotive at 
times, though upon a closer reading, she divulged much about her understanding of the 
nature of the betrayal of a relationship, and conversely, about the digression her 
relationship had taken from the ‘norm’. Nastya’s letter arguably reflected broader 
assumptions about the formation of sexual and moral behaviours in the first decades of 
the Soviet Union, and their pre-Revolutionary heritage, but in particular, she indicated 
her assumption of norms of marital fidelity, by her description of the external attack 
made upon them by her husband’s other partner. Nastya’s choice to share this publicly 
with the editors of Pravda also indicates the role of collective moral and sexual 
standards of behaviour by 1936, assuming a generally sympathetic audience, and 
supposing that the attack on the foundations of her relationship are actually borne by 
many ‘suffering women’. She wrote: 
Dear Editor, 
I do not know who to contact, or who can help suffering women, but I decided to write to 
you of my ills, those which torment me and all women. I am a kolkhoznitsa, entangled by 
children, shortages, shortcomings etc […] It torments me, I thought [of it] day and night, how 
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and who could do this – to stop this dissipation, for which wretched wives and children 
suffer. And when I read the newspaper, I decided to ask you if it’s the right thing for children 
to suffer, and that wretched prostitute, from whom the wife suffers […] she should be 
obligated to pay alimony. 
I read the article on the prohibition of abortion, I am pleased with it, and grateful to the 
person who decreed this. It would be very good if they stopped prostitution, which is found 
in the Issinsky district without shame, without embarrassment, and without conscience. The 
husband goes from the wife to the prostitute, but you [the wife] cannot speak, it’s none of 
your business […] 
Here for example, I say to myself, ‘I am a woman with a sense of responsibility, I work on a 
collective farm, where with work, with the children, I have no time for myself, and I do not 
complain to my husband. Because he found another, the children do not bother him. It’s fun, 
and [for him] nothing more is needed. He worked as a bookkeeper and she was the manager. 
[…] After a year, a child was born to her and he was sentenced to pay alimony, as you 
know.38  
Primarily, it is jarringly obvious that Nastya’s unnamed rival was not, as she claims, a 
sex worker, rather, she was her husband’s manager in the book-keeping shop. This 
blurring of boundaries between recreational and paid sex recalls the near moral panic 
identified in Siobhan Hearne’s case study of Sevastopol, in which Hearne highlights the 
frequency of raids on the parties of young people undertaken by Soviet authorities as 
raids on ‘private brothels’, to tackle the ‘black spot’, or social stain, on the community.39 
Nastya’s bookkeeping rival was more than likely the ‘black spot’ in this paradigm, 
reflected in her bourgeois tastes for lace and cash, and dereliction of duty at work in 
favour of drinking and having sex. This description is also significant that she described 
the ‘other woman’ in this way, as a decidedly ‘politically alien’ element in society, while 
in the same breath reiterating her socially valuable labour as a collective farmer and 
mother. Though declining to provide the woman’s name in a way prevented any real 
upheaval or state intervention, the rival’s namelessness also reinforced her exclusion 
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from Soviet acceptability. In contrast, Nastya later described herself as a ‘woman with a 
sense of responsibility’, thus juxtaposing her own discipline and individual sacrifice 
with her rival’s frivolity (drinking behind the scenes at the book-keepers with a 
husband that was not ‘hers’).  
Now he says: ‘She used me, I was drunk, she seduced me and I was smitten, and was pulled 
in. You come to her and she meets you with affection, we are very cheerful, she is always 
clean, never busy but free, but when you don’t come to her – to meet and spend, and you are 
busy with the children, you are scolded, all you have is a disadvantage. I do not know what I 
did wrong, but she just pulled me in, I couldn’t resist.’  […] ‘Again, her work is easy, with a 
day’s workday, she teases me: ‘you’re in boots, and I’m dressing all in lace, and there’s 
always money’ […] I also work, and became in a position with a fifth [child], and he says 
‘have an abortion, we can’t afford to raise the fourth let alone the fifth, although I myself am 
not to blame, now that the court has ordered me to pay.’ And so I had to have an abortion, to 
lose myself through some kind of prostitute and an irresponsible husband. And so, I ask – 
can you stop such ill-repute?40 
The apparent sense of ‘betrayal’, then, is one felt simultaneously by Nastya and intended 
to be felt by the Soviet project. She is tormented, as she wrote, ‘like all women’ by 
predatory prostitutes – from whose involvement with her husband she was excluded. 
The shorthand description of these women portrays them almost as a subhuman 
category – certainly not those young women ‘driven’ to sex work by financial need. 
Her hard work and commitment to their family were undermined by the diversion of 
her husband’s wages to his illegitimate child. Yet although the issue of alimony is the 
rationale for her letter, this is scarcely related to the despair she described, detailing 
that she came close to ‘throwing it all away’, turning to crime, and leaving the children. 
The word count afforded to the affair and her husband’s inability to resist it express an 
anxiety as to its emotional significance in relation to her marriage. Nastya’s suggestion 
that she should be paid alimony by the bookkeeper bears little relation to the drain on 
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her household resources the present alimony settlement constitutes, rather, it appears 
to have acted as a ‘debt’ Nastya felt she was owed for the betrayal.  
We have in our village many such unlucky girls, who threw themselves away at 17, they go 
unafraid to promiscuity (они идут в распущенные не боятся), because of alimony, no one 
will marry them, because they have lost themselves, the guys lack honest, good girls and 
these wretched prostitute catches the man, saying: ‘Maybe I like him better, he will leave his 
wife and take me, and we will have children, and if he doesn’t take me – he will pay – all the 
same to me’ 
And so it goes: who leaves his wife, pays. We have a rare woman who lives quietly, not 
tormented by a wretched prostitute. They are not afraid of anything, they thrust themselves, 
they drink a glass like a man, and all that is needed is a second time to seduce him - a familiar 
road. 
Maybe I shouldn’t have written to you – but I wrote what I knew and which was painful in 
my heart, and I was afraid of my husband, that he would scold me for it.41 
Though from this statement we cannot assume the bookkeeper’s age in relation to 
Nastya or her husband, we do have a clear indication of the approximate ‘threshold’ for 
the emotional maturity and moral responsibility for the betrayal. By ‘throwing 
themselves away’ at seventeen, the girls assume responsibility for their sexual and 
moral behaviour at some point prior to this; they possessed a sense of agency enough to 
be able to ‘throw themselves away’, outside of marriage. I suggest that this passage and 
its conceptual distinction indicate that, though it was widely accepted in the Soviet 
Union that the lifespan of women’s sexual relationships may vary, due to the lack of 
emotional depth or honesty inferred by Nastya, in her view, a great deal of social stigma 
remained attached to infidelity – in particular, when women became involved with men 
who were already in relationships. Their ‘fate’ as either black spot or stray wolf was not 
set in stone at this moment. Rather, it was their choices – presumed or actual – that 
determined their ultimate ‘character’, and possibility for redemption.  
                                                          
41 GARF, f. 9424, op. 1, d. 1476, ll. 89-92. 
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In Nastya’s case, for example, she presumed that it was greed, rather than material need 
which drives young women to seek ‘unavailable’ men from whom to receive alimony, 
and this alone is what sets them apart as ‘prostitutes’. It was not the fault of her 
husband, nor the failings of marriage as a remnant of the bourgeois past that pose a 
threat to their relationship, indicating the relative failure of revolutionary ideas about 
free love. Her husband’s self-defence painted the mother of his illegitimate child in a 
similarly negative light to Nastya, framing her dissatisfaction at the competing demands 
on his time as little more than manipulation. Beyond this, we know little of the woman’s 
life. Nastya commented on her motivations, suggesting that it was essentially the allure 
of alimony alone that drove the bookkeeper to embark on an affair with her husband, 
rather than any depth of feeling comparable to that between Nastya and her husband.42 
Frequent references to ‘prostitution’, ‘seduction’ and the behaviour of young girls imply 
strongly a gendered notion of infidelity, or dishonesty within relationships in the village. 
By virtue of another common feature of women’s letters – the emphasis of a husband’s 
honesty – we can find evidence of the gendering of this particular moral code in the 
early Soviet years. Elena Zh., in a 1930 entreaty on behalf of her arrested husband, 
refers to the incident as a ‘fatal accident’.43 A ‘crystal clear Bolshevik’, her husband had 
signed a statement of opposition in 1923, as one of 46 signatories. Since this incident, he 
was indeed ‘one of those few who honestly moved away from the opposition […] 
honestly carrying out the tasks of the party and government, of Bolshevik vigilance in 
the disclosure of this or that enemy of the people’. Elena’s letter continued for six pages, 
detailing the injustice done to her husband by his arrest. Breslav was ‘not to blame for 
anything’; nor however, were the arresting authorities. Breslav was instead, ‘a victim of 
                                                          
42 GARF, f. 9424, op. 1, d. 1476, ll. 89-92. 
43 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 160-166. 
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a band of criminals – his so-called relatives’ who had turned out to be ‘fraudsters, 
rogues, speculators, maintaining communications with other crooks, bandits in the 
concentration camps’.44 Her defence was to be believed, Elena maintains, because she 
has ‘known this man for eighteen years; known every movement of his pure, beautiful 
soul’. Elena knew ‘how much and how deeply he suffered from the consciousness of his 
old mistake [in signing the letter of opposition], which now cannot be blamed on him, 
because he never hid it from the party and never lied about it’.45 At the heart of Elena’s 
impassioned defence is the portrayed depth of her relationship to her husband. Though 
the circumstances of her correspondence were quite dissimilar to the accusations 
Nastya mades against her love rival, underlying both letters is a constructed sense of the 
expectation of fidelity in their marital relationships, and their companionate foundation.  
Nastya, for her part, sought in a very public missive – to Krest’ianskaia gazeta no less – 
to preserve the integrity of her relationship, which was ‘truer’ than that between her 
husband and the bookkeeper, and ultimately the revocability of her husband’s 
reputation, by assigning the origin of the lapse in public morality to her husband’s 
girlfriend.46 On the other hand, in a personal letter directed at Molotov to restore her 
husband’s position after an arrest, Elena invoked the image of an honest, sincere and 
‘deep’ Bolshevik marriage to preserve her husband’s socialist reputation, and protect 
him from the consequences of the allegations made against him. Though serving clearly 
different purposes, the two letters imply a sense of the ‘honesty’ of their morally proper, 
Soviet relationships, both under assault from anti-Soviet influences, as a device to 
protect the individual morality of the letter writer in some way.  
                                                          
44 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 160-166. 
45 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 160-166. 
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This is further implied by the fact that Elena’s concern was not solely for the fate of her 
husband, but of her own immediate family in general; herself and her sister in particular. 
She reinforced the truth of her statement about the depth of her marital relationship by 
asserting that she was ‘not talking about all of this as a […] wife, or just a friend, but as 
an old Party member, with the full responsibility for every word of [her defence].’47 The 
Party should ‘believe the simple, sincere words of an old member of the party, unsullied 
in 21 years of Party work.’ Elena begged, though not through concern for herself, but 
‘for the cause of Stalin-Lenin, to help to save this man’.48 Later in the letter Elena 
reiterates that she and her sister, ‘who for many years has […] abandoned her personal 
life and devoted herself to work for the party’ were an ‘honest, pure family’.49 Elena’s 
blood ran cold at the thought they might ‘perish at the hands of their fellow comrades, 
devoted to the cause of Stalin-Lenin’ so that ‘scoundrels, blackmailers, and therefore the 
enemies of the socialist world, capable of all the abominations of the earth’ might make 
some money from the matter.50 Interestingly, Elena signed the letter under her 
patronymic, with her husband’s surname in brackets. In doing so Elena asserted her 
own sense of agency, quite apart from the patriarchal authority of her husband that 
would have been considered characteristic of the old regime, underlining the integrity 
of her statements. Moreover, her use of the patronymic indicates her openness about 
her personal background in correspondence with authorities. Her statements regarding 
her honesty were to be trusted by the reader(s), as she attempted to hide nothing about 
her family history. Instead she made clear her plural roles as sister, wife, Party worker, 
and daughter.  
                                                          
47 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 160-166. 
48 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, ll. 160-166. 
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The norms of Soviet marriage at this time, are clearly those of comradeship, honesty, 
respect and a deep, mutual ‘knowing’. In Elena’s case, this relationship was largely intact 
but for the physical risk posed to the relationship by Breslav’s arrest, demonstrating the 
positive moral standard by which marital relationships were measured. By contrast, the 
present state of Nastya’s marriage demonstrated the nature of the threat posed this 
moral standard by lapses in Soviet morality within the community. The dissimilarity of 
the specific circumstances of the two letters is in some ways unimportant. Both Nastya’s 
confessional plea, and Elena’s request for justice echoed a deeply held desire to 
demonstrate a marital relationship with solid and abiding foundations, which happened 
to be under threat from an external foe, be that an adulterous affair or treacherous ‘anti-
Soviet’ family members. Though the letters from Elena and Nastya are distinctive in the 
clarity of their implications, the implications themselves are far from ‘unique’. Another 
woman, who identified herself as O. Vazhanova wrote to Molotov in the same year, 1936, 
requesting intervention in the case of the wrongful arrest of her husband – an ‘honest 
and devoted man of the party’ – who had been accused of wrecking. Vazhanova 
explained that it would be ‘hardly possible to find another executive who so closely and 
inseparably linked his life with one single branch of industry.’ Vazhanov may have made 
mistakes – it would be impossible not to given the degree of involvement with his work 
– but any allegations of wrecking would be ‘monstrous’. Vazhanova stated the source 
and nature of her knowledge of the issue: ‘I am his wife, I know every day of his hard 
working life, and I affirm that he gave the whole force of his intellect, will, and energy to 
the party and to the building of socialism, without reservation.’ The veracity of 
Vazhanova’s account of her husband’s honesty and fidelity to the party can be ‘proven’ 
by the fact that ‘the party knows Vazhanov’ […] her faithful son.’51 Evidently, though her 
                                                          
51 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, l. 58. 
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marriage was indisputably far from ideal at the time of writing, by virtue of Vazhanov’s 
arrest and their separation in circumstances. However, Vazhanova nonetheless 
continued to consider the marriage an enduring tie, discursively comparable to the 
paternal relationship between party and ‘son’. Though Vazhanova sought to ‘justify’ her 
husband’s life and work by their contribution to the socialist project, their marriage 
itself required little justification. She indirectly compared their bond with that between 
party and party member (an esteemed connection, no doubt), but little light was shed 
upon their marriage itself, beyond the fact that she has borne witness to his ideological 
‘correctness’.  
The depth and the veracity of a woman’s knowledge of her partner as a norm and a 
socialist virtue was reflected time and time again in letters requesting intervention in an 
arrest. L. Fotieva mitigated the lack of a legal bond between herself and her husband 
early in her letter by emphasising the de facto bond between the two: ‘Although 
formally Lyubarskii is not my husband, in fact we are husband and wife since 1927’. The 
marriage itself, though not formally acknowledged, must serve as proof of Lyubarskii’s 
innocence. Lyubarskii, Fotieva contended:  
is impeccably honest and deeply devoted to the Soviet government and our party. And 
through nine years of living together and of intimate, companionate relations (tesnogo 
druzheskogo obshcheniia), could not have helped noticing any anti-Soviet sentiments, if they 
existed or he had them, and of course, could not not react to them as a committed party 
member [myself].52  
Fotieva went some degree further in her justification of the veracity of their marital 
relationship – likely to mitigate the lack of formal record of its existence. But her 
justification of the relationship itself, though unregistered, is not dissimilar in character 
either to Elena’s or Vazhanova’s claims simply of truth and honesty.  
                                                          
52 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, l. 45. 
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The style of Fotieva’s writing is of course, more descriptive than others (when 
compared to Vazhanova’s relatively sparse style of writing in particular). She used 
frequent metaphorical devices, and two adjectives or adverbs where possible. However, 
this appears to have been a personal characteristic of the author – though it is an 
effective tool in portraying the truth and honesty she intended. Lyubarskii, Fotieva 
claimed, ‘is a Soviet man (chelovek) to the marrow of his bones and […] his arrest is the 
product of a serious misunderstanding or a malicious slanderous conspiracy’ – this 
latter point is one of which she was ‘convinced’.53 Like Yeva Friedlander in our 
discussion of the expression of negative emotions, and akin to many other expressions 
of worry for the well-being of husbands, Fotieva ascribed the gravity of the 
consequences of Liubarskii’s arrest and potential conviction a medical character: ‘the 
closing of the case could lead to Liubarskii’s serious illness, as he suffers from an acute 
gastric illness and [an illness of] the nervous system, and needs constant medical 
help’.54 The physicality of the threat against Liubarskii’s well-being lends Fotieva’s 
suggestion that he is a Soviet person to the ‘marrow of his bones’ a tangible character, 
imbuing her metaphor with a physical reality, or truth. The description of Liubarskii’s 
symptoms also portrays the matter as ‘treatable’ – by closing the case, authorities could 
dispel his illness and restore in her husband his healthy Soviet nature. 
Constant throughout the letter, and throughout Elena’s, Vazhanova’s, and even Nastya’s 
letters, are reemphases of the veracity of the partner in question, and their relationship 
with them, as well as the dishonesty and untruth inherent to the forces that have caused 
                                                          
53 GARF, f. 5446, op. 82, d. 56, l. 45. 
54 Letter from Yeva Friedländer to Presidium of Supreme Soviet, 16 May 1938, GARF, f. 7523, op. 23, d. 
201, l. 49. Certified typewritten copy, in Stalinism as a Way of Life, L. Siegelbaum, A. Sokolov, (eds), p. 229; 
GARF, f. 5446 op. 82, d. 56, l.141-4, in which a woman describes her husband as on ‘the verge of a self-
destructive catastrophe’; GARF, f. 5446 op. 82, d. 56, ll. 153-6, in which a woman explains that her 
husband’s doctor found ‘his heart and nervous system’ to be ‘shaken’. 
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the difficulties the relationships face. Though truth and untruth were commonly 
juxtaposed in relation to the Soviet project in letters defending the durability of a 
marriage in the face of arrest or potential separation, these truths and betrayals related 
almost entirely to the present circumstances, rather than the value of the relationship 
itself. This feature of marriage, which emerged concurrently to, and was reinforced by, 
the Soviet reconstruction of the institution, was emphasised by the prioritisation of the 
marital bond over other familial relationships, often biological. Vazhanova and Fotieva 
both claimed the validity and veracity of their marital relationships over kin and family 
relationships. Another woman, clearly committed to her work in the Zhenotdel, asked 
Krupskaia for assistance in keeping hold of her delegate’s ticket in 1928 on similar 
terms. She pleaded on the grounds of her and her husband’s loyalty to the party despite 
her father’s continued activity as a priest: 
Comrade Krupskaia, clarify this question for me, it is very important to me to be given my 
delegate’s ticket when I feel no guilt for myself, I should not be responsible for my father, 
with whom I have no connection. My husband, a member of the CPSU since 1926, a member 
of the Komsomol since 1922, works in the justice system55 
That she had no control or influence over her father’s actions, the woman’s husband, a 
member of the CPSU, should in her view serve to facilitate her inclusion in the ‘big’ 
Soviet family. Instead she saw her choices as far more significant than her heritage, her 
partnership with her husband as the more significant social bond in this context. 
Thus the strategies with which we are familiar – of euphemism; medicalisation; 
contributions to the socialist project – were all present in these women’s letters. To 
mitigate their marital difficulties and defend the accused parties, the women apparently 
feel little reason to justify the existence relationship itself in terms of the socialist 
                                                          
55 GARF, f. 7279, op. 8, d. 15, l. 67. 
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project, leaving us with little idea of the normativity of the marriages or living 
arrangements when not under such duress. As such, evident throughout the letters is an 
underlying assumption that a marital relationship in its foundation did not require said 
socialist normativity. As we have hitherto understood, the composition of the family 
itself was frequently fluid, and the increased emphasis upon the emancipation of 
women after 1917 created a discursive expectation that – regardless of the reality of 
their lives – women, as equal citizens, would be equal partners in relationships based 
upon comradeship and honesty. Since the precise nature of a Soviet woman’s marriage 
therefore would be mutually agreed between partners, the ‘acceptable’ fulfilment of this 
expectation might therefore logically take a variety of forms. 
 
Alternative Families 
  
As explored previously, the social validity of ‘the mother’ in Soviet culture was 
resurrected as the 1920s drew to a close, and the 1930s progressed. Though the 
straightforward essentialism in Stalin’s statement that ‘working class and peasant 
women are mothers; they are rearing our youth – the future of our country’ is of course 
problematic, it arguably presented to many women a recognition of the relationship 
between mother and child.56 Mothers, daughters, and grandmothers, through their 
connection to the ‘domestic sphere’ that had emerged by the end of the nineteenth 
century, and of course through their connection to the ‘past’, had found their roles in 
Soviet domestic life policed almost obsessively. Hygiene and sexual health campaigns 
attacked ‘folk healers’ as the ‘grandmothers’ of the village, and literacy campaigns 
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almost lampooned the backwardness of illiterate mothers and grandmothers. Frances 
Bernstein has shown, too, how the first years of motherhood were prescribed in minute 
detail, with literature and posters frequently decrying the nursing and parenting 
practices that had been part and parcel of community life in town and country for 
generations.57 By the end of the 1920s, however, maternal figures were sought for the 
Union’s millions of ‘urchins’ and orphans, and by 1936 as exemplified by the Decree, the 
socialist mother was officially added to the Soviet Union’s discursive ‘pantheon of 
heroes’. These apparently minor discursive shifts in Soviet ideology were something to 
which many women were finely attuned, whether they had children or not. Thus, it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that, in addition to the maternal role being employed to 
legitimise particular emotional expressions, and often to lobby for rights, its part in 
discussions of familial relationships would also be significant. 
In a 1929 letter requesting assistance addressed to Kalinin, Chairman of the Central 
Executive Committee, one woman, after describing her husband’s illness and her 
unhappiness at having had to leave Central Asia to work and support him, stated 
affectionately, yet plainly that “[my children are] such marvellous little fellows and are 
so fond of me and if I die – it will be hard for them to be without a mother.”58 Mothers 
clearly and consistently restated the value of motherhood and the relationship between 
mother and child both to the mother, the child, and to the state, emphasising the 
centrality of their own motherhood to the wellbeing of the people. By 1936, women 
increasingly defended the value of their own maternal relationships to the ‘big’ family of 
the Soviet state, however, while prior to the family’s official reinstatement, women who 
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were mothers sought to defend the value of their maternal role within the ‘big’ family of 
the state.  
However, though reference to individual relationships are common with reference to 
children, there appears to have been a reluctance from most women – other than 
groups of women who wrote letters on political matters – to discuss individual 
relationships not sanctioned by politically celebrated roles. This reluctance perhaps 
reinforces our conclusions about the changing relationship between the ‘small’ and ‘big’ 
socialist family. That the ‘private’ relationship between mother and child (or, future 
Soviet Person), eventually found itself supported by the institutions of state reflects the 
desire by the institutions of state to absorb and police its free alternative to the 
socialised family life for which they had hoped. Individual peer or romantic 
relationships between adults served no such purpose for the state, serving instead as a 
source of anxiety in particular for those officials charged with policing the public mood. 
Therefore, that maternal roles within the paternal state might constitute a useful tool to 
frame discussions of such relationships should come as no surprise. 
Following the ratification of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR and the period of terror 
that was to follow, proposals for amendments to legislation, constructive or otherwise 
were considerably fewer. Nonetheless, women and girls continued to write to 
authorities about their lives, requesting assistance, intervention, or correspondence, 
and within these communications still contain a wealth of evidence as to their authors’ 
understandings of their role and relationship with their social and political environment. 
Writing to Krupskaia in 1939, a young girl, Olga T., who had recently taken over her late 
mother’s role as ‘homemaker’, requested the assistance that had been awarded to her 
mother as a ‘mother of many children’. She was responsible for five other children and 
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her ailing father, and could not manage on the family’s current income, which had been 
sharply decreased following her mother’s death. The author suggested that it would be 
fair for her to receive her mother’s maternity benefits, since she had taken over her role, 
despite still being in school, and reminded Krupskaia of her proper relationship stating 
that ‘because I am not old, I am a young girl (molodaia dyevushka) I must spend time on 
fun, and culture. Without state assistance, the family will not survive. Our family is 
barely functioning.’59 This aspect of her letter is quite striking: amidst reference to the 
grief and material hardship her family experienced, the argument that she still sought to 
have the same ‘carefree’ existence as her peers indicates a deeply held sense that she 
should also be considered to be a child. Though she was compelled by circumstance to 
take over the matriarchal role in the family, she was keenly aware that her emotional 
maturity was still that of a child: she serves the state as a mother in her ‘small’ family, 
but is owed a duty of care within the ‘big’ family of the Soviet state. 
Olga’s reference to fun and culture possessed an alternative function in the girl’s letter. 
By suggesting that she did not have the time or money to spend on leisure activities, she 
reinforced through euphemism the sense of tedium and hardship she feels has taken 
over her familial relationships. Moreover, that as a young girl, she ‘must’ be able to 
spend time on fun and cultural activities, the author implied that this was her right as a 
Soviet child, daughter to a mother-of-many-children (and one who had assumed the 
maternal role prematurely). The statement suggests that early admission to the 
domestic drudgery so detested by Lenin risked a return to the pre-Revolutionary 
oppressions faced by young women, denying her the cultural (and ultimately political) 
education that would enable her to come of age as a useful Soviet woman, and her 
siblings to grow up to be strong and responsible Soviet citizens. Olga almost bargained 
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with Krupskaia, reiterating her emotional immaturity, stating ‘[a]nd I’m [just] a girl 
acting as the mother of a family, I can’t [do it] without government assistance… As a 
result of this, children can turn out bad.’ Her relationship to her family ought to have 
been that of a sibling, not only for the sake of her material well-being, but for the 
emotional and cultural well-beings of the members of the family unit more generally. 
Compelled to rely on a mother figure whose broad horizons ahead remained 
unexplored, who had little experience of childhood or culture may well, Olga reasoned, 
be catastrophic for the ‘big’ family - the imagined Soviet community - as a whole. These 
brief mentions of her ‘right’ to fun as a Soviet child contain within them a multitude of 
implications: about her emotional experiences; her changing relationship to her family; 
her sense of the balance of rights and obligations in relation to the state; and not least, 
her own sense of her generational cohort. 
The image of the family evidently continued to loom large in the decades after the 
Revolution, having been anchored to the authorities as a paternal unit, and this image 
pervaded everyday life, often accommodating alternative family structures within the 
security of the ‘big’ state family. According to T.P. Khlynina, the political vision for the 
new Soviet person was closely reflected by architectural forms and, more generally, by 
the ways of living promoted by policy and discourse. Kommunalki remained the norm 
but, amid financial restrictions upon early plans for large scale Constructivist 
construction and, subsequently, a diversion towards neoclassical design under Stalin, 
their blueprint for the transformation of Soviet social life evolved in a similar manner to 
their architectural blueprints.60 Despite grand visions for a reformulation of ‘the 
fundamentals of everyday life’, the establishment of life in urban communes did not 
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develop evenly or easily.61 Expanding upon conclusions about the relationship between 
architectural form and norms of Soviet society, Andy Willimott’s work on youth activist 
communes, explored the ways in which life in communal apartments acted as an 
alternative to the ‘old’ family. Willimott presents a letter from a young Komsomol 
member, Andrei – the founding member of the student commune in question - to an 
activist friend, Sergei, while both were at the parental home on their summer holiday: 
When I think that the petit-bourgeois family atmosphere with which I am now surrounded 
awaits me when I leave college in a year’s time, I get cold shivers down my back. And a deep 
sorrow seizes me. Is a return to the old family regime really the only way out? Brr, horrible 
[…] Sergei, my friend! What do you think of staying together after college too? Staying 
together even if one of us marries? […] Let us proclaim a storm! We will storm all right – if 
not heaven, anyhow the forms of life! And what is more important?’62 
Though as a young, male student and activist in the early twenties, the circumstances of 
Andrei’s revolutionary zeal for communal living were quite distinct from the women in 
this study, his suggestion that his commune should ‘proclaim a storm’ of the ‘forms of 
life’ in Soviet society by eschewing the traditional biological family is reflective of the 
space that had emerged in Soviet society. This is, he wryly suggests, more effective than 
storming the heavens, after all.  
Moreover, Willimott astutely suggests that, though amongst young people, the idea for 
the communal apartment was that it should constitute a new ‘family’ of activists, was 
inherently dependent on the principle of total equality its members – and not least in 
terms of their gender: ‘only then did they stand a chance of offering a genuine 
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alternative to the family’.63 Women, those without young families of their own in 
particular, appear to have embraced their shared living spaces, which had, prior to the 
Revolution, often been required through circumstance in urban areas. One such letter 
from a young woman, V. Tikhomirova, written in July 1936 contained a non-specific 
request for material aid to the apartment she shared with her friend Irina. Though the 
situation as Tikhomirova described it at present is far from ideal, one can quite 
reasonably assume a previous sense of ease with the living arrangements, as well as a 
degree of affection between the roommates.  
Nonetheless, material concerns had arisen for the pair. Though it is unclear as to 
whether there are others living with Irina and Tikhomirova, the latter appeared to feel 
their effects more acutely:  
Dear Viacheslav (Molotov), I’m afraid that my letter won’t find you in Moscow, but think, 
that somehow you will get it[...] Soon is the end of my stay at the school. On August 7 I will 
leave for Moscow. I sent Irina from here […] She went with great reluctance […] I did not 
want to let her go alone, but to go to Moscow, to our room – at the thought alone I was seized 
with panic. I literally suffer from panic in our apartment. There was some faint hope of 
changing the room for the better, when Irina got married, but Irina did not want to get 
married, and decided to dump her fiance. On the one hand, I’m really glad she said no, but 
financially things are really not good. Viacheslav, I again request of you help with the 
problem about the apartment. Please do it for us.64 
Tikhomirova’s letter was sufficiently vague as to leave the precise nature of the 
apartment’s financial struggle unknown. It remained unclear whether she wished Irina 
would marry to add to the ‘collective pot’, or to leave the apartment, and consequently, 
leave her with more space. One might assume that the reluctance of the author to join 
her roommate back in Moscow reflected a desire for more space, yet the lack of detail 
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afforded her disappointment at Irina’s refusal to marry, along with her comment that 
‘financially things are really not good’, left her complaint ambiguous enough to avoid 
any accusations of petit-bourgeois individualism. Instead, the reader is left with a sense 
that Irina’s impending marriage had been desirable due to the contribution of her 
betrothed to the household kitty. However, Tikhomirova clearly valued her relationship 
with Irina, expressing gladness on a purely emotional level that Irina was no longer 
trapped in an unwanted engagement. Additionally, her request that Molotov assist them 
with the problem about the apartment ‘for them’ implied, if only as a device to imbue 
her prose with a sense of pathos, a sense of solidarity with her roommate. The sincerity 
of Tikhomirova’s feeling for her roommate is indicated by her own reluctance to allow 
Irina to travel alone, the sense of pathos it instils being somewhat superfluous within 
the passage. It would have been more than conceivable to any reader that 
Tikhomirova’s sense of (familiarly female) comradeship with Irina was challenged by 
her desire for the success of their collective unit, rather than by a desire for Irina to 
move out of the space. 
That said, it was far from uncommon for those in collective living arrangements to tire 
of one another’s presence in a shared space. Klaus Mehnert in his account of Youth in 
Soviet Russia, describes a frequent sense of tetchiness amongst the subjects of his 
observation, stating that ‘the burden of the difficult times is responsible for nerviness 
and irritability.’ The triggers of this irritability were often amusing instances of petty or 
thoughtless behaviour – for example, ‘one amateur photographer developed his 
negatives at two o’clock in the morning, contrary to everyone’s wishes’.65 However, the 
practical effect of living in close quarters with peers outside the biological family was 
often tangible, and so we might see Tikhomirova’s frustrations as common, if not 
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representative, of the reality of living in shared apartments. Mehnert stated the causes 
of the departures of several commune members, occurring in reasonably quick 
succession. One girl left due to the commune’s effect on her health; another because of 
the behaviour of young men; another young girl married and went to her husband; and 
a young man was excluded for concealing part of his income.66A significant aspect of the 
series of departures is its gender ratio – it appears primarily to have been young women, 
who experienced the ill effects of communal living. This is largely corroborated by 
Willimott’s conclusions on the nature of the gender equality ‘necessary’ for the 
commune to constitute an alternative family: that the revolutionary new world had 
been ‘implicitly coded’ as masculine, as the pursuit of sexual equality generally took 
place on male terms.  
As we know, the assault on ‘old ways of living’ had in theory and policy been directed at 
women, and amongst young Soviet socialists too, these presumptions of the objectivity 
of the male sphere persisted.67 The masculine reality of the revolution of daily life was 
painfully apparent in Tikhomirova’s almost throwaway comment that ‘of course [she] is 
glad’ that Irina chose not to marry when she did not want to, and mirrored in resigned 
statements about the reality of married relationships and engagement with male or 
masculine authorities, for example, across the body of letters as a whole. Nonetheless, 
the ideological suitability of non-conventional living arrangements, and their co-
existence with the traditional family even after its rehabilitation, in some cases offered 
women with an alternative to their unhappy family lives. Critically, women ‘occupied’ 
these otherwise masculine spaces upon their own agency, as they had lobbied tsarist 
authorities for divorce in the decades prior to the Revolution, and as they had in the face 
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of extreme discrimination commanded their working environments upon entry to the 
workforce. 
One particularly striking example of the pragmatic utilisation of Soviet modes of daily 
life is found in a letter from a young Russian woman, in 1928, to Krupskaia, to appeal for 
material assistance. She began by briefly describing her background: ‘I will first 
describe to you my biography. I am a farm labourer. A dairy worker. A member of the 
union. I have no close relatives.’ The author’s ambiguous description of the status of 
‘close relatives’ nonetheless clearly avoided the suggestion that she was ‘alone’ – as a 
union member and farm labourer, she is surrounded by members of the Soviet family. 
Yet, the author found herself pregnant, and had wanted an abortion, though ‘[the father] 
did not listen’, and the doctors told her that, at six weeks pregnant it was ‘too late’ for an 
abortion. Throughout this narrative, the author of the letter implied a sense of her own 
agency, even where it has been denied. Ultimately, the author met an Uzbek woman, and 
they lived together, as she describes it, ‘like sisters’. The roommate had been married 
for eight years, but had no children. The author had her child, and was now living with 
her roommate ‘like two wives’.68 The persistent sense of the author’s own agency 
throughout the first part of the letter, in combination with her participation in collective 
labour, implies a sense that she was relatively ‘aloof’ from her peers in her locale: she 
described herself predominantly in the first person singular, an agent acting against a 
specific context. Yet, by contrast, her description of her living arrangements with the 
Uzbek woman she met, as ‘we’, strongly implies a sense of kinship and affection that 
was absent from the passages preceding. Though we cannot conclude for certain from 
the letter’s contents that this was a lesbian relationship, this seems likely, as the two 
lived first as sisters, then ‘as two wives’. In many ways, this aspect of their relationship 
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is unimportant: as friends, sisters, or lovers, the women have sought to take advantage 
of the expansion of the ‘norms’ of family life that occurred after the Revolution, to 
establish a living situation that suited them, even when that expansion of ‘norms of 
living’ had occurred on largely masculine terms. 
Ultimately, the images of shared rooms, communes and communal apartments that 
permeated Bolshevik discourse as an alternative to the traditional family and its 
domination of everyday life, remained in the public consciousness long after the nuclear 
family was formally reinstated. In conjunction with the transience lent to marriage by 
the formal acknowledgement of the trend towards love relationships, and the necessity 
of formal separation and divorce, this presented Soviet citizens with the possibility for 
an almost limitless array of alternative family arrangements, which often acknowledged 
and sanctioned the modes of living that had been present through necessity in the 
societies of the former Russian Empire. 
A series of correspondence by Marina Tsiurupa, on behalf of herself and her disabled 
stepmother Nina, about the abandonment and maltreatment by the girl’s father, 
illustrated the convergence of emotional discourses, social discourses and rights 
discourses in women’s letters in the early Soviet state.69 Writing to Molotov in 1936, 
Marina claimed that her father left his wife three months earlier, throwing her out of his 
home, sending his daughter with her, and claiming he could no longer live with her. He 
had given Marina an emergency contact number, though he refused to explain his 
departure, ‘saying only that he no longer agreed with our character’, though as it turned 
out, after a few days ‘it became clear that the issue was not in [our] character’.  He left 
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for his office in Tagil, taking with him his secretary, ‘with whom he had already lived for 
some time’.70  
Marina stated that throughout this time, her father’s wife was ‘very gravely ill’, and 
being unable to pay for her medicines (which she received only through the sanctions 
granted by Molotov or his office), saying that she should ‘get on her feet and work to pay 
for them’. Her father had sent a letter through a colleague stating that in light of his 
departure from the Academy of Science where he worked, he would be unable to give 
Nina any money, but would send Marina 250 rubles per month. He conceded that 
everyone may stay in the flat, and that Nina could sell the furniture until she was healed. 
When he eventually returned to work, he passed on the message that he was cancelling 
all of his obligations to them, and ‘started to chase them out of the flat’. He harassed 
them by telephone, and then sent a request to the passport office, disputing Nina 
Mikhailovna’s ‘right’ to the family name, though the day prior to his departure, she had 
received her new passport with the Tsiurupa family name. At this point, Nina was 
completely disabled, but Tsiurup would not give her the cards for the Kremlin hospital. 
Marina stated that her father was, in effect, ‘depriving [Nina] of the opportunity to heal, 
and of the doctors, who already studied her illness and could have helped her’. In 
addition to this, her father had ultimately sued them for the flat and all of their 
possessions, with the court date having been set at for the twenty-eighth of that month.  
Marina stated that ‘every day for the past three months, [they] had waited for more 
unpleasantness – can you imagine the impact of his attacks upon a sick person?’ Maria 
lamented that she had worked very hard at university for three years, having been 
accepted to attend an ‘Aero Club summer school’, arguing that under these conditions it 
was very hard to maintain her hitherto excellent grades. Apologising for the 
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inconvenience, Marina pleaded that the pair were ‘absolutely alone, and no longer had 
the strength to resist him’. When Marina went to her father’s direct superior for his 
protection, he told her that it was not of his concern, and that they should seek Soviet 
power.  
Her father duly and perfunctorily replied, having learned of these allegations, and 
rebutted his daughter and ex-wife’s claims, arguing that his role was ‘not so low as his 
ex-wife had claimed’, and that though he could do more for the Union, he had since the 
start of the Revolution been part of the struggle against sabotage, requesting Molotov’s 
protection and help.71 The correspondence illuminates the intersection between rights, 
relationships, and affective responses between family members, communities and 
former partners. Marina was evidently an accomplished young woman, having 
completed three years of university, and so was, generally speaking, an ‘adult child’. 
Nonetheless, her father had sought to renounce any remaining relationship with her – 
either due to his own agenda, or her allegiance to her ailing stepmother. Marina 
demonstrates a clearly very close bond with Nina, referring disconsolately to the pair of 
them as being ‘alone’ (odni), having described through the pages of her letter her 
actions on behalf of herself and her disabled stepmother, choosing to remain with Nina, 
rather than staying at the university, as her father suggested. Underlying this sense of 
solidarity is clearly a shared sense of despondence, as Nina described them as 
‘powerless’ in the face of his assaults. Throughout the letter, too, she referred 
consistently to the pair as ‘we’, rarely slipping into the singular when the option to use 
the plural is available. Only in her final line did she request assistance finding access to 
further education, for herself, and healthcare, and then work, for Nina. 
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Regarding her absconding father, George, Marina made an effort to underline the 
impropriety of his professional conduct. Though she declined to list any further his 
actions against the pair, Marina made sure to include the detail of his affair with his 
secretary at the Academy of Sciences, as well as his harassment via state organs. The 
contrast of her father’s activities with her own quest for technical education, and her 
completely disabled step-mother’s desire for work served to emphasise their potential 
to fulfil their obligations as Soviet citizens, and receive rights to state assistance, under 
George’s persecution. Ultimately, the Tsiurupa saga demonstrated the kinship and 
community priorities in the Soviet 1930s: the bonds of kinship had, clearly, under the 
pressure of Soviet law, been strengthened in the case of Marina and Nina, albeit in the 
face of disrespect and maltreatment by a family member that relationship had 
deteriorated. The extent to which Nina fulfilled a maternal role to Marina is unclear: she 
had only recently assumed the family name, yet the relationship may have been long-
term prior to this.  Either way – the bond between the women, consolidated largely 
through hardship, provides ample evidence of the ways in which women were able to 
take advantages of the fluidity of family life and form new family bonds, even where 
their attempts to take advantage of post-revolutionary legal changes met difficulties, 
having been designed for women living in a world that maintained a masculine 
presumed subject. Yet again, it is evident that the huge plurality of opinion and lived 
experience amongst women in the Soviet Union was astutely reformulated in ways that 
made their entreaties acceptable to Bolshevik ears.  
In some cases – perhaps as a response to the belittlement of older women as remnants 
of the old regime, or due to administrative necessity, women seek to occupy a maternal 
role in the lives of the wards, rather than identify themselves by their actual 
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relationship to younger family members. One elderly woman named Elizaveta Pletkina 
wrote to Molotov in February 1936, requesting material assistance: ‘Dear Viacheslav 
Mikhailovich! Excuse me for bothering you, but I address you by force of necessity. I live 
now with my adoptive daughter in old age, it is very bad, I cannot work myself due to 
old age and ill health, and my daughter is being thrown out from grade six – she will be 
unable to settle down. I appeal to you for help, even if she should work to help me’.72 It 
became apparent part way through Pletkina’s missive that her adoptive daughter was, 
in fact, her granddaughter, borne of her daughter whose fate was unclear from the letter. 
Though the legal status of the adoption was vague, the choice in Pletkina’s letter to refer 
to the child as her daughter served a variety of functions. By stating clearly that the girl 
was her adoptive daughter, Pletkina portrayed a sense of the sacrifice she had made for 
the proper upbringing of the young girl – a representative of the new Soviet generation, 
and the new Soviet society. This served to legitimise her entitlement to material 
assistance as an older woman. Though the fulfilment of the parental role would have 
been implied had Pletkina described the girl as her granddaughter, her description as 
daughter consolidated Pletkina’s social ‘relevance’ as engaging in labour that was, at the 
time of writing in 1936, socially ‘useful’, despite her inability to partake in paid 
employment herself.  
Moreover, Pletkina (somewhat dubiously) suggested that Molotov stayed with her 
midway through his journey to Kazan while her son was alive, in 1933: ‘I did not know 
that you are a head of state. And then I recognized you from the photo in the newspaper 
Izvestiia and found out who you were, and was advised to write you a letter, to get help 
to an old woman and her daughter’. Describing her adoptive daughter in this way in this 
passage – as the daughter of an old woman – Pletkina established a sense of longevity in 
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her role and contributions to the socialist state and its upcoming generations. 
Ultimately, Pletkina’s letter demonstrates the way in which families responded to 
circumstance – often at the agency of a maternal figurehead, particularly following the 
death or departure of male relatives – to form ‘new’ family units – much like Olga T’s 
premature assumption of the maternal role, earlier in our discussions. In 
correspondence with authorities, these ‘new’ family units often took on some of the 
most politically significant characteristics of a nuclear family – such as a mother figure – 
in order to demonstrate their required security within the regime.  
Likewise, another woman wrote a similar request for material aid to Krupskaia in 1930, 
although this time she did not claim to have met the minister herself. Her style of 
writing reflects its execution prior to the formal rehabilitation of the family, along with 
contemporary concerns about the neglect and destitution of children. She stated: ‘I live 
alone in the mountains of Krasnoiarsk […] my husband has already been dead a long 
time, and I live with my daughter in very bad conditions, many of my other children 
died, and so I live with my one daughter very badly’73 Clearly, the author was not living 
alone – she was living with her daughter. Yet, in the absence of her partner, and without 
the assistance of the state as a substitute, she considered herself to be very much ‘alone’. 
She went on to explain that she has two remaining children, living ‘as orphans’ in a local 
orphanage, due to her dire financial circumstances – rather than simply stating that two 
of her children lived in an orphanage. The repetition of the word ‘orphan’ in this sense 
suggests that her children were out of place in that context – living ‘as orphans’ even 
though they have a mother. The juxtaposition of ‘orphan’ and ‘orphanage’ emphasised 
the political anxiety about orphans and destitute children that was present at the time, 
providing a clear rationale for material assistance to their mother, so that they might be 
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returned to her as she desired.74 Yet, though women made clear reference to politically 
lauded elements of everyday life – truth in marriage and party membership, and strong 
maternal guidance to name but two – these discursive features did not serve to justify 
the structure of the social or family lives of citizens, but as a point of reference. As 
women’s writings about their rights as mothers and wives in varying circumstances 
reflected the resilience of the concept of the family in the previous chapter so too do the 
matter of fact acceptance by women of their family lives that do not fit the tropes 
identified in Soviet discourse.  
The persistence of ‘adoptive’ or ‘alternative’ families pervades the ways in which 
women discuss their social roles further, and continue to form a point of reference 
around which authorities should understand their circumstances as individuals. In a 
request for pedagogical research into homeless children – and a role in its undertaking, 
one woman petitioned Krupskaia again in 1930, for assistance working on the 
rehabilitation of orphans and ‘street children’:  
Dear Comrade and friend Nadezhda Konstantinovna, I’m sure that no one will understand as 
you do […] For me, the time is already passed when the heart responds differently to the 
grief of the child – the so called ‘alien’ child. For me there are no longer other people’s 
children. Therefore, the comfort that I met in the Children’s City Park of Culture and 
Relaxation pleased me greatly, as a huge achievement. Children there are gifted with 
something that in the pre-Revolutionary period, the most wealthy family could not deliver.75  
The author failed to expand upon why Krupskaia would understand more than other 
Soviet officials, though as her narrative continues, one can infer that this is due not only 
to her experience as Deputy Minister for Education, but as an older woman without 
children ‘of her own’, reflecting an assumption that the Soviet state constituted both a 
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‘big’ substitute family for its citizens and, consequently, an embodiment of the 
possibilities for ‘alternative’ family or social relationships.  
Indeed, letters frequently referred to Krupskaia, alongside her late husband, as the 
mother and father, or grandmother and grandfather of the Soviet Union.76 The author 
appeared to credit Krupskaia with the success of the project for specialist children’s 
facilities (in part, no doubt, since so few of the engineers of these projects remained in 
prominent positions by 1930). Though the author’s reference to there no longer being 
‘other people’s children’ for her obliquely indicates in its temporal construction that, 
when she was able to bear her own there may have been such a time, the explicit 
purpose of this phrase in the letter served to relate the ‘mission’ she will go on to 
describe to the ‘bigger’ Soviet family. She moved to this mission quite swiftly: 
But at the same time there are running round dirty, ragged street children on the streets, and 
when I talk to them […] it surprises them, as well as random passers-by. […] The attitude I 
encountered on the part of the administration, and the attentive views thrown to us by the 
visitors there showed me that here the ‘homeless’ is not considered the same child as all 
children in general. They are afraid, neglected, and they are still a ‘pariah’ that does not feel 
like a ‘person’ (chelovek).77  
The author suggested that much of the ‘problem’ with homeless children was related to 
their sense of existence outside the Soviet family: that without the rights and obligations 
of Soviet children to a happy childhood and to learn and be educated, they existed as 
‘pariahs’, feared by and in fear of members of the Soviet society they encounter. They 
did not, she contended feel like ‘people’, without access to the privileges of Soviet life. 
The author suggested then that, due to her skills in the matter it was her obligation to 
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act as a surrogate mother to the children, to rehabilitate them and raise them as Soviet 
citizens: 
I feel within myself the strength and ability to do this work, I am the supreme leader in this 
field […] I have some kind of ability, thanks to which, the homeless, reaching me, soon feel ‘at 
home’. They do not want to run away and steal, they are ready to live, even poorly, enjoying 
themselves and working, just to be with ‘grandmother’, as they call me. This nickname, given 
to me by them, characterizes our relationship as far as possible78 
Unlike many other letters from women on the subjects of children and grandchildren, or 
young people in their community, the author did not seek to ascribe herself a direct 
maternal role. She suggested that ‘grandmother’ was the best possible description of the 
relationship between herself and the children. In this way, the author perhaps 
broadened her role, as a figure of counsel for the children – not unlike the way Arganova, 
from the examination of Soviet generational cohorts, viewed herself in relation to the 
girls she helped into the city to learn. This grandmother-to-street-children suggested 
that the role of a grandmother, rather than a mother, enabled her to expand her 
contribution to the socialist state, as in the analogy she made to Krupskaia, she casts 
herself as a grandmother to the children, their guardian from ‘moral death’ outside the 
socialist system: 
Understand, dear Nadezhda Konstantinovna! After all, if the mother sees how the child is 
drowning, after all, it is easier for her to drown with him than to stand calmly on the beach. 
So once I saw this moral death of children, and at once I felt the strength to fight against this 
phenomenon – naturally, I strive for this work.79 
As an otherwise isolated figure in the Soviet system, the author relates herself to other 
isolated, and otherwise ostracized children in the community, as a substitute for a 
maternal role within the homestead, and as means of rooting herself to the Soviet 
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263 
 
project, and perhaps more tangibly to the community. Though the author clearly sought 
to persuade Krupskaia of the validity of this unconventional vocation, through its 
pedagogical value, it is significant that she adopted a similar motif to Pletkina and 
others, of the adoptive (grand)mother.   
 
The Substitute for the Soviet Family 
 
The socialist reconfiguration of social relations within the ‘big Soviet Family’ following 
the Revolution, though suggested to serve the emancipation of women, was clearly 
devised in masculine terms. Women remained in maternal roles during all discursive 
shifts, and little attention was paid to how their domestic roles might be shared by men 
– in this case, most painfully apparent in the examination of communal apartments. Yet, 
women continued to occupy the spaces they gained access to after the Revolution, often 
living independently, reformulating the ideal of the ‘shared apartment’, in order to 
protect the modes of living they found most suitable. Women frequently formed 
‘alternative family units’, enabled and in some ways sanctioned by state discourse, and 
where necessary, sought to employ aspects of the Soviet paternalism as a substitute for 
certain elements of everyday life.  
In a passionate account of devotion to Krupskaia written in 1928, a woman named 
Drozdova explicitly cast her role as in subordination to the paternal Soviet state, and in 
particular, to Lenin and Krupskaia as parental figures:  
I am a small cog, of poor, little, inconspicuous service, and I will never fulfill my desire, my 
dream […] Nadezhda Konstantinovna, I’m not alone – I have a five year old daughter, 
Oktiabrina, she is also childlike, she loves Lenin too and, like me, she dreams of visiting the 
mausoleum… Her father has died but she has never heard of him, does not speak of him and 
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does not visit his grave, she is drawn to Il’ich […] It’s not a matter of talk. I love you with the 
same love as my mother, and you are very like my dear mama (mamochka)80 
It is unclear what happened to Oktiabrina’s father, or what role he played in her 
mother’s life prior to her birth. However, Oktiabrina’s mother saw her role no 
differently than that of other mothers; her daughter had the paternalism of the Soviet 
state, embodied by Lenin, to substitute the upbringing her biological father might have 
offered. Women saw the state, or their peers and comrades as significant substitute for 
politically problematic family members in other aspects of their lives. Other women 
envisaged their roles as mothers as part of a ‘team’ of maternal caregivers across the 
state. One woman, named Ulygina, requested that Krupskaia ensured more coverage of 
other peasant children, in the magazine About our Children: 
The magazine ‘About our Children’ illustrates well the lives of the workers’ children, but it 
does not touch the lives of the peasants’ children. It would be interesting to know how the 
children live on the collective farms. We have only just organised ourselves in the collective 
farm and are still working on the creation of children’s rooms, which liberate the peasant 
woman and let them put all their efforts to collective farm construction […] We hope that we 
women, together, will be able to create a new life for children.81 
Ulygina’s letter echoed the calls for parity between the maternity rights of working and 
peasant women in the previous chapter, but in its relative length presents the request 
for parity in a far more harmonious light. Ulygina, as part of a newly organised collective 
farm, sought examples of those ‘like her’, to whose everyday life she and her peers 
might relate, and look to for guidance. Yet, rather than ignore the efforts at socialised 
childcare experienced by the children of workers, she sought esteem alongside them, so 
that ‘women together’ – neither specifically peasant nor working – might create a ‘new 
life’ for their children. The principle of women’s activism clearly resonated with Ulygina. 
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Writing in 1928, before the dissolution of the Zhenotdel, Ulygina’s letter displays an 
understanding of a collective gender identity as part of, rather than at odds with, the 
Soviet family – a ‘sisterhood’ in quite a different sense to that we are used to. Thus, the 
symbolic ‘family’ of the new Soviet society often inadvertently afforded women a 
blueprint, so to speak, to innovate ways of living, and forms of family life that best 
enabled them to preserve their spheres of agency – in Ulygina’s case, the ability to 
participate in labour, without being ‘confined’ to the domestic sphere; in Drozdova’s 
case, providing a father figure in her daughter’s life.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The personal lives of women were subject to escalating levels of state intervention in 
the 1920s and 1930s, yet women negotiated and often fiercely defended the social 
institutions and networks of kinship that structured their daily lives. Though policy and 
theory on the family in the 1920s and 1930s oscillated, women maintained a 
commitment to their own principles of family life, and frequently ascribed deep value to 
companionate marriage. Divorce was permissible, and women were generally 
supportive of the principles of divorce, and its necessity under different circumstances. 
However, Lenin’s concerns about promiscuity were widely shared by women, who in 
their estimations of marital infidelity, corroborated Lenin’s remarks that ‘to be sure, 
thirst has to be quenched. But would a normal person lie down in the gutter and drink 
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from a puddle?’82 The companionate aspect of romantic relationships was cherished 
over any notions of ‘free love’ that might have challenged their enduring bonds.  
Extramarital affairs, and unscrupulous alimony claims were often associated with 
notions of unfairness or dishonesty. Such threats to the relationships of our letter 
writers were often posited as selfish, or a betrayal of the collectivist character of the 
state, rather than a betrayal of the scorned partner. Frequently, risks to the stability of 
family life were framed in terms of ‘anti-Soviet elements’, a technique held in common 
with other expressions of unhappy experiences as addressed in chapter two. Despite 
their hostility towards ‘selfish’ behaviours that interrupted their daily lives, women did 
not necessarily prioritise social bonds or family structures that defied the norms 
presented in Soviet life, either in the 1920s or 1930s. Women sought to accommodate 
unconventional family relationships within Soviet discourse in the period, framing them 
as part of the ‘big’ family of the Soviet Union, as valuable contributions to the ‘new 
generation’, or as results of the collective environment. Family members were often 
adopted, and presented in letters to authorities as part of the norm. Likewise, the 
maternal role, in all its varied formulations, was fiercely defended.  
The carefully crafted narratives created by women in their letters effectively remained 
one step ahead of legislative shifts, as they employed many of the strategies of 
negotiation explored in previous chapters of this thesis to stretch and reshape the 
boundaries of Soviet social policy and discourse. Ultimately, through their efforts to 
maintain their interpersonal bonds, women demonstrated the flexibility and resilience 
of social institutions such as the family in their letters. The failure of the family to 
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‘wither away’, as Marxist and early Soviet thinkers had predicted forced Soviet policy to 
adapt to the demands of the new Soviet society. In essence, women’s descriptions of 
their social bonds and family relationships demonstrate the degree to which they 
strived to accommodate their own customs of family life, defending their core allegiance 
to its ties by cloaking discussions in appropriate discourse. 
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Conclusions 
 
A key goal of this thesis was to identify what can be learnt about the ways that different 
women in the early Soviet state understood what it meant to be a ‘New Soviet Woman’. 
The interrogation of several key research questions formed the basis of the study. What 
is significant about the language used by women in letters sent to ‘the state’? What can 
be learnt from this about how women of different ages and backgrounds understood 
their ‘emancipation’ after 1917? And how far were women able to exercise agency in the 
determination of their social roles and identities under the authoritarian conditions of 
Soviet power? By analysing the content of a broad selection of these letters, and tracing 
the evolution of the intersection between ideology and practice in women’s lives, the 
thesis has shown that women reproduced Bolshevik language, both consciously and 
unconsciously, to negotiate the terms of their ‘emancipation’ in the decades following 
Revolution. Crucially, it has demonstrated that women were able to use letters to 
accommodate their individual lives – as they actually existed, rather than as they were 
construed – within the ideological framework of the new Soviet state. In these 
concluding remarks, I will return to each line of inquiry, before outlining its significance, 
and indicating some avenues for future research. 
 
Emancipation and the Exercise of Agency. 
 
The thesis demonstrated that women of all ages and backgrounds crafted space for their 
individual lives in the discourse of the Soviet state, and constructed their social 
identities in a dynamic process of negotiation with the state. The thesis has shown that 
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women ‘appropriated’ certain aspects of discourse, such as education, the right to 
labour, and the principle of ‘equal rights’, which were used to construct a sense of social 
value, and create a more bearable existence under the constraints of authoritarian 
government. Close reading of a wide range of letters written by women from different 
backgrounds has demonstrated the extent to which popular reproductions of state 
discourse did reflect their author’s sense of the ‘limits’ of ideological acceptability. 
Moreover, the ingenuity with which women employed Bolshevik language has 
cemented the role of Soviet women as meaningful historical actors. 
Although the exercise of this agency was at times in conflict with state discourse or 
policy, it should not be confused with dissent, but understood as means of engagement 
with the Soviet utopian project upon their own terms. Women did, of course, provide 
dissenting voices at time – we need only to think back to Natalya K.’s letter, titled ‘Who 
to complain to about the police?’1- but, on balance, women’s communication with 
authorities was characterised by ambiguity and omission. Some elements of dissent 
were not incompatible with broad support, tolerance, or apathy, for other aspects of the 
Soviet experience. The ambivalence and diversity demonstrated in the letters consulted 
for the thesis has also served to highlight the diverse range of preoccupations and 
priorities held by women. 
 
Women’s Letters to the Soviet State.  
 
The thesis has shown that, as a source, letters provide a clear sense of their author’s 
understanding of the discourse in which they were expected to construct their social 
identities. Although it is necessary to account for the degree to which women’s 
                                                          
1 RGAE, f. 393, op. 56, d. 142, l. 249. 
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engagement with Soviet discourse (the process of ‘Speaking Bolshevik’) served to 
legitimise Soviet power, this does not lessen the impact of the revelations provided by 
the study of women’s letters to authority, revealing as they are of the variety of 
preoccupations that women felt they could legitimately raise. The agency they exercised 
under contradictory and oppressive political conditions remains remarkable. Built upon 
studies of the Soviet ‘self’, and studies of letters as a source, the study has examined the 
reproduction of Bolshevik language as it relates to gender and identity, to shed light on 
the way that the Soviet woman was constructed, arguing that she was actively involved 
in this process of reconstruction, through the way she spoke Bolshevik, both 
consciously and unconsciously. 
In content a number of themes were common across the writings of Soviet women. By 
virtue of the variety of personal and familial circumstances discussed in the selection of 
letters examined, the diversity, flexibility and endurance of the family unit emerged as a 
concept women were willing to vehemently defend. Women embraced the fluidity of 
family ideology in the period to accommodate their own unconventional homesteads. 
Many letters, on a range of different themes, showed the value women attached to 
literacy and education. According to the letter-writers consulted in the study, literacy, 
and more broadly education, constituted a transformative process for women from a 
variety of backgrounds, and fundamental to the process of ‘emancipation’ as women 
themselves saw it.  
Literacy and education were often central to discussions of negative emotions and 
experiences, providing women with the opportunity (discursively if not practically) to 
gain entry to the socialist happiness promised by Soviet ideology. Education was 
considered to offer the key to the acquisition of Soviet ‘rights’, through the effective 
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fulfilment of other obligations of Soviet citizenship, such as productive labour, self-
improvement, and motherhood. Education offered women opportunities to fulfil these 
obligations, through the access to labour outside the home, and the opportunities for 
socialist self-improvement it provided.  
Old and young women, from rural and urban backgrounds across the Soviet Union 
protected their roles as mothers and daughters, through the prism of the revolutionary 
socialist mother in her variety of ideological formulations in the period. However, 
although the opportunity to perform labour outside the home formed a critical 
component of women’s ‘emancipation’, both in terms of its effect upon self-esteem, and 
in terms of the practical fulfilment of the obligations upon which Soviet ‘rights’ 
depended, so too did the performance of domestic labour – in particular, the upbringing 
of that vital ‘new Soviet generation’. 
 
The Variety of ‘Soviet’ Experiences Amongst Women. 
 
As noted in the introduction to the thesis, it would have been neither desirable nor 
possible to prove the ‘existence’ of the authentic and gendered Soviet self, not least due 
to the range and variety of individuals represented by the letters found in the archives. 
However, the study has provided a valuable overview of the variety of gendered 
experiences of life in the first years of Soviet power, and the ways in which there were 
accommodated by the Soviet narrative at the behest of women themselves. The thesis 
has shed light on the extent to which women from different demographic groups were 
able to construct identities which were socially and politically ‘useful’ to them, and to 
272 
 
embrace and transform aspects of their ‘otherness’ to complement, challenge and 
endorse the regime. 
Above all, the thesis has interrogated the concept of generational cohort, both as an 
ideological tool, and a component of women’s identities, revealing how women 
reconciled the practicalities of their lives and ages with a dominant discourse which 
prioritised ‘youth’ as a central factor in the construction of Soviet society. From the 
perspective of Soviet theorists and policymakers, older women’s previous experiences 
of – and participation in – tsarist life threatened the foundations of the Revolutionary 
state, which was geared towards the elimination of the past and the construction of a 
new society free from its constraints. An emerging body of historiography on old age in 
the Soviet Union has, however, identified that the construction of age and generational 
cohort after the Revolution was as ideological as it was biological, causing a discursive 
ambivalence towards the elderly in the period. This inadvertently afforded older 
women, who were otherwise ideologically undesirable, a degree of flexibility in their 
emotional and political expression. Indeed, it is evident from their letters that, during 
the period of the study, women themselves maintained a keen awareness of the 
ideological malleability of generation in the period.  
 
Final Reflections.  
 
In the selection of letters as its major source base, the study has demonstrated the 
importance of looking across the boundaries of the traditional social categories that 
organise studies of Soviet history. Since studies have often focused on particular social 
groups, such as youth, peasant women, and working women, the thesis has expanded 
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the focus of studies of Soviet women’s lives to address similarities between different 
groups, identifying the exercise of agency in particular as an activity common to women 
of all social groups. Allowing the ‘common denominator’ of the experiences under 
examination to remain as broad as ‘women who wished to communicate, by letter, with 
Soviet authorities’ has meant that the findings of the thesis are determined by the 
subject matter women selected themselves. Although the study’s findings are 
necessarily broad, this focus has served to re-establish the focus on women’s 
engagement with Soviet ideology, and has provided several important considerations 
for future research.  
The thesis provides a fuller picture of the sense of social mobility provided by education 
at all levels, as seen through the eyes of those women who received it, showing how 
their intersectional identities framed the social inclusion and possibilities for mobility 
that resulted. For future research, an increased focus upon the various intersections of 
generation and geography would enrich the conclusions of the thesis regarding the 
value of education, providing vital new perspectives to the historiography on literacy 
and education among women in the Soviet Union. Additionally, a sustained focus upon 
the distinction of grief as a less problematic emotion for women to display as mothers, 
forms an important avenue for future research, as does the preponderance of references 
to suicide amongst the body of letters. 
Finally, the thesis has shown that, through the process of ‘Speaking Bolshevik’ directly 
to authorities, women were able to negotiate and defend their lives as they existed, 
accommodating them within the Bolshevik script. Several studies in the 
historiographical field have suggested that these processes of engagement served 
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ultimately to increase the discursive power of the Soviet regime.2 In contrast, the thesis, 
had deliberately avoided a ‘quest’ for either active dissent or support for Soviet power 
amongst women. Having allowed the letter-writers to direct the major themes of the 
study, and ‘speak for themselves’, the thesis argued that the practice of letter-writing 
was an activity which empowered women to find and reaffirm their own sense of 
agency, expressing this adeptly and creatively in a variety of ways. Though at different 
moments, women would praise or criticise aspects of the Soviet experience, rather than 
reflecting any broader sense of dissent or support for the Soviet project, their letters 
instead demonstrate the formation and empowerment of a female sense of ‘self’ in the 
USSR. 
  
  
                                                          
2 S. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilisation, (London, 1997). 
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